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Historically, educator post provisioning in South African public schools has been a 
contentious issue. Informed by the apartheid ideology, the staffing of schools was skewed 
both quantitatively and qualitatively in favour of the white population group. In contrast, 
the schools catering for the black population had to contend with high learner-educator 
ratios and poorly qualified educators. With the coming into power of the first 
democratically elected government in 1994 there was growing optimism that equity, 
redress and social justice would prevail in all spheres of society, including education. In 
the education arena there were significant attempts at addressing the inequity that 
prevailed in terms of educator distribution. 
 
This study which is grounded in the field of policy analysis, critically analyses the policy 
on educator post provisioning in public schools in KwaZulu-Natal in the post apartheid 
era. It focuses on the ideological underpinnings of policy on educator provisioning, the 
evolution of policy on educator post provisioning and the impact of policy on educator 
post provisioning from a social justice perspective. The views of the implementers of 
policy on educator post provisioning, namely, the school principals are also elicited.  
 
A combination of both the quantitative and qualitative research paradigms was employed 
in order to gather data in this study. A survey questionnaire was administered to 
principals in order to elicit their views on educator provisioning. Semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews were also conducted with principals and teacher union officials, 
respectively. An extensive study was also made of documents relating to educator post 
provisioning. The data gathered from these data sources was analyzed using critical 
theory as an over-arching analytical framework. Neoliberalism, managerialism and 
RAMs were also used as analytical tools in this study.  
 
The conclusions arrived at indicate that we are far from attaining equity in educator 
distribution. The state’s preoccupation with neoliberal ‘managerialist’ reforms in the 
education sector is in fact exacerbating inequity in educator distribution. Principals also 
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BACKGROUND AND ORIENTATION TO THIS STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1994, education in South Africa was structured along racial lines in keeping with 
the apartheid ideology of the National Party government. Separate education departments 
catered for the needs of the four principal racial groups in South Africa.  This resulted in 
the creation of nineteen education departments catering for the educational needs of 
Whites, Indians, Coloured and Africans on a separate and grossly unequal basis. This 
education system prepared learners in different ways for the positions they were expected 
to occupy in the social, economic and political life under apartheid. 
 
Apartheid education was characterized by wide-ranging imbalances and inequities. Some 
of the more notable input inequities in school-based education were the disparities in the 
per capita expenditure, the learner-educator ratios, the qualifications of educators and 
physical resource allocation (Naicker 1996:11). The Education White Paper 2  
highlighted these disparities by pointing out that the former racially and ethnically 
organized departments of education embodied substantial inequalities in per capita 
spending, the largest disparities being accounted for in the ‘skewed’ distribution of 
teacher qualifications, inappropriate linking of salary levels to qualifications, and 
disparities in learner-educator ratios (South Africa 1996b:29). Thus under apartheid, 
educator provisioning at public schools, in terms of both their quantitative and qualitative 
distribution, was a contentious issue and was one of the  major contributory factors to the 
differences in output of the public schooling system of the four race groups in the 
country.  
 
The coming into power of South Africa’s first democratically elected government in 1994 









commenced with the creation of a single national ministry of education together with 
nine provincial education departments which were to cater for the needs of the nine 
newly formed provinces (Gilmour 2001:6, Soudien 2001:34). Further, the newly elected 
government committed itself to the elimination of inequalities in the provision of 
education (Steyn 1999:67). It was the intention of the government to ensure an equitable, 
efficient, qualitatively superior and financially sound school system for all its learners. 
The Education White Paper 2, therefore, advocated that funding must ensure both equity 
and redress in funding from public (budgetary) resources, in order to achieve a fair 
distribution of public funds and the elimination of backlogs caused by past unequal 
treatment. It further alluded to prioritizing efficiency in resource allocation, utilization 
and expected outcomes (South Africa 1996b). 
 
Since the Government of National Unity (GNU) came into power in 1994, volumes of 
policy documents were produced. The majority of these policies were aimed at the 
transformation of the South African society. Some of the national policies aimed at social 
transformation were the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR). These policies set the general context for the 
development of policies that were more specific to particular sectors such as education. 
The general policy context promoted the principles of redress, equity, nation building and 
democracy (Harley, Bertram & Matson 1999:15).  
 
Historically, the learner-educator ratios favoured the White population group. African 
education was characterized by extremely high learner-educator ratios. The National 
Teacher Education Audit, commissioned by the Department of National Education 












Table 1.1:  Average learner-educator ratios by race and phase, 1994 
RACE PRIMARY SCHOOLS SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
White 23:1 16:1 
Indians 27:1 16:1 
Coloureds 27:1 20:1 
Africans 43:1 31:1 
Source: SAIRR (1996:23) 
 
The learner-educator ratios by province in 1994 further reveals the inequity that 
prevailed. 
 
Table 1.2: Average learner-educator ratios by new province and race in1994 
PROVINCE AFRICAN COLOURED INDIAN WHITE AVERAGE
Eastern Cape 45:1 25:1 23:1 19:1 41:1 
Free State 35:1 28:1 - 18:1 31:1 
Gauteng 35:1 26:1 24:1 21:1 29:1 
KwaZulu-Natal 40:1 24:1 21:1 22:1 35:1 
Mpumalanga 35:1 31:1 23:1 18:1 33:1 
Northern Cape 35:1 27:1 - 18:1 27:1 
Northern Province 38:1 30:1 22:1 19:1 37:1 
North West 35:1 31:1 22:1 19:1 33:1 
Western Cape 41:1 23:1 13:1 19:1 24:1 
Source: Gilmour (2001:7) 
 
The above tables (table1.1 and table 1.2) illustrate the inequity that prevailed in terms of 
educator distribution.  Therefore, as a matter of priority the DNE set about addressing the 









Labour Relations Council (ELRC)1. Strongly influenced by World Bank studies which 
maintained that a learner-educator ratio of 35:1 was appropriate for schools in developing 
countries, the ELRC in late 1995 passed a significant resolution setting uniform national 
learner-educator ratios of 40:1 and 35:1 in primary and secondary schools respectively.  
These norms took effect from January 1996. Further, the Education White Paper 2 
pointed out that these ratios did not stipulate exact class sizes, but instead provided 
parameters within which each provincial bargaining chamber could negotiate educator 
provisioning scales for its schools. This was seen as a major step towards equity in the 
provision of educators to all public schools in the province (South Africa 1996b:29). 
Notwithstanding these pronouncements to enable the provinces to move towards an 
equitable distribution of educators within 5 years, there were serious setbacks to this plan 
(DNE 1998:62).   
 
Given the government’s macro-economic policies which focused on financial austerity in 
terms of spending on social services such as education, serious tensions were created in 
the provinces in terms of what was affordable and what was needed in terms of educator 
provisioning. Consequently, many of the provinces as a cost saving measure did not 
increase their human resource base but instead looked at a more equitable distribution of 
the existing human resource pool. Further, with the introduction of a decentralized 
budgetary process and the delegation of educator provisioning to the provinces since 
1998, numerous problems were experienced in almost all provinces in attaining national 
guidelines in terms of learner-educator ratios. Provincial education budgets just weren’t 
large enough to employ additional educators in order to meet the dictates of national 




                                                          
1 The ELRC is a registered bargaining council for educators. It is made up of two main parties viz. the 
employer (the state) and the employee (educators, through their representatives which are registered trade 









1.2 PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to critically analyze the policy on educator post provisioning 
in ordinary public secondary schools in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
1.3 CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
This study seeks to answer the following critical questions: 
   What are the ideological underpinnings of the policy on educator post     
         provisioning? 
 What changes has policy on educator post provisioning undergone in order to 
meet the needs of schools? 
 What impact does policy on educator post provisioning have on issues of 
equity and redress?  
 What are the views of school principals with regard to policy on educator 
post provisioning and its implementation? 
 
1.4 RATIONALE FOR THIS STUDY 
Collectively, the following factors provide the rationale for this study: 
 The apartheid policies of the National Party government in education have 
resulted in an inequitable distribution of educators on racial lines to public 
schools. 
 The socio-political change that occurred in 1994 heralded the dawn of the 
pursuit of transformative policies in education. These policies were 
underpinned by values of social equity and redress. In terms of educator post 
provisioning, the goal was equity in educator distribution in public schools. 
 The implementation of policy on educator post provisioning has proved 
controversial and is fraught with problems. There are frequent reversals of 
policy decisions, postponements of implementation dates and ambiguity in 









 From the researcher’s experience as an educator and member of a school 
management team (SMT) the  following observations were noted: 
- The efforts by SMTs to ensure the delivery of quality public education as        
  well as to ensure effective and efficient schools is being seriously         
  undermined and compromised by the indecisiveness of the KwaZulu-Natal     
  Department of Education and Culture (KZN DEC) with regard to educator     
  post provisioning. 
                  - The annual announcement of the post provisioning norm for schools             
  together with the prospect of redeployment of educators declared in surplus       
  to their institutions has created tension, bitterness and conflict among       
  educators at public schools. Further, it has led to low morale and a reduction        
  in educator productivity. 
- The movement of educators whilst the academic year is in progress has                                    
   serious implications for sound school organization and administration. 
                       
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
This study is significant in that it will: 
 add to the scholarly research and literature in the field of educator post 
provisioning. 
 draw the attention of policymakers to the tension between the development of 
policy on educator post provisioning and the challenges of implementation. 
 provide information to policymakers with a view to improving policy on 
educator post provisioning. 
 sensitize both policymakers and education authorities to the views of 
principals on educator post provisioning. 
 inform education authorities of the incongruence between policy intentions of 











1.6 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM           
According to Motala and Mungadi (1999:7), the formation of post apartheid education              
policies is largely shaped by a macro-economic framework rooted in globalization. They   
contend that the quest ‘for equity, redress and social development’ as a policy vision in 
education is seriously ‘being constrained by demands for fiscal restraint and curbs in 
social spending’. 
 
Given this scenario, the problem to be studied in this envisaged research is whether 
educator provisioning in a province is ‘needs driven’ or ‘market-driven’.  In terms of 
needs, does prevailing policy ensure equity and redress in educator distribution? 
Inevitably, this raises questions about the country’s macro-economic policies and the 
ideology or set of ideologies underpinning it. 
 
1.7 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is confined to educator provisioning in the post 1994 era when a democratic 
order was installed into power in South Africa. It is specifically limited to the Province of 
KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Given the constraints of time and finance, it was not possible to focus on all school 
sectors in the Province. Hence, this study is confined to educator post provisioning in the 
ordinary public secondary school sector in the Province. Notwithstanding this limitation, 
the researcher is confident that this study has significance for the other eight provinces in 















1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
In order to facilitate understanding, broad explanations of the key terms associated with 
this study are provided. 
  
1.8.1 POST PROVISIONING MODEL (PPM)  
The PPM is a resource allocation model (RAM). Once the educator pool of a province is 
determined by the MEC for education in the province, the PPM is used to distribute that 
pool of educators to public schools. The PPM takes various factors into account which 
has a bearing on a school’s educator post provisioning needs. It is extremely technical 
and has a number of formulae built into it. It was first used as a RAM in 1999. Owing to 
growing discontent with the PPM, minor revisions were effected to it in 2002.  
 
1.8.2 POST PROVISIONING NORM (PPN)  
The outcome of the application of the PPM is the PPN. The PPN refers to the total 
number of state paid educator posts allocated to an institution regardless of their post 
level. It includes classroom-based educators (level 1) and management staff (Education 
Specialists, Deputy Principal/s and Principal). A PPN report is given annually to all 
public schools which stipulate the number of state paid level 1 and management posts the 
school is entitled to.  
 
If a school’s staff establishment is above the declared PPN for the year, then that school 
must declare those posts that are above the PPN as ‘surplus’. Educators who are deemed 
‘surplus’ are redeployed through compulsory temporary transfers (CTTs) to schools were 
vacancies exist. On the other hand, if a schools staff establishment is below the declared 
PPN for the year, then the school has vacant posts. These posts may initially be filled by 
educators who are ‘surplus’ in other schools through a compulsory temporary transfer 
(CTT) or through the appointment of a temporary educator. The vacant post can only be 










1.8.3 LEARNER-EDUCATOR RATIO  
The learner-educator ratio refers to the ratio between the total number of enrolled learners 
and the number of state paid educators in the province. It includes educators employed in 
management posts such as education specialists, deputy principals and principals. It 
indicates on average the number of learners to be taught by one educator.  
 
In practice, the learner-educator ratio is not a true reflection of class size. Class size is 
reflected by the leaner-classroom ratio. Owing to educators in management positions 
carrying lower period loads than their post level 1 counterparts, the class size is increased 
so as to accommodate the reduced period load of management members. In large 
secondary schools the class size can be as many as six to eight learners above the learner-
educator ratio. 
 
1.8.4 PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996 categorizes all schools in the country as either 
public schools or independent schools. Public schools refer to the category of schools 
which, in theory, are almost entirely funded by the state with just minor contributions by 
the users of the service. In contrast, independent schools are almost entirely funded by 
personal or private funds of individuals or organisations with the state making only minor 
contributions or no contribution at all. In South Africa, by far the vast majority of 
learners attend public schools. The independent schools are the privilege of an elite few. 
 
1.8.5 EQUITY  
Equity refers to ‘leveling the playing field’ with no group being privileged in a 
transformed system (Motala & Mungadi 1999:13). It refers to fairness and justice. Justice 
may require providing special support to those who were disadvantaged in the past. 
Equity would ensure that those who were more favoured in the past would receive less, 
while more will be given to those who were disadvantaged. Therefore, equity may mean 









1.8.6 REDRESS  
Redress refers to the correcting of past inequalities in policies and practice. In the South 
African context it refers to a commitment to shift the balance of power in favour of those 
who have been disadvantaged by apartheid. It is about correcting historical imbalances 
(Harley, Bertram & Mattson 1999:55).  
 
1.8.7 POLICY  
Some simplistic definitions of policy include ‘policy as a general expression of general 
purpose or desired state of affairs’, ‘policy as specific proposals’, ‘policy as decisions of 
government’, ‘policy as formal authorization’ and ‘policy as a programme’ (Taylor, 
Rizvi, Lingard & Henry 1997:23). Ball (1990:3), however, refers to policy as, ‘statements 
of prescriptive intent’ and ‘as operational statements of values’. Haddad (1995:18) 
defines policy as an explicit or implicit single decision or group of decisions which may 
set out directives for guiding future decisions, initiate or retard action, or guide 
implementation of previous decisions. 
 
Policies are made by, for example, national and provincial governments, municipalities 
and schools. The policies made by national and provincial governments and implemented 
through state bureaucracies (central and provincial) are usually referred to as public 
policy. Social policy, which covers aspects such as health, welfare and education, is one 
type of public policy. Thus, education policy is a part of social policy (Claassen & Van 
Wyk 1999:5). 
 
1.8.8 IDEOLOGY  
Ideology refers to a set of beliefs and values which coheres together in a more or less 
systematic way and can, therefore, be differentiated from other such sets. An ideology is 
held by a group of people, for whom it explains the nature of the reality they experience, 









defines ideology as a system of thought based on related assumptions, beliefs, and 
explanation of social movements and policies. 
 
1.9 REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
The literature that was selected for review was obtained from a comprehensive search of 
national data bases such as the NEXUS data base on current and completed research in 
South Africa and international data bases such as ERIC and EBSCO. The majority of the 
books and journal articles on the political economy, public management, policy analysis 
and educator provisioning was obtained from the libraries at the former University of 
Durban-Westville and University of Natal (Durban) and through inter-library loans. 
Further, literature on policy issues was obtained from the Education Policy Units at the 
University of Natal and Witwatersrand.  
 
In addition, literature with regard to educator post provisioning, was obtained from 
national and provincial ELRC proceedings and annual reports from the DNE and KZN 
DEC. Circulars issued by the KZN DEC were also surveyed. Memoranda, minutes of 
meetings and communiqués issued by the teacher unions and associations such as 
SADTU and APEK were also utilized as a source of information. Information was also 
obtained from educator publications such as The Educators Voice and The Teacher. The 
various newspapers available in KZN were also used as sources of information.  
Intergovernmental fiscal reports, policy documents on educator provisioning and the 
relevant legislative Acts were surveyed. 
 
1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A summary of the research methodology employed in this study is presented. 
 
1.10.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH PLAN 
In order to address the first critical question namely, what are the ideological 









following data sources: the Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) 
policy document, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the national 
Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF), ELRC deliberations (minutes and 
reports) and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Review reports. These documents were 
critically analyzed with regard to its relevance to ideology and educator post 
provisioning. 
 
The second critical question, namely, what changes has policy on educator post 
provisioning undergone in order to meet the needs of public schools?, was addressed by 
consulting the following data sources: ELRC Resolution 3 of 1996, Government 
Regulation R.593/4 of April 1998, Government Regulation R.1676 of December 1998 
and Government Notice R.1451 of November 2002. These data sources were critically 
analyzed in terms of the incremental changes that policy on educator post provisioning 
has undergone.  
 
In order to address the third and fourth critical questions, namely: 
 What impact does policy on educator post provisioning have on issues of equity 
and redress? and 
 What are the views of school principals with regard to policy on educator post 
provisioning and its implementation?   
survey questionnaires and interviews (unstructured and semi-structured) were used to 
gather data. The data obtained from the survey questionnaires were analyzed using a 
statistical package (SPSS). The interview data were subjected to content analysis by 
grouping the data into themes and categories. 
 
1.10.2 METHODOLOGY 
Based on the critical questions and the available data sources, this study employed both 
the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. The researcher saw both the 









used to provide ‘breadth’ and the qualitative data was used to provide ‘rich descriptions’ 
in support of the quantitative data. Further, by combining both methods the researcher 
was able to ensure that some form of triangulation of the data occurred which in turn 
enhanced the validity of this study. 
 
1.10.3 INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION 
A questionnaire, which was largely quantitative, was used to gather data from principals 
based at ordinary public secondary schools in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The 
questionnaire was the researcher’s primary data gathering tool. Qualitative data was also 
gathered using semi-structured as well as unstructured interviews in order to corroborate 
the data gathered from the questionnaire as well as to provide depth. The principals of 
ordinary public secondary schools were used as informants for the semi-structured 
interviews and provincial negotiators of educator unions serving on the staffing 
committee of the ELRC were used as informants for the unstructured interviews. 
 
The qualitative paradigm was also used in the study of documentary sources owing to the 
fact that the data is largely qualitative. In the study of documentary sources, the 
researcher sought primarily to describe and secondarily to critically analyze its contents. 
The study of the documentary sources was integrated into the literature review. 
 
1.10.4 SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
Being aware of the fact that it was not possible nor practical to survey the views of the 
entire population of principals in the province, the researcher opted for selecting a 
representative sample of principals. In selecting the sample, the stratified systematic 
sampling technique was used. All 306 principals who were part of the sample were 
requested to complete the survey questionnaire. 
 
In selecting the informants for the interviews, the purposeful sampling technique was 









provincial negotiators serving on the ELRC Staffing Committee were selected for the 
unstructured interviews. 
 
The documents selected for study were chosen using the purposeful sampling technique 
based on their direct or indirect relevance to educator provisioning.  
 
1.11 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This research study is divided into six chapters. 
 
CHAPTER ONE provides a general background and overview of the key aspects of this 
study. The study is introduced by pointing out the inequity that prevailed in educator 
distribution during the apartheid era and the subsequent transformative initiatives 
undertaken in the education arena since the advent of democracy in South Africa. The 
purpose of this study, the critical questions, the rationale for this study, the problem 
statement as well as the definition of key terms is then presented. A brief outline of 
methodology employed in this study brings this chapter to a close.           
 
CHAPTER TWO points out the intricacies of the policy process by showing the 
interconnectedness of all social policies and its impact on educator post provisioning. It 
commences with a discussion on the macroeconomic framework of the country by 
outlining the essence of the GEAR strategy and its impact on education. The financing of 
education in terms of overall provincial budgets as well as personnel and non-personnel 
expenditure trends is also explored. A brief outline on the policy framework for schools 
is discussed with specific emphasis on the South African Schools Act and the role of 
school governing bodies (SGBs). An account of the private financing provisions of the 
Act is then presented. A study with regard to state policies on educator provisioning is 
then explored.  









CHAPTER THREE presents the chosen theoretical frameworks and concepts. It 
commences by grounding this study in the field of policy analysis and provides a 
justification for employing critical theory as an over-arching analytical framework in this 
study. The concept of ideology is then explored with particular reference to 
neoliberalism. Linked to neoliberalism, managerialism is increasingly being adopted as a 
mode of governance in the public sector in many societies. Therefore, an account on 
managerialism and the emergence of a new institutional culture called New Public 
Management (NPM) is presented. As a consequence of managerialist approaches, the use 
of resource allocation models (RAMs) are employed to raise efficiency. An account on 
the characteristics of RAMs, the potential problem areas in the use of a RAM and the 
equity considerations in using RAMs is then presented. 
   
CHAPTER FOUR outlines the methodological approach and methods used to gather 
data. A justification for combining quantitative and qualitative methods in this study is 
presented. A description of the survey questionnaire, trialling of the questionnaire the 
sampling framework and distribution of the questionnaire is outlined. An account on the 
interviews conducted and documents studied is then presented.  
      
CHAPTER FIVE presents the data gathered in response to the critical questions. The 
questionnaire data which is largely quantitative is presented followed by the qualitative 
data obtained through interviews. An analysis and discussion of the interview and 
questionnaire data as well as the document study using the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks namely, critical theory, policy analysis, neoliberalism, managerialism and 
RAMs is then presented.  
 
CHAPTER SIX presents the main conclusions and the pertinent recommendations. 
Conclusions are drawn on the basis of the empirical findings and the relevant 











This chapter has provided an introduction and broad orientation to this study. The 
purpose of this study, critical questions, rationale for this study, statement of the problem 
and the significance of this study have been clarified. Further, key terms used in this 
study have been explained. The research methods employed in this study have also been 
described. This chapter concludes with an outline of each of the six chapters in this study. 
 










The previous chapter outlined the background and orientation to this study. This chapter 
commences with a discussion of the macroeconomic Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR). The GEAR’s impact on the budgetary process as well as 
its link to the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is highlighted. The 
financing of education in terms of overall provincial budgets as well as personnel and 
non-personnel expenditure trends is also explored. 
 
A brief outline on the policy framework for schools is discussed with specific emphasis 
on the South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996 and the role of school governing bodies 
(SGBs). An account of the private financing provisions of the Act is then presented. 
 
A study with regard to state policies on educator provisioning is then explored. The 
impact of ELRC Resolution 3 of 1996 as well as ELRC Resolution 6 of 1998 on educator 
provisioning is outlined. A discussion as well as commentary on the first nationally 
approved educator post distribution model as well as the revised post distribution model 
is presented. This chapter concludes, mainly for illustrative purposes, with an account of 
how the implementation of policy on educator post provisioning has unfolded in KZN in 
2004. 
 
2.2   THE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
In outlining the macroeconomic framework in South Africa, the essence of the GEAR, 





2.2.1 THE ESSENCE OF THE GEAR 
The GEAR represents the considered strategy of government to rejuvenate the South 
African economy within a framework of economic policies designed to provide a stable 
environment for long term growth and development. According to the document, the key 
elements of the vision of the GEAR relate to: 
• A competitive fast growing economy which seeks to create jobs for all work 
seekers. 
• The redistribution of income and opportunity in favour of the poor. 
• A society in which health, education and other services are available to all, and 
• An environment in which homes are secure and work places productive (South 
Africa. Department of Finance 1996:3). 
 
The document points out that notwithstanding the considerable progress made since the 
successful democratic transition in the country in economic development, job creation, 
which is a primary source of income redistribution, remains inadequate. It adds that the 
present growth trajectory of approximately 3% per annum: 
• Fails to reverse the unemployment crisis in the labour market. 
• Provides inadequate resources for the necessary expansion in social service 
delivery; and 
• Yields insufficient progress towards an equitable distribution of income and 
wealth (South Africa. Department of Finance 1996:1). 
Consequently, the GEAR argues that in order to attain sustained growth on a higher 
plane, transformation towards a competitive outward orientated economy is essential. The 
document claims that the GEAR strategy will attain a growth rate of 6% per annum and 
job creation of 400 000 per annum by the year 2000 (South Africa. Department of 
Finance 1996:1). 
 
Pampallis and Motala (1998:7-8) point out that the key argument of the document seems 
to be that high levels of growth are essential for the delivery of social services such as 
education and for attaining equity.  They add that the GEAR asserts the need for human 
resource development and for the effective training of managers and workers to enhance 
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productivity. In keeping with Levin’s (1998:131) postulation that education is a key 
component of a country’s ability to improve or maintain their economic welfare; the 
GEAR regards education as an important determinant of long term economic 
performance and income redistribution. The sustained improvement of the public 
education system is a high priority as is the growth in student numbers and improvements 
in mathematics and science education. 
 
According to Weber (2002:274), the GEAR plan hopes to reduce the budget deficit to 3% 
of GDP within four years and hopes to achieve this by cutting government spending 
amongst others. Therefore, careful management of the overall government wage bill is 
central to the GEAR strategy. Affordability considerations, maintenance of public 
services and macroeconomic consistency are considered paramount. Right-sizing of the 
public service is considered key to the management of the government wage bill (South 
Africa. Department of Finance 1996:8). In terms of government consumption expenditure 
the GEAR projects the following scenario: 
 
Table 2.1: Integrated scenario projections, 1996-2000 
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 AVERAGE
Real govt. consumption (% of GDP) 19.9 19.5 19.0 18.5 18.1 19.0 
Real govt. investment growth 3.4 2.7 5.4 7.5 16.7 7.1 
Source: South Africa. Department of Finance (1996:7) 
 
According to Nicolaou (2001:66), from the GEAR projections it is evident that 
government consumption expenditure is declining making it likely that allocations to 
education will continue to decline in real terms, thereby implying a decrease in the wages 
and salaries component to civil servants. Moreover, it is evident that government 
investment expenditure is expected to increase dramatically especially in year 2000 to 
more than double. Nicolaou (2001:67) adds that these projections are only possible given 
a 6% growth rate. The smaller the growth rate the more detrimental the effect on the 
government budget and its components. 
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2.2.2 THE RDP AND THE GEAR 
The RDP was drafted, in the main, by organisations associated with the Mass Democratic 
Movements (MDMs) of the country, mainly COSATU. Hence, it articulated the concerns 
of the masses and was aimed at addressing the needs of the previously disadvantaged 
people of South Africa. The RDP assigned a pivotal role to the government in that it was 
to play a leading and enabling role in guiding the economy and the market towards 
reconstruction and development. It cautioned that policies aimed purely at economic 
growth would accentuate existing inequalities and perpetuate mass poverty (Terreblanche 
2002:108). 
 
Terreblanche (2002:109) points out that the merits of the RDP were that it clearly and 
comprehensively described all the distortions and injustices that had become part of 
South African society during apartheid. More specifically for education it stressed the 
need to redress the inequalities prevalent in the education system and as such was a 
policy designed to attain equity.  
 
The GEAR on the other hand was an efficiency policy drafted by economists. In essence, 
it was a financial strategy aimed at stimulating financial growth in the country. It 
represented government’s strategy to revive the South African economy. The key 
argument of the GEAR was that high levels of economic growth are essential for the 
delivery of social services such as education and the attaining of equity (Pampallis & 
Motala 1998:7) In other words, equity would result as a spin-off from economic growth. 
 
2.2.3 THE GEAR AND ITS IMPACT ON EDUCATION          
The GEAR forecasts that it could create jobs and increase GDP by 6% per annum. Since 
the economy’s national income cannot be controlled directly by the government, the 
government budget becomes the only variable that can be controlled. According to 
Nicolaou (2001:69), if the growth rate is 3% instead of 6% then the government’s budget 
needs to decrease dramatically since less revenue has been generated. As the government 
budget declines so does state expenditure on civil service salaries, social investment etc. 
She adds that in reality the annual growth rate has been declining since 1996 with only 
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1.7% in 1997 and 0.1% in 1998. With declining growth rates, the smaller national income 
implies large decreases in government expenditure. The total education budget highlights 
this trend. Mabe (1998:12) therefore adds that the great irony is that the GEAR document 
notes that progress in education is vital for economic performance, redistribution and 
long term transformation of this country but then simultaneously calls for a cut in 
government spending on education. 
 
According to the GEAR, emphasis is placed on education reform in a context of fiscal 
constraint, a focus on decentralization, cost saving and cost recovery (through user fees) 
and a shift of financial responsibility for education from public to private sources (Vally 
& Tleane 2001:180). This, according to Nicolaou (2001:68), implies that the market 
system, through user fees, will create an unequal educational process resulting in an elite 
group of highly educated individuals who attend excellent schools on the one extreme 
and a mass of poorly educated individuals from public schools on the other. Further, as 
more services are provided privately (or not at all) the exclusion principle becomes more 
dominant. Mabe (1998:13) adds that the problem with this is that impoverished 
communities do not have the means to pay. Consequently, education may become a rare 
commodity afforded by only the rich. Learners from disadvantaged communities will not 
be able to attend better and more successful schools. Therefore, the GEAR objectives will 
in fact increase inequality between the races, gender and provinces (Nicolaou 2001:70). 
 
According to Mabe (1998:12), the GEAR shows many similarities to structural 
adjustment programmes which reversed the gains made by many African states in the 
immediate post colonial era.  Harber (1988:248), therefore, questions the extent to which 
educational policy in the new South Africa reflects the educational priorities usually 
associated with structural adjustment programmes. He adds that countries with structural 
adjustment programmes have typically undergone the following educational experiences: 
• Cuts in the education budget 
• A decline in the value of teachers salaries 
• Stagnation and reduction in teacher employment 
• A slowdown in progress towards education for all 
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• An increase in the learner-educator ratio 
• A decline in enrolment rates 
• A reduction in expenditure on teaching materials such as textbooks 
• A shift from public finance of education to private finance 
• A decline in access for the poor (Harber 1998:248). 
  
2.3 THE GEAR AND THE MEDIUM-TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK          
      (MTEF) 
The manner in which budgets are put together (centralized or decentralized) impacts on 
the autonomy of the provinces in determining their expenditure on education in general 
and educator personnel in particular. Hence, a discussion follows on the South African 
budgetary process and budgetary reform as well as a link between the GEAR and the 
MTEF. 
 
2.3.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN BUDGETARY PROCESS AND BUDGETRY   
         REFORM 
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 108 of 1996, officially adopted in 1997, 
changed the way budgets are put together in the country. The new budget process is much 
more decentralized, giving provinces a greater amount of choice in determining 
expenditures on health, education, welfare and the public service. The new budget 
process is much more complicated than the old one. In the past only one budget was 
produced for the whole country. Now, the national government and each provincial 
government must produce a separate budget – a total of ten budgets instead of one 
(Heintz 1998:5). 
 
The new thinking focuses on budgets as a tool or operational plan to achieve 
government’s stated objectives. This means that a budget should be driven at all times by 
substantive policy norms. The net result is that budgets are now viewed as vehicles to 
produce specific outputs. In South Africa, budget reform is directed by the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and the Public Finance Management Act. The MTEF is 
simply a planning tool that enables spending agencies to project the cost of existing 
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policies over the medium-term (3 years) and to plan for the incorporation of new policies 
by requesting extra money over the ceiling that rolled over from the previous year or by 
identifying potential savings (Wildeman 2001:1). Thus the introduction of MTEF in 1998  
resulted in an expansion to the budgetary process. Instead of creating only a budget for 
one year, the national government and the provinces now have to produce budgets for the 
next three years (Heintz 1998:5).     
 
The MTEF creates a mechanism for resolving the conflict between what is affordable (a 
top-down approach) and delivery needs (the bottom-up approach). This conflict is one of 
the basic tenets of economics – resources are limited but needs are not. However, it must 
be borne in mind that the final choice over resource allocation and policy remains a 
political one. The MTEF merely provides the mechanism with which policy can drive 
budgeting within the limits that the economy can afford (Walker & Mengistu 1999:27). 
 
Chabani Manganyi (2001:34) the former Director-General of Education poignantly notes 
that the MTEF had a profound impact on the department’s understanding of the education 
system as a whole. He adds that the framework and its review processes made it possible 
for the Ministry of Education to examine its policy priorities by determining the main 
expenditure drivers in the system.  
 
2.3.2 THE LINK BETWEEN GEAR AND THE MEDIUM-TERM EXPENDITURE             
         FRAMEWORK (MTEF) 
The MTEF is considered an offspring of GEAR. According to the Department of 
Finance, the purpose of the MTEF is to contribute to achieving consistency between the 
governments macroeconomic, developmental, social and other commitments. The 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy targets of GEAR were to serve as the point of departure 
for the development of strategies and objectives regarding government expenditure. Both 
the MTEF and GEAR exert similar forces on the government and education budgets. 
According to Nicolaou (2001:74), the only difference between the two is that the MTEF 
is a medium-term policy tool which through strategic planning dictates the size of state 
spending for several years.   
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The fact that budgets are predetermined for the next three years within the context of 
fiscal discipline and expenditure saving leaves very little room for flexibility and hence 
does not allow for needs driven budgetary adjustments. 
 
2.4 THE FINANCING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In the South African context, ordinary public school education is financed from two main 
sources, namely, the state and from private sources (SGBs through user fees - school 
fees, donations and fund raising activities). In terms of state financing, approximately 
90% of the education budget of a province is spent on personnel costs and approximately 
10% of the budget is spent on recurrent1 and capital costs2. The post provisioning model 
(PPM) distributes in the main the 90% of the budget allocated for personnel to public 
schools (see section 2.4.2, page 26) and the national Norms and Standards for School 
Funding (NSSF) distributes the 10% of the budget allocated for capital and recurrent 
costs to public schools (see section 2.4.3, page 27). 
 
2.4.1 PROVINCIAL BUDGETS AND EDUCATION EXPENDITURE 
In countries which consciously promote their own development, expenditure for 
education and training tends to increase.  According to Tesfaye (2002:10), in developing 
countries the large number of children who reach school age cause a considerable 
expansion of the demand for education services and a corresponding expansion of 
expenditure. He adds that owing to the increased expenditure the number of educators 
tends to increase because of the following considerations: 
• The number of hours they work tends to diminish 
• The learner-educator ratio tends to fall 
• The salaries of the educator staff tend to increase in order to attract the best 
elements to the profession. 
 
                                                 
1 Recurrent costs apply to physical supplies that are consumed in the educational process within a single 
budget year. 
2 Capital costs relate to more durable items (land, buildings, equipment) that render useful services over a 
period of years if properly maintained. 
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Developments in South African education, however, do not resonate with Tesfaye’s 
pronouncements. Table 2.2 (see below) shows that education expenditure as a percentage 
of the provincial budgets has been consistently declining. Bot (2003:25) confirms this by 
pointing out that in 2002/03 the provinces allocated on average approximately 37% of the 
budget to education as opposed to 40% in 1999. This has, consequently, had a negative 
impact on educator numbers in the system as well as the above mentioned three 
considerations identified by Tesfaye.  
  
Table 2.2: Education as a percentage of provincial expenditure. 
PROVINCE ACTUAL MTEF ESTIMATES 
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Eastern Cape 39.6 40.1 38.6 35.5 36.4 35.5 
Free State 40.2 38.6 36.2 36.4 36.3 35.9 
Gauteng  37.6 36.0 33.9 32.7 31.5 29.7 
KwaZulu-Natal 37.5 37.0 35.7 36.1 34.8 33.8 
Limpopo 44.0 42.6 40.0 39.8 38.6 36.9 
Mpumalanga 42.7 39.4 40.4 39.8 39.3 39.3 
Northern Cape 36.2 34.4 33.6 33.2 32.5 33.1 
North West 40.1 40.1 38.2 36.1 35.7 34.8 
Western Cape 34.9 34.6 32.9 31.3 30.9 29.9 
Average 39.1 38.3 36.7 35.6 35.1 34.0 
Source: South Africa. National Treasury (2003:53) 
 
According to the GEAR, roughly 20% of the budget allocated to education was too high. 
Weber (2002:287) notes that while increasing nominally, education spending has 
declined in real terms in recent years. On average the education budgets as a percentage 
of provincial expenditure has declined from 39.1% in 2000/01 to 36.7% in 2002/3. 
Moreover, in terms of the MTEF estimates, this trend is set to continue and reach 34.0% 
by 2005/06. In KwaZulu-Natal the actual percentage of the budget allocated to education 
has always been lower than the national average. From 37.5% of the budget in 2000/01, 
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expenditure on education over the MTEF is set to decline to 33.8% of the provincial 
budget in 2005/6.  
 
2.4.2 PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE 
Delivery of education is one of the most personnel-intensive public services.  Educators 
are treated as an input with a cost to the economy equivalent to the value of their salaries 
(OECD 1970:78). Given the labour intensive nature of education, it stands to reason that 
personnel costs will consume a large percentage of the education budget. According to 
Coombs & Hallak (1972:86), 60-90% of the total education costs is often accounted for 
by staff costs. Spending trends on education personnel in South Africa shows a 
progressive decline in relation to the education budget. On average the actual spending on 
education personnel declined to 86.7% of the budget in 2002/03 compared to 90.9% in 
2000/01. Bot (2003:26) notes that since 2000, personnel expenditure has gradually been 
brought under control. Bot reasons that this can be attributed in part to a reduction in the 
number of educators. Over the MTEF period the percentage spending on educational 
personnel is set to decrease even further to 82.7% of the education budget. KwaZulu-
Natal also shows a similar trend with the percentage spending on personnel declining 
consistently over the years in relation to the education budget. However, compared to the 
national average, KwaZulu-Natal expends a larger proportion of its budget on personnel. 












Table 2.3: Provincial education personnel expenditure as a percentage of the education 
budget.  
PROVINCE ACTUAL MTEF ESTIMATES 
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Eastern Cape 94.2 91.1 88.6 86.1 85.9 83.3 
Free State 90.1 88.2 86.6 84.1 81.3 80.9 
Gauteng  84.9 83.2 81.8 77.0 77.3 78.2 
KwaZulu-Natal 93.2 89.1 88.9 84.2 83.6 83.3 
Limpopo 92.2 91.8 89.7 87.0 86.4 87.3 
Mpumalanga 93.0 88.9 83.1 81.5 81.4 81.9 
Northern Cape 84.1 84.6 81.0 79.8 79.9 78.3 
North West 92.1 90.9 89.6 86.5 83.1 82.2 
Western Cape 88.7 85.7 83.8 84.3 84.7 84.4 
Average 90.9 88.6 86.7 83.7 83.1 82.7 
Source: South Africa. National Treasury (2003:57) 
 
2.4.3 NON-PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE 
The national Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF) which came into effect on 
1 April 1999, spells out how non-personnel expenditure (capital costs and recurrent costs) 
will be funded. Capital cost allocations are based on ‘need’ which is defined as: 
• Lack of schools in an area, or 
• Overcrowding of existing schools. 
Based on ‘need’, funds are allocated for the construction of new schools or additional 
classrooms (South Africa 1998e:sec. 91-95). 
 
In terms of recurrent cost allocations, funds are disbursed to schools based on a resource 
targeting list. Two equally weighted factors are used to rank schools from poor to least 
poor, namely: 
• The physical condition of the school, facilities and crowding – condition of the 
school infrastructure, learner-classroom ratio etc. 
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• The relative poverty of the community around the school (South Africa 
1998e:sec. 101). 
The rank list of schools are then divided into quintiles which determines the per learner 
allocation in terms of the resources targeting table. Provinces are not restricted to the 
grouping of schools into quintiles. The NSSF allows for further sub-divisions. KwaZulu-
Natal for example has opted for ten divisions (deciles).  
 
Apart from the distribution of recurrent costs, the resource targeting table is also ‘built 
into’ the revised post provisioning model which came into effect in January 2003 (see 
section 2.6.10.2, page 43). The resource targeting table is used as a distribution tool for 
the redress component in the revised post provisioning model. 
 
2.4.4 THE NSSF AND PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE 
Whilst the NSSF does not deal directly with personnel costs in provincial education 
departments, it does set certain policy targets for schools. It spells out the Ministry of 
Education’s personnel policy for schools which include the following key principles: 
• Schools must be supplied with an adequate number of educator and non-educator 
personnel 
• Such staff members must be equitably distributed in accordance with the 
pedagogical requirements of the schools, and 
• The costs of personnel establishments must be sustainable within provincial 
budgets (South Africa 1998e:sec. 24). 
 
The NSSF notes that personnel costs as a percentage of a provincial education 
department’s budget is approximately 90% and points out that this leaves very little in 
terms of per learner spending on non-personnel costs. According to Vally (1999:10), the 
consistent reduction in non-personnel expenditure has resulted in parents having to make 
larger financial contributions to schools.  Therefore, as a policy target, based on both 
local and international evidence, the Ministry of Education declared that personnel:non-
personnel expenditure in ordinary public schools should be of the order of 80:20. The 
personnel:non-personnel expenditure split in provincial education department’s budgets 
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has been the subject of intense scrutiny and analysis by the MTEF Education Sectoral 
Review Teams, both in 1997 and 1998. The Review Team pointed out the lack of 
capacity of provincial education departments to manage in particular, personnel 
provisioning and funding. The consequent result is that high personnel expenditure totally 
dominates education expenditure and undermines the ability to provide non-personnel 
resources (Chisholm 1998:6). Given realistic assumptions, the Review Team’s 1998 
Report pointed out that the 80:20 split advocated by the Department may take many years 
to achieve and, therefore, recommended that an 85:15 split between personnel and non-
personnel expenditure be achieved by 2005. Provinces were, therefore, directed towards 
meeting this target and their MTEF estimates had to reflect a commitment towards 
attaining this target (South Africa 1998e:sec. 25-28, DNE 2000:124). 
 
2.4.5   COMMENTARY ON THE NSSF 
In terms of equity and redress, the NSSF acknowledges that existing funding provisions 
which allow SGBs to improve the quality of education by raising funds for additional 
resources have mainly advantaged middle class learners in already well-resourced 
schools. Consequently, the NSSF has been welcomed owing to the fact that recurrent cost 
allocations will be addressed through schools being targeted for resources on the basis of 
need (Motala 1998:7). 
 
Motala (1998:8) observes that for the first time school funding and poverty are related 
both in terms of the paucity of school resources and the socio-economic status of the 
community in which the school is located. It aims to improve the quality of education by 
not only redistributing resources, but also redistributing the conditions of learning so as to 
increase the possibility of attaining ‘cognitive equity’ amongst all learners in South 
Africa. 
 
The success of the policy intentions of the NSSF, however, rests on finance. Given the 
need for fiscal austerity imposed by the GEAR no new funds were going to enter the 
system. Provinces were to reduce personnel costs in order to finance greater budgetary 
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allocation for recurrent and capital costs. How personnel costs are going to be reduced 
without widespread retrenchments is unclear.  
 
NUPSAW (2002b:7) notes that the manner in which schools were classified into the 
relevant quintiles/deciles was rather unscientific. No in loco inspection was done of 
schools in order to establish the poverty levels of the school community or the school 
infrastructure. The basis of the classification was the School Register of Needs compiled 
in 1996. They note from a survey conducted that some farm schools were placed in 
quintile 4 alongside some advantaged schools. They add that some dubious criteria were 
used in the classification of schools such as tiled roofing of the homes surrounding 
schools in certain areas and the number of parents that had cars in a particular area. They 
reasoned that the placement of schools in a particular quintile was dictated by economics: 
the fewer the schools in quintiles 1, 2 or 3 (the poorest), the less money the education 
department would have to disburse (NUPSAW 2002b:8).  
 
According to Rademeyer (2004:1), Professor H. Davies of the South African Foundation 
for Education and Training argues that the financing of schools based on their location 
and condition of their buildings is no longer a reliable indicator. He stated that the 
government’s model for allocating funds did not take into account the demographic 
changes to schools since 1994. Therefore, Davies together with the Federation of School 
Governing Bodies called for individual learners rather than the school as an institution to 
be funded. 
 
2.5 THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Since the installation of a democratic order in South Africa in 1994, the education system 
has experienced numerous policy changes. The focus and content of these changes have 
varied over time and among different organs of the educational system. Yet almost all 
have been overtly driven by principles of equity and redress. Motala and Mungadi 
(1999:9) also note the impact of global influences on educational reform in South Africa, 
such as the trend in many developing countries to less directly interventionist state 
policies which emphasize education growth in a context of fiscal restraint, a focus on 
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decentralization and cost saving, a re-emergence of human capital approaches to 
economic growth, a shift of financial responsibility for education from public to private 
resources and a growth in the notion of partnerships and volunteerism. The policy 
framework for schools, however, was only established in 1996 with the promulgation of 
the South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996. 
 
2.5.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS ACT   
The enactment of the South African Schools Act heralded a major change in the landscape 
of school governance in South Africa. Sweeping away the many and varied school 
categories from the former departments, the South African Schools Act provided for only 
two types of schools, namely public and independent schools. At the core of the South 
African Schools Act was the provision for the establishment of statutory School 
Governing Bodies (SGBs) entrusted with the task of school governance (South Africa 
1996c:sec.16). The SGBs were to comprise the principal (ex officio), elected 
representatives of parents, educators and non-teaching staff and, in secondary schools, 
learner representatives. The Act further decreed that the number of parent members must 
comprise one more than the combined total of other members (South Africa 
1996c:sec.23). This, according to Fleisch (2002:77), stacked the voting power in favour 
of the parents.  
 
SGBs were granted considerable powers to manage their own affairs. However, what was 
abundantly clear in the South African Schools Act was the intention of the state to 
decentralize school governance. This intention was clearly articulated in the Draft White 
Paper on Education and Training in South Africa: ‘the Ministry of Education believes 
strongly that schools must be owned by the communities they serve’ and ‘schools must 
increasingly come to manage themselves’ (South Africa 1994:50). Steyn and Squelch 
(1997:1) note that in recent decades there has been a growing trend towards 
decentralizing the way schools are managed, with calls for more autonomy at the school 
site. This is in keeping with school governance trends internationally. Levin (1998:132) 
points out that many countries have taken steps to move more authority to individual 
schools and to strengthen the role of parents in governing schools. Therefore, Steyn and 
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Squelch (1997:1) add that in terms of the changes taking place in South Africa as a whole 
and in education in particular, more emphasis is now being placed on decentralized 
management. A new concept has thus gained currency in the governance of schools in 
South Africa – that of self-managing schools. 
 
2.5.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS ACT AND PRIVATE FUNDING 
An area of serious concern arose in the area of funding in the South African Schools Act. 
As Fleisch (2002:78) notes: ‘for its critics, the core of the South African Schools Act was 
the radical financial provision’. Given the economic policies of the state, it was unwilling 
to commit huge additional funds to education. Consequently, the only option was to 
allow parents to supplement the state’s contribution. Weber (2002:285) agrees with 
Fleisch by stating that in line with the GEAR market forces will determine the provision 
of education. On the advice of international school finance consultants working for the 
DNE it was recommended that SGBs be given the right to set and compel (even by 
processes of law) the collection of school fees based on the consent of the majority of 
parents in each school. This provision has created a situation where wealthy parents are 
able to provide better resources for the schools their children attend. Consequently, 
Weber (2002:285) notes that the quality of a good education is correlative to the price 
that is paid. Education is thus, fundamentally, reduced to a commodity. Fleisch 
(2002:80), however, notes quite alarmingly that the notion that most parents would be 
expected to pay something for their children’s schooling, in some cases a substantial 
portion of their disposable income, surprisingly with very little opposition became part of 
the South African Schools Act.  
 
Critics have pointed out that the inevitable consequence of a differentiated school fee 
structure would mean that some schools could peg school fees at a high level, while poor 
and working class communities could feasibly expect to levy only extremely modest fees. 
This would inevitably lead to the continuation of uneven per capita expenditure. They 
also point out that this was a departure from the ANC education manifesto that was 
interpreted by many to mean free education for all (Fleisch 2002:79). Weber (2002:285) 
adds that a likely outcome is that, in the long run, there will be systematic inequality 
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between a small number of rich schools for whites and middle class blacks and a majority 
of poorly resourced schools catering mainly for blacks. He adds that in China the 
devolution of central funding to local levels, as a part of decentralization of education, 
has widened disparities between rich and poor regions. Class differences have similarly 
widened in Russia, Australia and New Zealand. 
 
According to the DNE’s review on public school finance, schools raise an estimated 
R3.5bn to R5bn a year from fees and other sources, which represents 8-12% of the cost of 
public schooling (DNE 2003). Bot (2003:34) notes that although schools in poor 
communities charge relatively low fees, many parents cannot afford these. Therefore, she 
adds that it is not surprising that since the imposition of school fees, the issue has been 
contested because it imposes an additional burden on poor parents and contradicts the 
right to free, compulsory education. The former national Minister of Education, Professor 
Kader Asmal has agreed that the payment of school fees remained one of the obstacles 
hindering universal access to education, but emphasized that fees were necessary as 
government did not have sufficient resources (Bot 2003:34). 
 
Soudien, Jacklin and Hoadley (2001:81) point out that within the context of resource 
efficiency as a discourse in South African education, baseline levels of provision of 
personnel, equipment and materials are assumed to exist in terms of which learning and 
teaching are presumed to be possible. Beyond these baselines, communities and 
individuals have the right to exercise their individual tastes by resourcing schools above 
the baseline provision by the state through user fees. Through granting schools the right 
to set user fees, Soudien, Jacklin and Hoadley (2001:82) argue that the state is instituting 
financing practices which embody the principles of consumer choice. This, they add has 
the effect of locating individual schools within a market which differentiates schools 
according to the degree to which a particular parent body is able to supplement public 
provision with additional private funding. TLSA (1999b:2) notes that the education 
policy strategies of the state are promoting privatization, in that, to an ever increasing 
extent the funding of schools is being shifted onto parents and other stakeholders as part 
of a general process of the privatization of all aspects of life in South Africa. 
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In terms of educator provisioning, the Education Laws Amendment Act, 100 of 1997, 
which amended the South African Schools Act, made provision for schools to appoint 
educator staff in addition to those employed and paid for by the state. The appointment of 
such staff, the Act deemed, would be the responsibility of the SGB and would be paid for 
out of school funds raised by parents (SAIRR 2000:176). Consequently, the NUPSAW 
(2002a:2) notes that schools located in advantaged communities, which have the financial 
means, can employ the extra teachers they need. The TLSA (1999a:12) notes that at 
many schools there was acrimonious debate when SGBs were forced to create ‘SGB 
posts’. Since the educators paid by the education department were insufficient to meet the 
needs of schools, SGB’s had to find the money to employ the necessary educators. These 
SGBs, however, were accused of being agents of privatization. The accusation was that in 
using school funds to pay for additional educators, SGBs were implicitly condoning the 
states abdicating its responsibility to pay all the educators a school needs. However, when 
some SGB’s refused to employ additional educators, they were accused of playing 
politics while children’s education suffered. 
 
SGBs are increasingly being called upon to hire additional educators owing to the decline 
in the number of state paid posts allocated to a school. Motala (2002:11) has noted that 
nationally, the number of state paid educators decreased from 97.1% in 1996 to 91.8% in 
2000 and educators paid by school governing bodies increased from 2.9% in 1996 to 
8.2% in 2000. Given the high learner-educator ratios prevalent in KZN (see section 
2.6.11, page 61), Ramrathan (2002:40) notes that schools are being forced to employ 
educators through their school budgets to support the number of learners in their schools. 
He further notes that employment trends suggest that there will continue to be an increase 
in demand for privately paid educators as this market begins to increase.  
 
A research study conducted in the Western Cape has shown that schools that can afford 
to appoint or keep additional educator staff perform better in key subjects such as 
mathematics. On the other hand, schools that charged school fees of between R0 – R 200, 
had very few learners taking subjects such as mathematics (Rademeyer 2004). 
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2.6 DEVELOPMENTS WITH REGARD TO EDUCATOR PROVISIONING  
According to House (2000:13) no government in liberal democracies can survive without 
economic expansion. However, the concern for economic growth is manifested in a drive 
for greater efficiency and this has special implications for education. In most countries 
educational policies appear to be formulated primarily with regard to the national 
economy and without sufficient regard for educational practice. Government budgets, 
therefore, constrain educational spending and hence educational policies are frequently 
formulated to reduce costs and increase the productivity of schools (House 2000:14). 
 
The impact of economic concerns on education manifests itself in what Lam (2001: 347) 
terms ‘finance-driven’ reform and is characterized by the following: 
• Shifting public funding from higher to lower levels of education thereby giving 
more students greater educational opportunity. 
• Increases in school fees to bridge the gap between the actual cost and subsidies. 
• Reducing school expenditure by holding down salary bills and increasing class 
sizes. 
In the South African context, however, ‘finance-driven’ reform, through the neoliberal 
GEAR macroeconomic policy has, however, been coupled with ‘equity-driven’ reform. 
The ‘equity-driven’ reform aims at providing basic education and greater educational 
opportunities to the disadvantaged populations through the redistribution of resources 
within the educational system.  
 
Given the inequity that prevailed on racial lines in the distribution of educator posts, the 
major task that faced the new government was that of ensuring a fair and equitable 
distribution of educator posts. However, the need for fiscal austerity meant that equity 
was to be regulated using policy mechanisms for redistributing the existing pool of 
educator posts both between and within provinces. The idea was that all schools would be 
subject to a uniform set of learner-educator ratios, the result of which would be that most 
advantaged schools (formerly White, Indian and Coloured schools) would lose educator 
posts, and many disadvantaged schools (formerly African schools) would gain educator 
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posts. For the system as a whole, however, the total pool of educators would remain the 
same (Fleisch 2002:42). 
 
2.6.1   RESOLUTION 3 of 1996 
After protracted negotiations between educator unions and the state at the national ELRC, 
Resolution 3 of 1996 was adopted. Resolution 3 of 1996 provided for the right-sizing of 
the educator corps and spelt out a programme by which posts at education institutions 
will be redistributed to give effect to the policy of equity in educator post provisioning. 
According to Resolution 3 of 1996: 
              The phasing in of equity in the funding of education between provincial 
              education departments will result in the provision of educator personnel 
              increasing in some departments and decreasing in others. However, it is 
              not envisaged, that the total educator personnel provision in the country  
              will be reduced. In order to manage the process of attaining equity,  
              excess educators in education departments or components thereof will be  
              redeployed (ELRC 1996: sec. 1.3). 
 
It was pointed out that right-sizing of the educator force must be seen as a process and 
not a single event. Therefore, agreements in the national ELRC identified April 2000 as 
the date by which equity must be achieved. Notwithstanding national time frames for the 
achievement of equity with regard to educator distribution, the provincial ELRC of KZN 
was of the view that equity should be achieved as soon as possible and a time span of 
initially two years which was later readjusted to two and a half years was agreed to in its 
management plan. Thus, KZN envisaged achieving equity in the distribution of educator 
posts by April 1999 (ELRC 1996: sec. 1.2; KZN DEC 1996: D 2.2 – 2.3). 
 
2.6.1.1 DETERMININATION OF STAFFING NORMS 
Given the ANC government’s stance that education expenditure, as a percentage of the 
overall budget would not increase because of the assumption that government 
expenditure on education was already high (24% of expenditure and over 4% of GNP), 
financial modeling revealed that the country could not afford learner-educator ratios 
below 35:1 (Fleisch 2002:46-47). Given this scenario, nationally, ratios of 35:1 were 
adopted for secondary schools and 40:1 for primary schools. It was also stated that these 
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ratios would also be applicable for the 1997 school year but added that the ratios may be 
amended in the light of research to be conducted into, inter alia, the workload of 
educators and the functions of Deputy Principals and Heads of Departments (ELRC 
1996:1.4; KZN DEC 1996: D2.4-.7; DNE 1996:56). 
 
In order to distribute educator posts to schools on an equitable basis, a staffing norm (a 
formula by which posts are allocated to schools) developed by the KZN DEC was used. 
The norm was to be an interim staffing norm. It took no account of the different post 
levels, for example Heads of Departments, Deputy Principals and Principals. It only 
stipulated the total number of educator posts a school qualified for including management 
personnel. The formula basically had four components, as follows: 
• a basic allocation based on the number of learners and an optimal class size for 
each phase. 
• a non-contact allocation to enable educators to have non-contact, or non-teaching 
time. 
• a management allocation to allow for the management of the school. 
• an additional allocation for schools offering certain technical or agricultural 
subjects and music (as an examination subject)  (KZN DEC 1996:F2).                                                
 
Based on the above, an interim staffing norm for schools was determined and schools 
were categorized within the framework of agreements and procedures into three different 
categories: 
• schools which are less favourably staffed than the agreed norms of 40:1 and 35:1 
• schools which are more favourably staffed than the agreed norms of 40:1 and 
35:1, but less favourably staffed than the interim staffing norm; and  
• schools which are more favourably staffed than the interim staffing norm. 
 
A three step process was then planned to attain equity. The first step which was to have 
been completed at the beginning of 1997, involved the shedding of posts at schools which 
were more favourably staffed than the interim staffing norm and the redistribution of 
these  posts to schools that were less favourably staffed. After completion of step one it 
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was envisaged that there would be just two categories of schools, namely, schools that are 
less favourably staffed than the agreed norms of 40:1 and 35:1 and schools which are 
more favourably staffed than these norms. Step two entailed the shedding of posts from 
the more favourably staffed schools to the less favourably staffed schools. By April 1998, 
it was envisaged that a final staffing norm will be introduced and the final step, step 
three, will be set in motion. Step three was a move to finally bring all schools to equitable 
staffing, except where the staffing norm differentiates on the basis of, for example, the 
inclusion of technical subjects (KZN DEC 1996:D). 
 
2.6.1.2 IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION 3 of 1996 
Resolution 3 of 1996 had the backing of the educator unions and the unions committed 
themselves to supporting the actual process of right-sizing in schools. Within the 
education departments, however, Fleisch (2002:48) notes that there were two competing 
conceptions of school right-sizing. For the old guard, right-sizing was simply a technical 
activity in which schools would adjust their educator establishments to comply with the 
new formula. The activist-bureaucrats, in contrast, viewed the right-sizing process as a 
political instrument of deracialisation and redress. These managers saw school right-
sizing as opening the way for white educators to move into historically black schools. It 
was part of the greater project of social transformation. 
 
In practice, the right-sizing process only commenced late in 1996 (Steyn 1999:68). 
However, early in 1997 it was realized by the national and provincial education 
departments that the process of right-sizing of educators had not progressed according to 
plan and had not had the desired effect. Steyn (1999:69) advances the following reasons 
for this: 
• The incapacity of most provincial education departments to manage this very 
complicated process efficiently. 
• The lack of co-operation and co-ordination between the provincial education 
departments to redeploy educators across the provincial borders. 
• The redeployment scheme proceeded from the assumption that educators could 
simply be moved from one part of the system to another. They did not bank on the 
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reluctance of educators to be redeployed. In some cases, for a variety of good 
reasons, redeployment of specific educators was impossible or very problematic. 
Although some 24 000 redeployment opportunities had been gazetted nationally, 
Duncan Hindle, the then Director of Human Resources in the National 
Department of Education, said that only 5 000 educators had been redeployed 
(SAIRR 1998:156).  
• The fierce opposition to the process by educator organizations despite earlier 
commitment to the process. Motala (1996:9) notes that some of the signatories to 
the agreement, especially NAPTOSA, have come out to criticize plans to 
redistribute educators. 
• The unexpectedly high numbers of educators in all provinces who applied for the 
voluntary severance packages (VSP’s). This was most likely because many 
educators felt insecure about a future in teaching. According to SAIRR 
(1998:157), in KZN, 3 200 educators applied for the VSP and 3 100 applications 
were granted. Nationally, by April 1997, more than 19 000 educators applied for 
the VSP, and close to 16 000 packages were granted (SAIRR 1998:156). In 
August 1997 a provincial review report found that most provincial education 
departments had drained themselves of vital skills and expertise by the granting of 
VSP’s (SAIRR 1998:157). 
• Decisions made by some provincial education departments (e.g. KZN) to 
accelerate the process to reach the national learner-educator ratio goals well 
before the year 2000 (see section 2.6.1, page 36). 
 
Owing to budgetary constraints, several provinces announced in November 1997 that the 
services of temporary educators would be suspended in 1998 (DNE 1998:63). The 
SADTU estimated that some 48 000 educators would be effected by this suspension, 
many of whom had been in the employ of the state for several years. Thulas Nxesi, the 
SADTU General Secretary, claimed that the state was now prepared to abolish educator 
posts rather than transfer them to areas of need. This, he added, amounted to downsizing 
in education rather than rightsizing. He, therefore, reasoned that rightsizing was no longer 
on the state’s agenda, but education cutbacks were (Geyer & Skinner 1998:3). The 
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NAPTOSA declared that provinces were in reality not overspending on education. The 
NAPTOSA argued that the problem was that the provinces were provided with totally 
inadequate funding to meet their educator needs. Duncan Hindle, however, maintained 
that temporary educators had fixed term contracts and provinces were simply honouring 
those contracts by allowing them to expire (SAIRR 1998:158).  
 
2.6.1.3 TERMINATION OF THE NATIONALLY DRIVEN RIGHTSIZING 
PROCESS 
Given the failure in the implementation of the rightsizing process, the then National 
Minister of Education, Professor Sibusiso Bengu announced in December 1997 that the 
department had abolished national guidelines on learner-educator ratios as well as the 
educator rightsizing programme. Provinces would, henceforth, decide how many 
educators they could afford to employ and then set their own learner-educator ratios 
based on their individual budgets. Professor Bengu added that these measures were 
necessary as the Minister of National Education no longer had a say in the provincial 
education budget allocations owing to changes in the budgetary process and current 
measures for educator provisioning do not necessarily harmonize with the new budgetary 
measures (SAIRR 1998:159; DNE 1998:62-3). 
 
2.6.1.4 RESOLUTION 3 OF 1996 AND RIGHTSIZING 
The Department of National Education noted that the rightsizing process had a valid 
principle: the attainment of equity in the distribution of human resources to schools. As 
the major resource input to schools, the rightsizing process was viewed as a significant 
step towards greater equity in education (DNE 2000:44). However, the government 
conceded that its policies had failed. Cost cutting had become more important than 
promoting equity. Weber (2002:289) notes that what started off as redeployment and 
redistribution of educators, ended up as retrenchment when thousands of educators left 
the system. Weber adds that the rightsizing of educators between 1996 and 1998 failed to 
equalize learner-educator ratios or to cut costs.  
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Motala and Pampallis (2001:5) note that whereas provinces recognized the importance of 
the redeployment of educators to disadvantaged school communities, the process of 
implementing such redeployment policies was overtaken by the need to rationalize 
aggregate numbers of educator personnel in the system as a whole. They add that this was 
done largely, if not entirely, in response to the demands of the states fiscal policies. 
 
Fleisch (2002:59) contends that the rightsizing process failed dismally in its attempt to 
produce a leaner, more efficient and productive public service. Based on information 
from a senior department official, he claims that rightsizing failed because of poor 
planning. In Fleisch’s view, the architects of the plan did not have reliable information on 
medium-term educator demand and supply, overestimated provinces’ capacity to 
undertake large and complex processes less than one year after their establishment and 
failed to anticipate educator reactions (Fleisch 20002:60). 
 
Minister Kader Asmal, in acknowledging expectations of educators of stability and job 
security, noted the ‘unwished-for side-effects’ of the rightsizing process by declaring that 
many educators have been demoralized by the uncertainty and distress of rationalization 
and redeployment (DNE 2000:41). Further, Gilmour (2001:13) adds that the process of 
rightsizing has divided schools, generated learner protests, continues to create a political 
furore, and places intolerable pressure on principals who have to oversee the process. 
Soudien (2001:38) notes that at schools affected by the rightsizing process, educators in 
unison speak of increased incidences of stress from having to deal with increased learner 
numbers, overcrowded classrooms and larger teaching and marking loads.  
 
With the large number of educators having taken the voluntary severance packages 
(VSPs), there was a stripping of expertise from the system, both at the managerial level 
and at the level of classroom specialization. This was largely because there was no 
restriction on the eligibility of those who may wish to leave. Further, the granting of 
VSPs came at a huge financial cost to the provincial education departments and many 
provinces were plunged into financial crises due to the granting of VSPs. In order to 
‘balance the books’ the reaction of most of the provinces was to cut non-teaching 
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professional services (such as counselling and special education) and reduce expenditure 
on non-personnel items (Gilmour 2001:13). 
 
2.6.2 SHOWDOWN BETWEEN EDUCATOR UNIONS AND THE STATE WITH  
REGARD TO EDUCATOR PROVISIONING 
In KZN, in order to keep within the allocated budget for personnel expenditure, the KZN 
DEC issued Circular HRM 1 of 1998 which stated that the services of temporary 
educators occupying substantive posts will be terminated at the end of February (KZN 
DEC 1998a:1). In a subsequent Circular, HRM 4 of 1998, the department explained its 
stance on the non-renewal of contracts of temporary educators. It advanced that it ‘was 
constrained to adopt certain austerity measures as a result of the severe cut-backs in its 
budget’ (KZN DEC 1998b:1).  
 
In March 1998, KZN dismissed all temporary educators (7 000 educators). The SADTU 
accused the KZN department of education of being inconsistent in the selection of 
educators for dismissal and not acting in the spirit of national ELRC agreements which 
stipulated that only educators employed after July 1996 would be considered temporary. 
Instead, the department dismissed educators employed before this date. The department 
then planned on selectively re-employing certain temporary educators based on 
curriculum needs in the schools. The Provincial Secretary of SADTU KZN, Ndaba 
Gcwabaza, declared that the re-appointment process was chaotic with some temporary 
educators being re-employed on a month to month contract basis whilst other educators 
were given contracts until the end of December 1998. Moreover, he added that 
Superintendents of Education Management (SEMs) were moving into schools and 
shifting educators around wily-nily. In some instances SEMs shifted educators to schools 
with full staff complements and ignored understaffed schools (The Educators Voice 
1998b:14). 
 
In the absence of nationally agreed norms and standards on educator provisioning, the 
SADTU argued that no rationalization or retrenchment should be taking place. The 
effects of the retrenchment of the temporary educators on the school system in KZN was 
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pointed out, namely, large class sizes due to the compression of classes and permanent 
educators taking on the additional workloads of the retrenched temporary educators 
(Naidoo 1998:5). The SADTU then tabled a proposal at national ELRC which included 
the following: 
• A rejection of retrenchments of temporary educators and called for redeployment. 
• A call for national norms and standards for post provisioning, arguing that 
provinces should not be given the power to decide these ratios. 
• An indication that provinces did not have the capacity to deal with increased 
budget control. 
• A statement that equity and redress would not be achieved if this was made 
dependent on each provincial department’s budget (Geyer 1998:2). 
The state’s failure to respond to these proposals led the SADTU to declare a formal 
dispute with the state at national ELRC. Notwithstanding the SADTU’s proposal and 
dispute with the state, the National Minister of Education, Professor Bengu, went ahead 
and published regulations supporting the states proposals on educator provisioning 
(Geyer 1998:2). 
 
The National Minister of Education noted that in terms of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996, provincial legislatures are empowered to 
determine the funding of a provincial education department and the Labour Relations 
Act, 66 of 1995, provided for rationalization linked to operational requirements. The 
Minister, therefore, promulgated legislation (Government Regulation 593 and 594 of 
1998) declaring that the following regulations will apply in respect of future post 
provisioning and rationalization processes: 
• A Member of the Executive Council (MEC) must, after the provincial department 
of education’s budgetary allocation has been approved, and after the department 
has determined what proportion of the budgetary allocation should be allocated 
for the creation of educator posts in that province, determine the total educator 
establishment of such a department. 
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• The head of a provincial education department must allocate from the provincial 
pool of educators, educator posts to educational institutions and departmental 
offices, taking into account guidelines determined by the National Minister. 
• In the event of a change in the number of posts created in a department or 
allocated to an educational institution or departmental office, the position of 
educators affected by such change must be dealt with in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (South Africa 1998b; South Africa 1998c). 
 
These regulations meant that the provincial education budgets would form the basis for 
determining the provincial pool of educators. Further, the regulations would also devolve 
post provisioning norms to provinces. By divesting itself of the responsibility for 
determining national norms for educator provisioning, the National Department would 
force unions to negotiate with provinces individually. From the unions’ point of view the 
prospect of negotiating nine separate agreements was problematic, opening up the 
potential of splitting the organization in nine parts, thereby diluting the strength of the 
union (Fleisch 2002:57). 
 
The new regulations led to a showdown between the National Minister of Education and 
educator unions. The SADTU was of the view that devolving powers to the provinces 
would fragment education and create nine different departments with different 
transformation agendas (Geyer & Skinner 1998:3). The matter eventually went to 
mediation. Given the tremendous pressure that was brought to bear on the state, the state 
at national ELRC was forced into an agreement with educator unions which included the 
following: 
• The national minister will determine national norms and standards for educator 
post provisioning by endorsing this policy in the National Education Policy Act. 
• The minister will enter into consultation with educator unions in the ELRC with a 
view to reaching an agreement on policy before it is determined. 
• Temporary teacher contracts be extended until teachers can be redeployed. 
• The withdrawal of Regulations 593 and 594 as well as the opening of negotiations 
on new regulations to replace Regulations 593 and 594 (Geyer 1998:2). 
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The agreement between the state and teacher unions culminated in the signing of ELRC 
Resolution 6 of 1998. 
 
Fleisch (2002:57) points out that the unions had won a key victory, although they 
conceded some points. Whilst the condition that the provinces could determine the size of 
their educator post pool based on their budgets, the minister would set national learner- 
educator ratio targets. 
 
At national ELRC, provinces were required to make submissions as to what learner 
educator ratios they could afford. Based on these ratios, the state set national norms and 
standards at a ceiling of 39:1 and a target of 37:1. Duncan Hindle (Grey 1998:2), Chief 
Director of Education Human Resources, argued that this was ‘an extremely favourable 
ratio’, representing ‘an abstract ceiling’ above which no province is allowed to go. He 
pointed out that many provinces had proposed ratios that were substantially below this 
ceiling. The only province to come in close to the ceiling of 39:1 was KZN. Hindle 
pointed out that the national average ratio was a manageable 35:1. The unions were far 
from happy with these norms. Their dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that these 
norms do not represent actual class size. Edwin Pillay, Deputy President of SADTU 
added that class sizes may be as large as 55:1. The SADTU remained steadfast in its 
position that the national norm should be 32:1, and believed that the state’s proposal 
threatened the job security of educators and created the platform for retrenchments. The 
union vowed to continue to consult at a political level with regards to national norms and 
standards in order to influence policy (The Educators Voice 1998a:2; Grey 1998:3).  
 
The DNE acknowledged in its Annual Report of 1998 that educator post provisioning was 
indeed a contentious issue and consequently it was seeking solutions to the problem. 
They added that the department had engaged in a study of ‘appropriate proportions’ of 
resource inputs to education. Through an extensive process of consultation, research and 
piloting, the Department announced that it had developed a policy driven model for the 
distribution of educator posts. This model, the department claimed, allowed for educators 
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to be provided according to the complex curricular needs of each school. The model, it 
claims, was tested in all provinces and was to be implemented in 1999 (DNE 1998:68).  
 
2.6.3 PERSONNEL COSTS 
The Education Sectoral MTEF Review Team had identified a major problem with 
educator personnel costs which had risen dramatically since 1995/96. A new process had 
to address the question of equity in the distribution of educators as well as responding to 
the financial pressure on provincial personnel and non-personnel budgets. The Minister 
was, therefore, obliged to issue a new set of regulations, which gave MEC’s the 
responsibility for determining educator establishments within their budgetary allocations. 
Budgetary allocations for personnel, however, had to be scaled down. The 1998 MTEF 
Review set a target of 85:15 split on personnel: non-personnel costs in order to permit an 
increase in funding on learner resource materials, educator development and other 
qualitative inputs (DNE 2000:124). 
 
2.6.4 THE EMPLOYMENT OF EDUCATORS ACT, 76 OF 1998 AND EDUCATOR 
POST PROVISIONING 
The Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998 had a significant bearing on educator post 
provisioning. In terms of section 3(3b) it was now legislated that for the purposes of 
creating posts, the MEC in charge of education in a province was deemed to be the 
employer of educators in service in that province. Further, in terms of determining 
educator establishments, the Act stipulated the following: 
• The MEC for education shall determine the educator establishment of a provincial 
education department. 
• The Head of Department of education in a province shall subject to prescribed 
post provisioning norms allocate posts to schools (South Africa 1998a:sec. 5). 
 
2.6.5 THE CREATION OF EDUCATOR POSTS AND THE NEW POST 
DISTRIBUTION MODEL 
In keeping with provisions of the Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998, the Minister 
of Education introduced measures in terms of Government Regulation No. R.1676 for the 
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creation of educator posts in a provincial department of education as well as the 
distribution of such posts to schools. 
 
The Regulation was quite explicit on aspects of educator post provisioning and contained 
the following important provisions: 
• In determining the post establishment of a provincial education department, the 
MEC must consult with trade unions in that province which are members of the 
ELRC and governing body organizations which are active in that province. 
• In the creation of posts, the MEC must take into account the budget of the 
provincial education department; the effect the post establishment will have on 
the employment security of educators; the need for redress in the implementation 
and promotion of curriculum policy; the fact that the division between 
expenditure between personnel and non-personnel costs in the budget should be 
educationally and financially justifiable and in accordance with national policy. 
• In determining the educator post establishment, the MEC must take into account 
the terms and conditions of employment of educators that may be affected by the 
post establishment, including provisions for leave, substitution and remuneration 
related issues (South Africa 1998d:1a-d). 
 
The Regulation also spelt out the post distribution model (a resource allocation model) to 
be used in determining educator posts at schools. An important factor to be taken into 
account in the distribution of educator posts was the need for redress in the 
implementation and promotion of curriculum policy. The head of a provincial education 
department was tasked with the responsibility to determine an annual programme in this 
regard after consultation with trade union parties to the ELRC and governing body 
organizations which are active in that province (South Africa 1998d:2b). 
 
2.6.5.1 THE POST PROVISIONING MODEL (PPM) 
The PPM was the brainchild of the Department of National Education. According to 
Motala (1998:9), the main motivation for the development of a post provisioning model 
was that educator posts need to be allocated optimally, and the creation and distribution 
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of posts must be in line with the funds available for this purpose. It was a significant shift 
from earlier policy guidelines where a uniform learner-educator ratio was set down. The 
PPM was workshopped, debated and amended to the fairest possible option at national 
ELRC before implementation. 
 
The PPM determines the relative need and priority, in respect of post provisioning, of 
each school and distributes the total pool of available posts to these schools in accordance 
with the relative needs and priorities. The norms according to which the needs and 
priorities are determined are based on the following factors: 
• Educational and organizational requirements in respect of class size. 
• Whether or not more than one language medium is used. 
• The number of school phases provided for. 
• Disabilities of learners. 
• The size of the institution. 
 
A school’s share of the total pool of educators in a province is determined by the 
weighting of all learners in accordance with their relative post provisioning needs, after 
which the available posts are divided among the schools pro rata to their weighted 
number of learners. Apart from the posts distributed to schools through this model, 
provision should also be made for ad hoc allocation of posts to institutions were specific 
circumstances necessitate such additional allocations. A limited, but sufficient number of 
posts, therefore, need to be retained in a central pool for this purpose (South Africa 
1998d: Annexure 1). 
 
An important acknowledgement in the Regulation is that although a public school’s 
curriculum has a bearing on its post allocation, the inequities that exist among schools 
with regard to curriculum offerings are not taken into account by the PPM. Heads of 
education departments were, therefore, empowered to address separately these inequities. 
The annual programme according to which the department will address these inequities 
should include the retention of posts in a central pool for the allocation thereof to schools 
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where these subjects are introduced and which, therefore, qualify for additional posts in 
terms of the PPM (South Africa 1998d:Anexure A).  
 
2.6.5.2 WEIGHTING NORMS 
Different weighting norms were applied to the design features of the PPM. The 
weightings were applied as follows: 
 
Public Schools: 
• A learner in grade 1, 2 or 3 is counted as 1.15 weighted learners based on the need 
to have smaller class sizes during the formative phase. 
• A learner in grade 4, 5, 6 or 7 is counted as 1 weighted learner. 
• Learners in grades 8 and 9 are weighted in terms of study fields based on the need 
to have smaller class sizes in certain subjects (usually those with a practical 
component). 
• Learners in grades 10 to 12 are weighted in terms of all their subjects. The 
weightings that apply to these subjects are based on class size requirements. In 
respect of each learner the relevant weightings applicable to his or her six 
examination subjects are accumulated plus provision for non-examination 
subjects.  
 
Special provision for schools with more than one language medium of instruction 
• Schools offering instruction in an additional language medium will have the 
number of weighted learners being taught in the additional language in each grade 
increased by 15%. 
 
Combined schools 
• If a school offers education to learners in the primary as well as the secondary 





Learners with special educational needs 
• Learners who have special educational needs as a result of severe disabilities are 
weighted in terms of their disability category.  
• Learners who are mildly to moderately disabled are weighted in terms of the 
curriculum they follow and not in terms of their disability. 
 
Formula 
• The number of posts to be allocated to a school is determined by means of the 
following formula: 
                         P = wl/twl x (p – c x Inst) + c 
             Where    wl = total number of weighted learners at the school 
                           twl = total number of weighted learners in the provincial department 
                             p  = total number of posts to be distributed to all schools 
                           Inst = total number of schools to which the posts need to be distributed 
                               c = a constant value that determines the extent to which the formula 
                                      will benefit smaller institutions   
 
2.6.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 6 OF 1998 
In terms of educator provisioning all provincial education departments were to implement 
ELRC Resolution 6 of 1998 which set out to: 
• Entrench principles of redress and equity in educator provisioning. 
• Provide clear directives to provinces on procedures to be followed in determining 
educators surplus to an institution as well identifying vacancies. Through the 
process of redeployment, educators deemed to be in surplus at an institution were 
to be moved to institutions were vacancies existed. 
• Protect educators from victimization. 
• Ensure the participation of educator unions at all levels of the process (Geyer 
1999:2). 
 
The PPM was to be used as a tool to facilitate the implementation of Resolution 6 of 
1998. According to Geyer (1999:2), all provincial education departments were to verify 
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the statistics of the number of educators they had on their records and develop 
management plans indicating the number of educator posts they could afford. The PPM 
was then to be used to distribute the educator posts to institutions. Provinces after 
determining the post establishments of institutions, issued a post provisioning norm 
(PPN) report (see example of PPN report on page 52) to schools indicating the number of 
educator posts the province will fund at the school. Based on the PPN report, institutions 
were to engage in the process of identifying educators surplus to the institution or declare 
possible vacant posts that may exist.  In order to identify educators deemed to be surplus 
or possible vacancies that may exist at an institution, a comprehensive procedure manual, 
to guide the process was issued to institutions. 
 
Serious problems were encountered in the implementation of Resolution 6 of 1998. Some 
provinces had problems verifying the number of educators on the payroll. In some 
provinces there were serious problems with computer software and they lacked the 
technological capacity to assist them in applying the PPM to determine the post 
provisioning norm (PPN) of schools. Another problem was the lack of basic data in some 
provinces. This led many schools to question the correctness of the PPNs supplied to 
them (The Educators Voice 1999:3). 
 
In KZN, two circulars were issued, HRM 51 of 1998 and HRM 1 of 1999 (procedure 
manuals for the implementation of the PPN), as well as the PPN Report for each school, 
in order to manage the process of rationalization and redeployment of educators. 
However, many schools questioned their PPNs. The APEK advised its members to check 
their PPNs as some schools had detected errors which were eventually corrected by the 
department. Organized labour pointed out the problems regarding the programme used to 
calculate the PPN to the Department (APEK 1999:2). The Department thus declared that 
‘pursuant to queries and complaints with regard to the staff allocation, the department in 
consultation with the national department of education deemed it necessary to apply an 
amended programme.’ The amended programme resulted in some schools gaining posts 
while others lost posts. Further, serious problems were experienced in interpreting 




and misinterpretations of circulars on rationalization and redeployment a detailed 
clarification document was sent to schools under cover of Circular HRM 10 of 1999.  
Owing to the problems around the interpretation of documents on the implementation of  
the PPN, the department had to consequently, amend its management plan and time 
frames for the completion of the process (KZN DEC 1999b:1). 
   
The KZN DEC announced that of the 6 779 educators declared surplus, over 4 000 
educators were placed in vacancies. The Department then envisaged completing the 
process by March 2000, a date nine months later than projected in its management plan 
(KZN DEC 2000:2). However, in the Department’s Annual Report on Activities for 2000, 
an amended figure of 7 340 educators surplus to their institutions was quoted. Further, it 
was announced that the success rate of placement of educators deemed to be surplus to 
their institutions PPN was 92.2 % (KZN DEC 2001a:28). 
 
2.6.7 EDUCATOR POST PROVISINING SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF   
         RESOLUTION 6 OF 1998 
Pardesi (2004:2) observes that the implementation of Resolution 6 of 1998 has not 
benefited rural schools. In the main these schools remained with very few educators. She 
adds that in the years since 1998 the issues of post provisioning became very complicated 
and it was clearly noticeable that it was the vehicle used by the department of education 
to downsize the number of educators being employed on a permanent basis. This 
coincided with global trends to casualise labour, including educators. There were 
increasing numbers of temporary educators in the system. Vacancies were not advertised 
nor filled resulting in many educators receiving no benefits. 
 
NUPSAW (2003:5) notes that the net effect of the rightsizing process was the downsizing 
of the educator complement at schools. They postulate that ten years into the unitary 
system of education most secondary schools that had staff establishments of between 40 
and 50 educators now have establishments of between 20 and 30. But the numbers of 
learners have remained constant or have increased. They further note that the process of 
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reducing the number of educators at many schools takes place against a background of 
other upheavals in schools: 
• There are already fewer educators because of earlier retrenchments 
• Class sizes are larger 
• The teaching loads of individual educators has increased 
• There are major changes in curricula and syllabi (OBE) 
• There are many educators who are uncertain of their futures because they are in 
temporary posts (on contract). 
 
At many schools, problems were experienced in deploying educator staff to cover their 
existing curriculum offerings. Schools which did not have the financial means to employ 
SGB paid educators to meet their curriculum offerings had no option but to rationalize 
their curriculum packages. The TLSA (1999a:11), therefore, observes that the direct 
result of the educator rationalization process was the phasing out of subjects like art and 
music in many schools.  
 
2.6.8 THE TIMING OF THE RELEASE OF THE PPN 
The process of attaining equity in educator distribution to institutions is on-going. The 
provincial education departments, based on MTEF estimates and deliberations at 
provincial ELRCs, each declare on an annual basis the number of educator posts they can 
afford. Provinces then, based on the PPM, release the PPNs to institutions which then 
engage in identifying surplus educators for redeployment or vacant posts that may exist. 
 
The timeous release of PPNs is vitally important in terms of human resource planning. In 
some schools, SGBs appoint additional staff to supplement those provided by the state. In 
terms of the South African Schools Act, any funds to be utilized for staff appointments by 
the SGB of a school, must be ratified at an annual budget meeting involving the general 
parent body (South Africa 1996c: sec. 20(4), 20(9), 38 (2)). Annual budget meetings are 
normally held in September or October in order to ratify budgets and set school fees for 
the forthcoming school year. Thus, if schools are not aware of their PPNs for the 
forthcoming year as dictated by policy, the budgeting for additional educators by the 
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SGBs will amount to guess work. In KZN, the SGBs of eleven schools in 
Pietermartizburg obtained an interdict against the MEC and Head of the Education 
Department, preventing them from implementing the 2004 PPN due its late release. 
According to papers filed in court, these schools had not contemplated the department 
reducing its PPN and, therefore, did not budget for the hire of additional educators to fill 
the posts that may be lost due to a decrease in the PPN (The Mercury 2004b:1). 
 
Mdlalose (2003:73) asserts that if the PPNs are released too late in a school year it does 
not allow for proper planning and seriously undermines strategic planning efforts. It is 
therefore, not possible to deploy educators properly for a particular year. He further adds 
that the late release of PPNs has a negative effect on educator work satisfaction. It would 
ensure that institutions whose PPNs have increased get the additional educators timeously 
in order to ease their duty workloads.     
  
2.6.9 DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PPM 
Since the introduction of the post provisioning model (PPM) in 1999, there has been 
growing discontent with regard to the impact of the model on issues of equity and 
redress.  
 
One of the key problems associated with the PPM is that the supply of teachers is fixed 
by the budgets of the provincial education departments. Thus, the model is limited in the 
sense that it could only allocate posts to schools given the supply of educators determined 
by the budget. The poorer provinces with larger learner numbers will suffer as their needs 
outstrip their educator supply (Motala & Pampallis 2001:93).  
 
The weighting of subjects is fundamental to determining the number of educator posts to 
be allocated to a school. In this context, Madisha (2001:5), the President of SADTU, 
commented that the PPM tends to favour schools with varied subject offerings and is, 
therefore, a source of inequity. However, the DNE takes a different view on this. 
According to the Department, a major benefit of the PPM has been the rationalization of 
the curriculum offered in schools, since post provisioning is now linked to an approved 
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set of offerings by an institution. It adds that departments now regulate the curriculum 
offered in each school through the PPM (DNE 2000:45).   
 
The PPM’s capacity to affect curriculum redress has been questionable. Pardesi (2004:2) 
observes that in all provinces there is a serious demand for curriculum redress. Whilst the 
PPM makes provision for a province to set aside posts for curriculum redress and in turn 
to allocate these posts to schools so that they may offer a varied curriculum, in practice 
many provinces made no provision for this.  
 
2.6.10 THE REVISED PPM  
Dissatisfaction with the PPM largely as a result of pressure from educator unions led the 
National Minister of Education to promulgate new regulations with regard to the creation 
of educator posts in provincial departments of education and the distribution of such 
posts to educational institutions. The new regulations which took effect on 1 January 
2003, included a revised PPM which the Department claimed, ‘addressed the issues that 
the previous model did not address’. However, educator unions were dissatisfied at the 
manner in which implementation of the revised model took place. They assert that 
implementation had been poorly managed resulting in chaos in the provinces and at 
school level. They argued that the parties to the ELRC should have discussed the model 
after the testing of it in the various provinces before implementation (ELRC 2003a:5). 
 
2.6.10.1 DETERMINATION OF EDUCATOR POST ESTABLISHMENTS OF A              
              PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION BY THE MEC 
In determining the post establishment of a provincial department of education, the MEC 
must consult with trade unions in the province who are members of the ELRC and 
governing body organizations which are active in the province. The MEC must also take 
into account the following: 
• The budget of the provincial department of education 
• The effect that the post establishment will have on the employment security of 
educators 
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• The need for redress in the implementation and promotion of curriculum policy in 
keeping with the basic values and principles set out in section 195 of the 
Constitution 
• The fact that the division between expenditure on personnel and non-personnel 
costs in the budget should be educationally, administratively and financially 
justifiable and in accordance with national policy that may exist in this regard 
• The terms and conditions of employment of educators that may be affected by the 
post establishment, including provisions for leave, substitution and remuneration 
related issues (South Africa 2002: Schedule 1c-d). 
 
In determining the educator post establishments of schools by the head of a provincial 
department of education, the revised post distribution model must be applied by taking 
into account: 
• The post establishment of the provincial department of education 
• The need for redress in the implementation and promotion of curriculum policy. 
The head of a provincial education department was tasked with the responsibility 
of determining an annual programme in this regard after consultation with trade 
union parties to the ELRC and governing body organizations which are active in 
that province (South Africa 2002:2b). 
 
2.6.10.2 FEATURES OF THE REVISED PPM 
The revised PPM is based on the principle that available posts are distributed among 
schools proportionally to the number of weighted learners. The concept of ‘weighted 
learner’ instead of actual learner is used to enable schools to compete on an equal footing 
for posts. As some learners and some learning areas require more favourable post 
allocations than others, each learner is given a certain weighting that reflects a learners 
relative need in respect of post provisioning (South Africa 2002: Annexure 1(1-2)). 
 
The model takes into account the following educational and administrative factors that 
impact on the post provisioning needs of learners: 
• The maximum ideal class size applicable to a specific learning area or phase. 
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• The period load of educators. 
• The need to promote a learning area. By providing a more favourable learner- 
educator ratio in respect of a learning area in grades 10 – 12, schools can be 
motivated to promote such a learning area. 
• The size of a school. 
• The number of grades. 
• More than one language medium of instruction. 
• Disabilities of learners (LSEN). 
• Access to the curriculum. In order to ensure fair and affordable access of learners 
to the curriculum, the number of learners that are fully funded in respect of 
subjects that are more expensive to offer need to be regulated. This measure, it 
was envisaged, will lead to redress in the implementation and promotion of the 
curriculum. 
• Poverty. In order to compensate for the negative impact that poverty has on 
learning, the poverty grading of a school is taken into account. 
• Level of funding. Policy may require that different phases be funded at different 
levels. Currently, all grades are set at 100% level of funding while grade R is set 
at a funding level of 0. 
• Ad hoc factors. Certain factors that are not considered above, such as an 
unexpected growth in learner numbers, may exist at a certain school and may 
justify the allocation of additional posts to such a school (South Africa 
2002:Anexure 1(3)). 
 
2.6.10.3 WEIGHTING NORMS 
Different weighting norms were applied to the design features of the revised PPM. The 
weightings were applied as follows: 
 
Grades 1 to 9 
• Based on the principle that uniform curricula apply to learners in schools in all 
phases up to grade 9, the following formula is used to determine the weighting of 
a learner: 
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                                                      w = c/m/l x f   
       Where        c =  40 (the highest ideal maximum class size in relation to the others) 
  m = ideal maximum class size 
  l = average period load 
  f = funding level 
 
Grades 10 to 12 
• In view of the variety of learning areas, each learner is weighted separately in 
terms of his or her curriculum. A subject-learner weighting (slw) is determined 
for each subject taken by a learner by means of the following formula 
                                                    slw = c/m x p/l x f/7   
       Where       c =  40 (the highest ideal maximum class size in relation to the others) 
  m = ideal maximum class size 
  p = promotion factor 
  l = average period load 
  f = funding level 
• The promotion factor in the table is set at 1. Should provision be made in policy 
that a certain subject should be promoted by, say 7%, the value of 1 would 
become 1.07. 
• Each learner is allowed to take 6 examinable subjects. 
• All non-examinable subjects are grouped and given the same weighting as 1 
‘ordinary’ examinable subject. 
• A total number of weighted learners is then determined by adding the total 
numbers of examinable and non-examinable weighted learners together. 
 
Size of the School, Number of Grades, Language Medium of Instruction 
Provision is made by adding a certain number of weighted learners to a school’s weighted 
enrolment linked to each recognized language group (maximum of two language groups) 
and each grade provided for at the school. The following values apply: 
• A base number of weighted learners are added to each school. Any value from  
      10 - 20, in accordance with a department’s needs will apply. 
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• Additional weighted learners must be added in respect of each grade in which 
learners are enrolled. If learners in a particular grade are taught in more than one 
language medium, a further additional weighting will apply in respect of that 
grade. 
• In respect of a combined school, the base number of 10 – 20 weighted learners is 
granted in respect of both the primary school phase and secondary school phase. 
 
Poverty 
• The total number of weighted learners in each school is then adjusted in terms of 
its poverty ranking. The head of a provincial department of education must set 
aside a certain percentage of its available posts (top-sliced from the total pool of 
educators) for poverty redress. The minister may from time to time set the 
maximum percentage that provincial departments may use for this purpose. Until 
this limit is revised, it is set at 5%. 
• Redress posts are to be distributed to schools based on the relative poverty of the 
learners of a school using the framework of the indices utilized by the province in 
the national Norms and Standards for School Funding.  
 
Distribution Formula 
After the total number of weighted learners of each school is determined, the number of 
posts to be allocated to a school (PPN) is determined using the formula: 
Post = total number of posts available  x  total weighted learners of school     
                                                                   Total weighted learners in province       
 
An example of a PPN report, based on the revised PPM is given on page 61. 
 
2.6.10.4 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REVISED PPM   
The DNE in a press statement highlighted that the key feature of the model is based on 
the Ministry’s determination to respond to the negative impact of poverty on education. It 
is a known fact that poverty is the most significant barrier to learning in South Africa and 




focused attention by the state. The model is designed to cater for this priority by 
providing relatively favourable learner-educator ratios in respect of publicly funded posts 
to schools that cater for the poorest learners. Therefore, the most significant revision 
brought about by the revised model is that schools catering for poor learners may gain 
one or two additional posts on account of  poverty-targeting introduced in the revised 
model (DNE 2002:1).  
 
Though the revised PPM pays greater attention to curriculum redress, cognizance must be 
taken of the fact that the model merely allocates a number of educator posts to a school. 
How the educators are to be deployed in terms of school time-tabling is still left to the 
discretion of the school principal. For example, the school might qualify for curriculum 
redress posts in order to promote subjects like music and dance but the deployment of the 
educators appointed for this purpose is still largely left to the discretion of the principal. 
Therefore, the revised PPM merely gives a number of posts to the school with no 
compulsion on the principal on how to deploy the allocated posts. 
 
Whilst the revised PPM stipulate maximum ideal class sizes for different subjects, the 
post provisioning task team of the national ELRC has noted that this was not the actual 
situation that prevails in terms of class size at schools. The department in its response 
noted that it was very difficult to determine the correct norm for class sizes. They add 
that the values used in the revised PPM were based on ‘inputs received from a number of 
resources’. However, they concede that it was not scientifically determined. According to 
the department the subject class sizes are constrained by the pool of posts the school 
qualifies for in terms of the PPN (ELRC 2003a:3). 
 
2.6.11   POST PROVISIONING AND LEARNER-EDUCATOR RATIOS 
Provincial learner-educator ratios are determined largely by the provincial education 
department’s budget for personnel expenditure. The total number of learners at all 
institutions within a provincial education department is divided by the total number of 
full-time equivalent educators that is affordable in terms of the budget for personnel 
expenditure (Mdlalose 2003:12).  
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The learner-educator ratio is one of the factors that affect the quality of education 
provided in schools. World Bank studies indicate that learner-educator ratios of 25:1 and 
lower are important for learner success (Vadi 1998:9). Moreover, given the urgent need 
to improve the quality of education in disadvantaged schools, trends from overseas 
studies show that disadvantaged learners reap the most benefit from smaller classes and 
their results improve the longer they stay in classes of less than twenty (Noonan & 
Doherty 2003). Vally and Spreen (1998:8) note that recent research conducted on class 
size expressed the view that small classes are likely to improve the achievement of 
learners from disadvantaged backgrounds. Further, small classes are also likely to 
produce the greatest gains in achievement in mathematics, technical subjects and reading 
in the first four years of schooling. However, due to policy advice that expenditure on 
personnel is too high in relation to the education budget (see section 2.4.2, page 26); the 
policy strategy of many of the provincial education departments was to reduce the salary 
bill by keeping learner- educator ratios consistently high. Consequently, in KZN (see 
table 2.4 below) there has not been much change to the learner-educator ratios since 
2000. 
 
Table 2.4: Learner-educator ratios in KZN 
YEAR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
LEARNER-EDUCATOR 
RATIO 
35.7:1 36:1 36.1:1 35.7:1 35.4:1 
Source: KZN DEC (2003a:2; 2002e:2; 2002c:2; 2001b:2) 
 
It must be pointed out that the learner-educator ratios are averages and in no way an 
indication of class size. Given the fact that school management teams (SMTs) have far 
reduced scheduled teaching hours and classroom- based educators carry a teaching load 
of between 85% and 92%, the actual class size is well in excess of the learner-educator 
ratio (South Africa 1999:sec. 3.3, Vadi 1998:9). 
 
The unions in KZN consistently and in unison always rejected the high learner-educator 
ratios in the province. In 2002, the SADTU in opposing the 36.1:1 ratio, called into 
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question the commitment of the MEC and the CEO for education in improving class sizes 
as well as improving learning and teaching through the provision of more educators. The 
union consequently campaigned for a three year agreement to be reached, the basis of 
which should be the national average ratio of 32:1 (SADTU KZN 2002:1-2). From the 
department’s point of view, however, the principal issue was the ability to reconcile the 
high learner-educator ratio with the need to reduce personnel expenditure to 85% of the 
total budget and simultaneously increase the strength of the supporting components so 
that they can deliver services effectively (KZN DEC 2002a:22). In reconciling these 
apparently conflicting demands the only option available was to maintain the high 
learner-educator ratios. 
 
Compared to the other nine provinces (see table 2.5 below), KZN has always had the 
highest learner-educator ratio. Moreover, the learner-educator ratios have been well 
above the national average. 
 
Table 2.5: Learner-educator ratios in South Africa 
PROVINCE 1996 2000 2002 
Eastern Cape  36.3 31.5 31 
Free State 30.1 31.9 29 
Gauteng 29.2 30.9 31 
KwaZulu-Natal 37.1 35.7 36 
Limpopo 36.0 34.8 32 
Mpumalanga 30.2 30.6 34 
Northern Cape 33.9 33.5 30 
North West 30.2 30.3 28 
Western Cape 32.9 30.7 32 
Average 33.7 32.7 32 





2.6.12 PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POST             
           PROVISIONING NORM (PPN) AT SCHOOL LEVEL 
The implementation of the PPN at school level is the responsibility of the school 
principal. In keeping with national guidelines, procedure manuals are developed by 
provincial education departments in consultation with educator unions for the 
implementation of the PPN. These manuals together with the PPN report are sent to 
schools for the attention of the principal and chairperson of the school governing body 
and spell-out the following: 
 
2.6.12.1    OBJECTIVES OF THE PPN IMPLEMENTATION 
The objectives of the PPN implementation are as follows: 
• To provide a fair and transparent basis for the staffing of schools 
• To identify educators ‘additional’ to the staff establishment 
• To identify vacant posts in accordance with the given post provisioning norms 
(PPN). 
• To facilitate and expedite the movement of educators ‘additional’ to the 
establishment and displaced educators to vacant posts 
• To achieve equity in educator staff provisioning (KZN DEC 2003a:2; 2001b:2). 
 
2.6.12.2 MAIN PRINCIPLES 
In terms of the main principles, it is incumbent on principals as implementers of the PPN 
at school level to fully apprise the staff at a formal staff meeting of the implementation 
procedures. Further, the full compulsory curriculum as required by national policy must 
be accommodated within the allocated staff. Under no circumstance must a school reduce 
or exclude non-examination subjects on the grounds that the allocated staff is insufficient 
to cope with the full curriculum. Principals are asked to use creative management 
strategies to deliver the full curriculum (KZN: DEC 2003a:2; 2001b:2). 
 
2.6.12.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PPN 
In implementing the PPN, the manual spells-out the role of the principal as follows: 
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• The SEMs apprise principals on the criteria for the determination of educators 
‘additional/surplus’ to the staff establishment and implementation procedures. 
• Immediately on returning from the briefing meeting with the SEM, principals 
apprise staff at a formal staff meeting of the allocated staff for the year and the 
criteria and implementation procedures related to the PPN. 
• The principal must identify those posts that are vacant and those that are surplus 
on the basis of the curricular needs of the school. 
• Inform staff on the procedures for determining educators ‘additional/surplus’ to 
the staff establishment and the effect it will have on their respective staff 
establishments. Union shop stewards located at the school should be present at the 
staff meeting (KZN: DEC 2003a:3; 2001b:3). 
 
2.6.12.4 IDENTIFICATION OF EDUCATORS ‘ADDITIONAL/SURPLUS’ TO  
              THE STAFF ESTABLISHMENT 
• Permanent educators are classified according to the main subject or subjects/ 
group of subjects (secondary school) or phase (primary school) to be taught. In 
the Junior Primary and Senior Primary Phase, an educator is expected to teach all 
subjects except where an educator is unable to teach a specific language. 
• Considering the approved curricular needs of the school, the principal allocates 
the permanent educators in terms of the main subject or subjects/group of 
teaching subjects into the relevant subject/s or phases. 
• Should two or more educators compete for the same post after taking into account 
the curricular needs, the principle of last-in-first-out in the service of the 
department based on current years of continuous service, must be applied. 
• The principal after consulting with the educator staff may recommend that 
educators who may be declared ‘additional/surplus’, be absorbed in vacancies that 






2.6.12.5 MANAGEMENT PLANS 
An integral part of the procedure manual is an elaborate management plan spelling out 
time frames and identifying individuals responsible for the carrying out of certain duties 
related to PPN implementation. Duties such as matching educators declared in ‘surplus’ 
to vacancies, issuing letters of placement, identifying resultant vacancies and the 
advertising of resultant vacancies are spelt out (KZN DEC 2003a: Annexure G; 2001: 
Annexure B). 
  
2.6.12.6 COMMENTARY ON PPN IMPLEMENTATION 
The procedure manual on PPN implementation has been the subject of much debate 
among principals. Principals are at the forefront of the PPN implementation. According 
to Mdlalose (2003:50), they are unfortunate to be (by virtue of their position) always 
expected to be leaders in the implementation of changes and policies which at times they 
don’t even understand. Consequently, principals would not possibly be expected to have 
all the answers to questions educators have regarding the implementation of the new 
PPN. 
 
When an educator is declared ‘surplus/additional’ to the staff establishment, Mdlalose 
(2003:50) has noted that the affected educator would unreasonably conclude that the 
principal has personal problems and differences to settle with the educator. Moreover, 
Mdlalose (2003: 51) points out that some staff members may sympathize with affected 
colleagues and wish that the principal had taken steps to protect them whereas in reality 
the principal cannot do anything. He/She has to implement policy. Failure to do so may 
result in disciplinary action taken against a principal who fails to implement national or 
provincial policy as stipulated in the Employment of Educators Act. This state of affairs 
strains the trusting, supportive and harmonious relationship that should exist between 
principals and educators (Mdlalose 2003:51). 
 
2.6.12.7 PPN IMPLEMENTATION AND SCHOOL ORGANISATION 
School organization is regulated by policy. Policy stipulates that admissions, educator 
allocations, educator workloads and timetables must be finalized before the first school 
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day so as to ensure that teaching and learning is not disrupted at the start of the new 
school year (KZN DEC 2003b:5). Thus, the timeous communication of the PPN to 
schools is an imperative for proper school organisation. 
 
An increase in the PPN at a school brings with it a whole host of problems because the 
vacant post/s at schools must either be filled on an interim basis by compulsory 
temporary transfers (CTTs) of surplus educators at other schools or by the employment of 
temporary educators before the vacancy can be filled permanently through an 
advertisement in a departmental vacancy list. The filling of posts through compulsory 
temporary transfer can take weeks to materialize and this consequently, leads to classes 
being left unattended and learners being denied their constitutional right to an 
uninterrupted education. If the post is not filled through compulsory temporary transfer 
then a temporary educator is employed to fill the vacant post (KZN DEC 2004b:1). 
 
However, the filling of posts by temporary educators does not guarantee the immediate 
appointment of the educator since the department stipulates that a set procedure needs to 
be followed. Only after approval from the District Manager, can a temporary educator 
assume duty (KZN DEC 2004b:1-2). This procedure once again leaves classes 
unattended for a period of time. A further problem is created in that temporary educators 
are employed on a term by term basis. As a result the contracts of temporary educators 
are terminated at the end of each term and in some instances their contracts are only 
renewed on a month to month basis (KZN DEC 2004d:1). Given the uncertainty and job 
insecurity experienced by the temporary educator, as well as delays in the payment of 
salaries of temporary educators – in some cases educators have not been paid for up to 
eight months - the temporary educator often does not return in the new term in the event 
of his/her contract being renewed (The Rising Sun Chatsworth 2004:12). This then sets 
into motion once again a new cycle in the appointment of a temporary educator with its 
attendant problems. 
 
The appointment of substitute educators also carries with it a whole host of problems. 
Substitute educators are appointed when a permanent educator proceeds on 
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accouchement leave (in this regard prior approval must be obtained) or sick leave in 
excess of thirty days (KZN DEC 2002d:1). The same procedure as that for the 
appointment of temporary educators is followed when it comes to the appointment of 
substitute educators. (KZN DEC 2004b:1-2). Moreover, the number of substitute 
educators budgeted for is totally inadequate to cater for the number of educators who 
proceed on sick or accouchement leave. This, then puts added financial pressure on SGBs 
to pay substitute educators for state-paid permanent educators who are on official leave. 
The TLSA (1999a:12) notes that if SGBs cannot raise the necessary funds to pay the 
salaries of substitute educators, they are accused of being incompetent and are unfairly 
contrasted with SGBs that have greater fund-raising skill and potential. The pity of it all 
is that the anger of school communities is turned mainly inward against SGBs. It should 
indeed be directed against those responsible for school policies based on economic 
imperatives, instead of on educational and ethical considerations. 
 
Pardesi (2004:2) avers that there is, in most provinces, insufficient allocation in terms of 
the MTEF processes for substitute educators in relation to the number of educators on 
leave. Lewis (2002:1) at a conference on HIV/AIDS and the Education Sector highlighted 
the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on educator productivity and, therefore, called for 
a review of policy on substitute educators.  
 
2.6.13 THE UNFOLDING OF THE 2004 PPN DEBACLE IN KZN 
The process of educator provisioning has always been a contentious issue in KZN. With 
educator provisioning being devolved to the provinces, subject to national norms and 
standards, the KZN department of education as an implementing agency of National 
ELRC and Provincial ELRC agreements often found itself in conflict with educator 
unions.  
 
In KZN matters came to a head in the declaration of the PPN for 2004. Consultation on 
the PPN with educator unions before declaration is regulated by legislation. However, 
unions party to the provincial ELRC claim that full consultation had not run its course 
and, consequently, the KZN DEC in declaring the 2004 PPN was acting unilaterally and 
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not in the spirit of national agreements. As a matter of fact similar allegations were 
leveled at the KZN DEC in the declaration of the 2002 PPN. Owing to mounting 
dissatisfaction by the unions that the learner-educator ratio for 2002 was in no way an 
improvement on the previous years ratio, the SADTU and the National Teachers Union 
rejected the PPN pending further negotiations (Mdlalose 2003:25). However, the 
department argued that in terms of its budgeting system there was no extra money that 
could be used to employ more educators over and above the already declared PPN and, 
therefore, the declared PPN stands (KZN: DEC 2002c:1).  
 
In terms of the MTEF Consultation Report tabled at national ELRC, the first meeting to 
begin consultation on the PPN for 2004 was scheduled for April 2003, but owing to the 
unavailability of accurate statistics and petty bickering as to whose responsibility it was 
to call the consultative meetings, deliberations on the PPN only began in September of 
that year (ELRC 2003b). The KZN MEC pointed out that the MTEF budget provides for 
three years guaranteed funding and hence, the figures for 2004/5 and 2005/6 were already 
known. Consequently, provinces were expected to work within the baseline figures and, 
therefore, it was not possible to obtain funds above that which constituted the baseline. 
The MEC pointed out that the MTEF allowed for the employment of 74 000 educators 
which translated to a learner-educator ratio of 35.4:1. The unions were far from happy 
with this situation and tabled a proposal that a ratio of 30:1 be considered for 2004. The 
MEC pointed out that a ratio of 30:1 was unaffordable and urged the unions to work 
towards a ratio of 32:1 for 2004/5. The department claimed that they projected a decrease 
in the learner enrolment for 2004 and consequently the number of learners would 
decrease the ratio. The unions disputed this and further argued that education in the 
province should be funded at 40% of the budget and not 35%. They added that given the 
underfunding and no provision being made for curriculum transformation posts, their 
demand for a ratio of 30:1 was not unreasonable.  Further, the unions questioned the 
accuracy of the statistics on educator and learner numbers presented by the department. 
The MEC pointed out that his was a political office and in terms of post provisioning 
regulations he was obliged to consult on the creation of the posts and, therefore, would 
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not venture into the administrative domain. The MEC added that the process of 
consultation had commenced and may well continue (KZN ELRC 2003a:1-5). 
 
Whilst the consultative process was still in progress, the KZN DEC in November 2003 
issued Circular HRM 83 of 2003 which declared PPNs for 2004. The unions pointed out 
that the final consultative meeting with the MEC had not taken place, therefore, HRM 83 
of 2003 was premature. The SADTU argued that ‘you cannot distribute posts before the 
MEC creates posts’ (KZN ELRC 2003b). 
 
The MEC at the MTEF Consultative Meeting scheduled for December argued that he was 
aware of the release of the PPN by the department which was necessary for planning for 
2004. Unions indicated that they were unhappy with the consultation process thus far and 
believed negotiations in the KZN ELRC were in bad faith. Whilst the unions were 
discussing the PPN, the officials from the department were implementing the PPN. The 
unions, therefore, called for an immediate withdrawal of HRM 83 of 2003. They argued 
that the PPN process for 2003 first be concluded and the 8 000 vacancies that that existed 
must first be advertised and filled before implementing the 2004 PPN. The unions 
pointed out that in August, agreement was reached in the filling of vacancies but the 
department did not honour the agreement. The unions indicated that they were prepared 
to agree to the 2003 PPN for the commencement of 2004 and consult further on 
improvement in the PPN. The Department though was not prepared to compromise. The 
unions expressed their disappointment at there being no agreement especially since they 
were not consulted on the PPN circulars that went out to schools (KZN ELRC 2003b:1-
6). 
 
In terms of HRM 83 of 2003, before schools closed for the year the PPN was to be 
implemented. Educators declared in surplus were to be identified as well as vacancies 
that may exist. In terms of the department’s management plan, surplus educators were to 
be matched to vacancies over the December holidays and moved to their new schools on 
the first school day of 2004. Resultant vacancies were to be advertised in February 2004 
(KZN DEC 2003a: Annexure G). 
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When schools reopened, the department failed to complete the process of moving 
educators declared ‘additional/surplus’ to their schools to vacant posts. The SADTU in 
the meantime informed its membership of the controversy surrounding PPN for 2004 and 
called on its members to protest against the forceful implementation of PPN 2004 by the 
department (SADTU KZN:2004a; 2004b;2004c). Union members engaged in a protest 
march in Durban and vowed to extend their demonstration to other regions in the 
province. SADTU spokesperson, Mbuyiseni Mathonsi said that teachers were calling for 
the suspension of the PPN because the process was flawed (The Mercury 2004e:2). 
 
The need for accurate and up-to-date data on learners and educators is paramount to 
educator post provisioning in any province. In KZN, there has always been controversy 
over the statistics presented by the department of education with regard to learner and 
educator numbers. The department has often been accused of presenting unreliable 
statistics as well as carrying ‘ghost’ learners and educators on its database. Owing to 
accusations from the unions that the department had no verifiable statistics on learner 
numbers, the department in the meantime engaged in a mammoth exercise to verify 
learner numbers submitted by principals. Department of education officials engaged in a 
headcount exercise which ran for two weeks. The audit found that many schools had 
manipulated their enrolment figures so as to qualify for an improved PPN. The MEC thus 
declared that he had doubts that the province had 2.5 million learners. He added that 
more than 70% of the 505 schools visited had inflated their numbers and had given 
frivolous reasons for the mismatch. The MEC indicated that the count would have a big 
impact on the learner-educator ratio (The Mercury 2004d:1).  
 
Based on the schools’ 10th day enrolment statistics, verified figures from the headcount 
and queries raised by various schools regarding their PPN calculation, the department 
issued Circular HRM 28 of 2004 which entailed the issuing of a final PPN report (based 
on a learner-educator ratio of 34.4:1) to schools as well as an amended management plan 
for the implementation of the PPN. In terms of the management plan, educators declared 
‘additional/surplus’ to their schools were to be moved to vacancies on the first day of the 
new term (KZN DEC 2004c:1/ Annexure). The action by the department was once again 
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a unilateral one. Educator unions were not consulted which should have happened in 
terms of provisions of the Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998 and collective 
agreements in the national ELRC. The SADTU vehemently opposed the implementation 
of Circular HRM 28 of 2004 and argued that it won’t be party to its implementation. The 
union informed its members that it was seeking legal advice on the viability of 
interdicting the department from proceeding with the implementation of Circular HRM 
28 of 2004. Further, the union indicated that it had sent a memorandum to the MEC, 
Narend Singh outlining its demands on the PPN issue (SADTU KZN 2004b:1). 
 
The MEC in an attempt to resolve the stand-off over the PPN issue called a meeting of all 
educator unions. The meeting, however, was not fruitful in offering anything new, except 
by way of increasing the number of substitute educators in the system. The SADTU in 
the meantime outlined its programme of action against implementation of the PPN which 
included a provincial march to the Pietermartizburg legislature as well as a total shut-
down of schools (SADTU KZN 2004c:1). The SADTU also called for the resignation of 
the MEC as well as for the department’s CEO, Prof. C. Dlamini to be fired. The National 
Teachers Union (NATU) as well as the Parents Association of KZN was far from happy 
with the final PPN. They argued that whilst the provincial norm was 34.4:1 the actual 
class size will be far in excess of this (The Mercury 2004a:5).  
 
The first term of 2004 was brought to a close with educators who were declared 
‘additional/surplus’ being issued with letters indicating the new schools they were to 
report to in the new term. Further, the contracts of temporary teachers were terminated.  
  
In the province, the PPN issue was becoming a political one. The country was in the 
midst of its third democratic national elections. The KZN province was under the rule of 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the MEC belonged to the IFP. The SADTU, on the 
other hand, was aligned to the African National Congress (ANC) which was the ruling 
party in the national government but was an opposition party in KZN. The SADTU 
overtly canvassed in the province for the ANC in the April elections. The MEC, just prior 
to the elections, placed full page advertisements in the main provincial newspapers 
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outlining events around the PPN issue. The advertisements accused the SADTU of 
‘turning education into a political football for purposes of vote-catching’ (Post 2004a:16). 
The SADTU in reaction to the MEC’s advertisements also bought space in provincial 
newspapers and explained its view on the PPN issue as well as attack the MEC and his 
political history (Daily News 2004:6). 
 
The SADTU took the PPN issue a step further by making a High Court application for a 
court interdict. This led to the implementation process being halted. The halting of the 
implementation process of the PPN midway through the process resulted in chaos at 
schools. The educators who were moved to vacancies were unsure as to whether they 
should return to their previous schools. Moreover, the Department released vacancy lists 
(Circulars HRM 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41) and called for applications to these vacancies. In 
order to prevent confusion the department issued Circular HRM 54 of 2004 which 
indicated that surplus educators who have been placed and moved to new schools must 
remain where they are and not return to their original schools. Further, applications for 
advertised posts will continue to be received by the department but no further processing 
will be done (KZN DEC 2004e: 1). 
 
In the meantime the outcome of the 2004 general election saw a shift in political power in 
KZN from the IFP to the ANC. The SADTU in a communiqué to its members pointed 
out that the results of the 2004 general elections ‘have brought about the possibility of an 
immediate solution’ to the PPN problem (SADTU KZN 2004d:1-2). The appointment of 
the new MEC for education, Mrs Ina Cronje towards the end of April brought some 
respite to the PPN debacle. The SADTU then engaged in a meeting with the MEC and 
called for: 
• All processes relating to the 2004 PPN be reversed 
• An audit of all educator posts in the province be done 
• The immediate filling of all educator posts created in terms of the 2003 MTEF 
and PPN 
• Meaningful consultation on PPN 2004 
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• The provincial ELRC be convened for the development and determination of the 
2005 PPN to enable the MEC to finalize the process of consultation as required by 
law by 15 June 2004 (SADTU KZN 2004e:1-2). 
 
The MEC committed herself to resolving the PPN debacle. She called for a fresh round of 
consultations with all stakeholders. Consequently, the MEC in terms of Circular HRM 
54A of 2004 called for the ‘staying of’ PPN 2004 and all other processes related to it 
(KZN DEC 2004f:1). 
 
The MEC after consultation with educator unions in June 2004 declared that ‘the 2004 
PPN has been nullified because it was the product of a process that did not comply with 
the provisions of the Employment of Educators Act and related regulations’ (Post 
2004b:3). This declaration by the MEC meant a reversal of the PPN process for 2004. 
Consequently, educators who were transferred to schools based on the 2004 PPN had to 
return to their former schools (KZN DEC 2004g:1). The net result of the nullification of 
the PPN, however, meant that schools were to operate outside of a PPN for 2004. The 
unions pointed out that this is in fact good news in the sense that schools will benefit if 
their educators who were declared surplus return to them, because they will be getting 
more educators (Post 2004b:3). Further, the schools affected due to the withdrawal of 
educators are not jeopardized because they are permitted to employ temporary educators 




This chapter has highlighted how the state’s macroeconomic policies in the form of the 
GEAR have constrained spending on education. The resultant effect of the GEAR on 
policy on educator post provisioning was explored in terms of its effects on the 
affordability of the educator pools of provincial education departments as well as the 
distribution of educators to schools in terms of the PPM. The impact of state policies on 
educator distribution in terms of equity and redress was also highlighted. 
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The previous chapter outlined the inter-connectedness of all social policies (educational, 
economic and political) as well as its impact on educator provisioning. This chapter 
focuses on the theoretical orientation to this study. It commences by grounding this study 
in the field of policy analysis and employs critical theory as an over-arching analytical 
framework. An account on ideology with reference to neoliberalism is presented. The 
concept of managerialism is then explored with specific reference to a new institutional 
culture called ‘new public management’ which has arisen in the public sector. A brief 
account of managerialism in education is focused on, as well as the consequences of 
pursuing managerialist policies in education.  
 
This chapter concludes with a discussion on the use of RAMs in education. Specific 
reference is made to their characteristics, why they are used, possible problem areas in 
their use and finally equity considerations in their use.   
 
3.2 POLICY ANALYSIS 
Policy analysis according to Codd (1988:235) is a form of enquiry which provides either 
the informational base upon which policy is constructed, or the critical examination of 
existing policies. The former is called analysis for policy, whereas the latter has been 
termed analysis of policy. 
 
Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard and Henry (1997:36) view analysis for policy as referring to the 
policy research conducted within educational bureaucracies in the process of policy 
production and evaluation. Analysis of policy can take two different forms, namely: 
• policy advocacy which has the purpose of making specific  policy 
recommendations; and 
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• information for policy in which information and data is provided to policy makers 
to assist them in the revision or formulation of actual policies. 
 
Taylor et. al. (1997:36) view analysis of policy as a more academic task. Analysis of 
policy can also take on two distinct forms, namely: 
• analysis of policy determination and effects, which examines the inputs and 
transformational processes operating upon the construction of policy and also the 
effects (impacts and consequences) of such policies on various groups; and 
• analysis of policy content, which examines the values, assumptions and ideologies 
underpinning the policy process. 
 
The thrust of this study is, in the main, the analysis of policy with regard to educator post 
provisioning rather than the analysis for policy with regard to educator post provisioning. 
Further, the researcher takes a critical stance in the analysis of policy on educator post 
provisioning and uses critical theory as an over-arching analytical framework in this 
study.  
 
3.2.1 CRITICAL POLICY ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL THEORY 
Critical policy analysis includes looking at how policy processes are arranged, what the 
content of the policy is, whose interests the policy serves, how it is implemented and 
what the outcomes are. In doing critical policy analysis, exploring the values and 
assumptions which underlie the policy, in whose interests is the particular policy 
initiative and who are the winners or losers, become an integral part of the analysis. 
Therefore, critical policy analysis is, ‘a value laden activity which explicitly or implicitly 
makes judgments as to whether and in what ways policies help to make things better’ 
(Taylor et al. 1997:37). 
 
In engaging in a critical analysis of policy on educator post provisioning, the researcher  
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viewed the analysis from a conflict1 rather a functionalist2 perspective and has, therefore, 
drawn on the work of a theoretical tradition called critical theory in analyzing policy on 
educator post provisioning. According to Gibson (1986:44): 
 Critical theorists in education have three things in common. They  
begin from a concern to map the inequalities and injustices of  
education. Next, they claim to trace those inequalities and injustices  
to their source, showing the educational processes and structures by  
which they are maintained. Finally, they seek or propose remedies to  
those injustices. 
 
In using critical theory the researcher has chosen to focus on the following aspects of this 
paradigm: critique of ideology, critique of instrumental rationality, enlightenment and 
emancipation. 
 
3.2.1.1 CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 
Ideology is not a neutral concept. For critical theorists it is considered a very powerful 
concept. Ideologies are formed by the social practices and beliefs of the powerful in 
society and they penetrate everyday life, familiar assumptions and beliefs (Higgs & 
Smith 1997:186, Gibson 1986:11). McLaren (2003:79-80) asserts that ideology serves 
both a positive and negative function. It is to the negative function that he focuses where 
he links ideology to a theory of domination. Owing to asymmetrical power relationships, 
some groups are privileged over others. These privileged groups sustain their domination 
through ideology by maintaining a breach between ‘ideas and reality’ and ‘words and 
deeds’ (Held 1980:183). In interrogating and deconstructing policy on educator post 
provisioning, the researcher explores how state ideology, in the form of neoliberalism has 
impacted on educator provisioning at public schools and has resulted in some sectors of 
the population maintaining their privileged position whilst simultaneously subverting the 
principles of equity and redress as espoused by policy.  
 
 
                                                 
1 A conflict perspective is based on the premise that society is in continual conflict with some groups 
dominating others and that everyone competes for power (Claasen &Van Wyk 1999:22). 
2 A functionalist perspective is based on the assumption that society is an orderly self-regulating whole in 
which incremental changes take place to ensure stability and consensus (Claasen &Van Wyk 1999:22). 
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3.2.1.2 CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY  
Critical theorists view instrumental rationality as the dominant feature of the modern 
world. Instrumental rationality represents the preoccupation with means in preference to 
ends. It focuses on how things can achieve goals, rather than whether the goals are 
worthwhile. It is concerned with method and efficiency rather than purpose – the most 
efficient means to a given end (Gibson 1986:7). Critical theorists question ‘efficient in 
terms of what?’ and why such a value is considered more worthwhile than others. 
According to Jones (2003:74), such reasoning in modern society is a consequence of 
capitalist activity, where a preoccupation with new and ever more efficient means of 
achieving productive ends becomes the be-all and end-all. This concept of instrumental 
rationality is useful in this study in analyzing the tension between economic efficiency on 
the one hand and equity on the other. Are these two terms compatible or are they 
mutually exclusive from a social justice perspective? 
 
3.2.1.3 ENLIGHTENMENT  
Enlightenment consists of the disclosure of the true interests of individuals and groups. It 
aims to point out who the true beneficiaries are of particular practices and policies. 
Young (1989:40) contends that through enlightenment, oppressed groups can ‘select 
strategies and tactics’ and engage in political action and struggle in order to set 
themselves free from the forces of oppression. In terms of educator post provisioning, the 
researcher aims, through critical reflection, to expose the needs and concerns of the 
different stakeholders in the education system. More importantly, it aims to point out 
whether policy on educator post provisioning addresses the needs and concerns of all 
stakeholders. If not, it aims to expose whose interests are served by the current policy on 
educator post provisioning.  
 
3.2.1.4 EMANCIPATION 
Critical theory attempts to reveal those factors which prevent groups and individuals from 
taking control of or even influencing those factors that affect their lives (Gibson 1986:5, 
Young 1989:58). Rush (2004:9) asserts that critical theory is not merely descriptive but 
rather a way to instigate social change by providing knowledge of the forces of social 
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inequality that can, in turn, inform political action aimed at emancipation (or at least at 
diminishing domination and inequality).  By such revelations it aims to set people free 
from the dominating and repressive structures of society. In other words, it is 
emancipatory. Thus, critical theory has a very clear agenda – to transform society 
(Bertram 2003:116).  
 
In terms of educator provisioning, the emancipatory nature of critical theory will be used 
to reveal if policy on educator post provisioning has contributed to reproducing inequality 
and thereby disadvantaging certain groups in society. Through such revelations, it is 
hoped that this study will galvanize those groups disadvantaged by prevailing policy on 
educator post provisioning into action for change. Further, this study in itself attempts to 
serve as an agent of change because at the end of this study the researcher makes certain 
recommendations in order to improve policy on educator post provisioning. 
 
3.2.2 WHAT IS POLICY? 
The word ‘policy’, is used in many different contexts to refer to diverse sets of 
phenomena. Harman (1984:13) asserts that policy is sometimes used in a very narrow 
sense to refer to ‘formal statements of action’, while others use the word policy as a 
synonym for words such as ‘plan’ or ‘programme’. However, he uses the word policy to 
refer to courses of purposive action being followed or to be followed in dealing with a 
recognized problem or matter of concern, and directed towards the accomplishment of 
some intended or desired set of goals. 
 
Codd (1988:235) avers that policy is taken to be any course of action (or inaction) 
relating to the selection of goals, the definition of values or the allocation of resources. 
Fundamentally for Codd, policy is about the exercise of political power and the language 
that is used to legitimate that process. 
 
According to Kogan (Ball 1990:3), policy is clearly a matter of the authoritative 
allocation of values. They are the operational statements of values and are statements of 
prescriptive intent. Ball (1990:3) adds that values do not float free of their social context. 
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Therefore, the question arises as to whose values are validated in policy and whose are 
not. Thus ‘the allocation of values’ draws attention to the centrality of power and control 
in the concept of policy.  
 
Ranson (1995:440) contends that policies are statements which are typically expressed 
both in utterance and in textual form. They have a distinctive and formal purpose for 
organizations and governments: to codify and publicize the values which are to inform 
future practice and thus encapsulate prescriptions for reform. Policies are thus orientated 
to change and action, providing intent of transforming practice according to ideal values. 
Policies, therefore, systematically challenge the taken for granted assumptions and 
practices in organizations or the state. Ranson (1995:440) adds that the form (orientation 
to change) and substance (the value orientation) of policy challenge the practice and 
traditions of organizational working in way that can generate conflict. Agreement about 
change and values is not a given; they are likely to be ‘essentially contested’ within 
organizations as much as the polity as a whole, as different interest groups struggle to 
acquire influence over purposes and resources. 
 
Policy on educator post provisioning encapsulates all of the above conceptions of policy 
in the sense that it: 
• Represents formal statements of action that seek to address the contentious issue 
of educator distribution. 
• Challenges existing practices of educator distribution and as a result it has the 
potential of bringing the different stakeholders, namely, educators, department 
officials, politicians and unions in conflict. 
• Results in the publicizing of the values that inform educator provisioning. 
• Is simply not received and implemented by the policy recipients but is contested 






3.2.3 TYPES OF POLICIES 
Policies, according to De Clercq (1997:128), vary in their purpose, complexity, target 
groups, distribution of costs and benefits and location of their impact. The following 
types of policies are distinguished: 
• Procedural policies which spell out who is going to take action and through 
which structures and processes such action should be taken (Harly, Bertram and 
Mattson 1999:18).  
• Material/Distributive policies which provide real resources to some interest 
group. 
• Symbolic policies which remain rhetorical about needed changes. According to 
Harly, Bertram and Mattson (1999:17), symbolic policies create a vision of the 
ideal situation. They state that there is a danger that this vision will remain simply 
a vision if the policy documents are not supported by practical rules and 
regulations. 
• Regulatory policies refer to the laws and rules that policies introduce and enforce. 
They may limit the behaviour and actions of certain groups and individuals. 
Success of regulatory policies, according to Hargrove (Hill 1984:132), may often 
rest upon the extent to which they have redistributive consequences. 
• Redistributive policies which shift the allocation of resources or rights among 
social groups. Hargrove (Hill 1984:132) posits that redistributive policies are 
harder to implement than distributive ones. 
 
Policy with regard to educator post provisioning can be categorized as all of the above. It 
is a procedural policy because it spells out the roles of individuals, such as the MEC in 
the creation of educator posts in a province and the Head of the Education Department in 
the distribution of such posts. The fact that this policy provides human resources to 
schools, qualifies it to be a material/distributive policy. It is also a symbolic policy in that 
it creates a vision of the ideal situation at public schools where equity will prevail in 
terms of educator distribution. Further, it also spells out the laws and rules for educator 
distribution which makes it a regulatory policy with possible redistributive consequences. 
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3.2.4 POLICY MAKING 
According to Ganapathy (Dyer 1999:45), in developing countries policy making is seen 
as more prestigious than implementation and it is to the formulation of policy that 
attention is paid. With regard to policy on educator post provisioning this was the case. 
The policy actors focused their attention more on the formulation of the policy. They 
neglected implementation issues owing to the fact that implementation was a provincial 
function. Haddad (1995:19) notes that there are two essential dimensions of policy 
formulation: the how? (The process) and who does it? (The actors). 
 
3.2.4.1 THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS 
In terms of the ‘policy process’, Evans, Slack and Shaw (1995:2) contend that the policy 
process shows two distinct views. The first view depicts policy making as a set of stages 
or steps which follow a logical order (functionalist perspective). The second view depicts 
policy making as a messy, fluid process which cannot be reduced to a simple linear 
model (conflict perspective). It emphasizes the unpredictability of the policy process. 
Instead of seeing the stages as rigidly sequential, each one is viewed as a challenge to be 
faced at some point in the process of policy formulation and implementation.  
 
The Policy Process as Discrete Steps and Stages 
Harman’s (1984:16) view of the policy process is based on the notion that the handling of 
policy by any department or agency generally involves a series of sequential stages or 
phases. Each stage is different, both in terms of what happens to the policy actors and 
their policy efforts, and their results. He identifies the policy process as comprising of 
four stages, namely, emergence and problem identification; policy formulation and 
authorization; implementation; and termination or change. 
 
De Clercq (1997) and the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) 
(1995), agree that this is one view of the policy process. De Clercq (1997:29), however, 
labels the four stages differently, namely, policy initiation; policy formulation; 
implementation; and evaluation. Both De Clercq and Harman conceptualize policy 
formulation and implementation as two separate and distinct activities. This top-down 
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(bureaucratic process model) approach, according to Bowe, Ball and Gold (1996:274), 
creates the perception that policy ‘gets done’ to people by a chain of implementers whose 
roles are clearly defined by legislation.  
 
Policy Making as a Fluid Process 
In practice, the elements of the policy cycle do not take place as a series of discrete steps 
but are experienced as a continuously interactive process (‘bargaining and conflict’ 
model). Some stages may be skipped and others may be concurrent or follow a different 
order, depending on the nature of the policy itself (De Clercq 1997:129). 
 
According to Evans, Slack and Shaw (1995:4), at all stages, affected stakeholders seek to 
make changes which address their concerns. In this sense, the formulation of policy 
options is not something which happens only at the beginning of a cycle, but is 
continuous, with important inputs being made even after the adoption of a particular 
policy option. Thus, even well into the implementation stage, powerful actors can and 
will seek to influence the translation of policies into regulations and actions. Given the 
large number and variety of factors and forces involved in policy making, ‘pure 
rationality’ should not be expected as the policy process ‘is fluid, even messy, but still 
largely understandable’. 
 
Policy making in respect of educator post provisioning was in fact a messy and fluid 
process and did not follow the neat and discrete steps and stages as identified by Harman 
(1984) and De Clercq (1997).  The policy initiation and formulation stage was fraught 
with problems. The National Minister of Education after unilaterally initiating and 
formulating policy was forced to withdraw such policy owing to pressure from educator 
unions. The Ministry of Education was, therefore, forced to go back to the drawing board 
and consult with trade union organisations on the formulation of policy. Notwithstanding 
the attempts by educator unions to influence the policy formulation process to suit the 
needs of its membership, the state officials stood firm in their proposals and ensured that 
their concerns were articulated in policy. Despite the unions attempts to campaign at a 
political level to influence the policy formulation stage, this was not fruitful.  
 86
The implementation stage was not without problems either. This stage posed the greatest 
challenge because whilst policy was formulated nationally, implementation of policy was 
driven provincially. At provincial level there was constant policy re-contextualisation and 
re-creation. Further, the capacity of officials to implement the educator post provisioning 
policy was often called into question.  
  
3.2.4.2 THE POLICY ACTORS 
The question of who participates in the policy process is an important one. Ranson 
(1995:441) reasons that this is dependent on how policy is generated. In other words, is 
policy generated and controlled ‘top-down’ or is involvement a democratic process in 
which representatives take part in all or some stages of policy? Or is involvement a 
political process dependent upon power and ownership of ‘resources’?  Policy generation 
with regard to educator post provisioning was supposed to be a democratic process with 
representatives from the state sector and employee sector participating in the process at 
national ELRC. However, the manner in which policy generation unfolded was 
reminiscent of a ‘top-down’ approach with the state officials using their power to ‘push 
through’ policy.  
 
According to Harman (1984:18), the actors involved with education policy fall into two 
groups: the official and non-official. The official actors are individuals or organizational 
entities which have legally-based responsibilities such as: 
• Actors from levels of government (president, ministers, members of parliament) 
• The Education Ministry and their senior officials – While Ministers hold formal 
authority, in practice a great deal of authority is delegated to senior officials. 
• Government agencies outside the education portfolio which play a part in 
developing and implementing policy 
 
The main non-official actors are interest groups, political parties and the media. Of the 
interest groups, the key players are educator unions and parent associations. The major 
educator unions are important because at any time they will be exerting pressure about a 
wide range of topics at a variety of pressure points. In trying to influence policy on 
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educator provisioning, the major educator union, the SADTU used mass action as a tool 
to get state officials to re-negotiate aspects of the policy which was not in the interests of 
the educators and the learners.  
 
Which policy actors are particularly important depends on the context, the nature of the 
policy being considered and the stage of the policy process. In the South African context 
everyone - from the World Bank to the trade unions – was involved in shaping education 
policy. However, not all actors have to participate equally at all stages of the policy 
process.  
 
The policy actors involved in generating policy on educator provisioning were the parties 
to the national ELRC viz. the state officials and employee representatives (trade unions). 
These policy actors, in theory, were expected to canvass the views of their representative 
constituencies and table mandated positions on educator provisioning. The extent to 
which this did or did not happen, however, is a subject of debate. In the unfolding of 
policy formulation on educator post provisioning, it is important to note that the policy 
proposals were in fact formulated by the state officials. With the state officials 
comprising fifty percent of the bargaining council, all the state needed was one other 
employee grouping to side with its proposals in order to get the policy adopted. Because 
the unions are not homogenous entities, driven by the same values and beliefs, they could 
not find common ground on a collective employee position on educator provisioning. 
This weakened the unions as a collective in the bargaining process. Consequently, this 
strengthened the state’s position and they were able to get the policy adopted at national 
ELRC.  
 
3.2.5 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS 
In terms of this study, data was gathered with regard to implementation of policy on 
educator post provisioning at school sites. Therefore, policy implementation analysis will 




Van Meter and Van Horn (Hill 1984:129) define the implementation process as ‘those 
actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of 
objectives set forth in prior policy decisions’. According to Lane (1993:91) 
‘implementation refers to the bringing about, by means of outputs, of outcomes that are 
congruent with the original intention. He adds that implementation has a double meaning: 
‘to give practical effect to’ or execution on the one hand, and ‘fulfill’ or accomplishment 
on the other. 
 
In the policy arena, there has often been the erroneous, implicit assumption that once 
policies are adopted, full implementation would follow naturally. This assumption, 
according to De Clercq (1997:129), is based on the view that the translation of policy into 
action or practice is an unproblematic and smooth process which requires strong controls 
to ensure that the bureaucracy executes faithfully the directives of the political bosses. 
The policy, according to Dyer (1999:47) is seen as paramount and resistance to it tends to 
be seen as irrational, and a barrier to implementation. When a discrepancy develops 
between intended policies and implemented policies, it is attributed to the lack of 
institutional and resourcing capacities of the state bureaucrats or inadequate control 
systems over the bureaucrats.  
 
McLaughlin (De Clercq 1997:129) problematises the implementation process in order to 
explain the inevitable gap that develops between intended and actual policies. For him, 
implementation is not about automatic transmission but is a process of bargaining and 
negotiation between the various local and national actors. Just as policies are not made in 
a vacuum, they are not carried out in a vacuum. According to McLaughlin, the 
implementing bureaucrats will always put their own interpretations and meanings to the 
intended policies and in the process, will use their power or discretion to subvert or 
transform the original goals of the policy. In recognizing the power of the implementers, 
policy implementation analysts argue that effective policy making should reckon with 
and anticipate implementation problems in order to strategize accordingly and influence 
or constrain the agents of the implementation process. 
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Pressman and Wildavsky (Hill 1984:30) postulate that in order to ensure successful 
implementation, the degree of co-operation between agencies in the implementation 
chain has to be very close to one hundred percent if a situation is not to occur in which a 
number of small deficits cumulatively creates a large shortfall. They thus introduce the 
concept of ‘implementation deficit’ when enacted policies are not fully implemented due 
to a lack of synergy between agencies in the implementation chain. 
 
Craig (1990) in his study titled Comparative African Experiences in Implementing 
Educational Policies highlights certain factors which influence policy implementation. 
These factors will be used as benchmarks in analyzing the implementation of policy on 
educator post provisioning.   
 
3.2.5.1 THE POLICY MESSAGE  
Craig (1990:24) identifies three fundamental components of a policy message, namely, 
the substance of a policy; the means specified for putting a policy into effect; and the way 
in which the substance and the means are communicated. 
 
With respect to substance of a policy, the issue is one of realism. Among those who 
maintain implementation failures can be traced back to unrealistic policies, there are two 
general positions which have a bearing on policy on educator post provisioning:  
• In terms of the problem addressed by the post provisioning policy, to what extent 
is there a need for social and attitudinal changes? 
• In terms of the policy message and objectives, to what extent does 
implementation of the policy result in undesirable consequences for the 
recipients? 
 
The means specified for implementation could also be a constraining factor. For any 
given policy there may be numerous possible approaches to implementation. Taking into 
account the resistance any innovative policy is likely to confront, it is important that 
policy makers because of their familiarity with the policy goals select and if necessary, 
institute an appropriate implementation strategy. With regard to policy on educator 
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provisioning it is important to note that the formulating agency and implementing agency 
are two separate entities. Therefore, consultation of individuals involved in implementing 
policy would be an imperative in order to institute an appropriate implementation 
strategy.  
 
The way in which a policy is communicated can have important effects on the prospects 
for implementation. Implementation is more likely if a policy is straightforward and if its 
goals and mechanisms are expressed precisely and explicitly. Harman (1984:25) contends 
that an ideal policy is one that is clear with unambiguous goals. Gunn (Hill 1984:131) 
adds that there must be a complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives 
to be achieved; and these conditions must persist throughout the implementation process. 
 
In terms of implementing policy on educator post provisioning it is, therefore, vitally 
important that all role players in the implementation chain are au fait with the goals and 
objectives of the policy and mechanisms involved in implementation. The lack of clarity 
and openness, and incoherence or vagueness can leave implementers without much 
needed guidance and provide openings for those bent on obstruction of policy. 
 
3.2.5.2 THE BUREAUCRATS AND THE ADMINISTRATORS 
Within the African context, and more specifically within education ministries, there is a 
lack of experience and poor training of administrators and school inspectors. Officials 
have been criticized for the inadequate delivery systems that have been instituted, for 
their lack of interest in seeing projects through to completion and their inability to work 
in harmony with those in other agencies (Craig 1990:50).  
 
In terms of implementation of policy on educator post provisioning at school sites, the 
role of the SEM is pivotal. The extent to which they are able to provide strong leadership 
and reliable support to principals when they confront unanticipated problems and 




3.2.5.3 THE EDUCATORS 
Educators are sometimes seen as an obstacle to the implementation of policies. They may 
doubt that putting such policies into practice is worth the effort. They may believe that 
particular policy objectives cannot attain the intended goals. They may reject the theory 
used to justify the reform or may just rationalize that a particular policy will just not 
work. Educators also view new policies with a certain degree of suspicion. They may 
reason that a new policy will mean increased workloads without additional compensation 
(Craig 1990:52). Therefore, in terms of policy on educator post provisioning, the extent 
to which the outcomes of the implementation of the policy have positive pay-offs for 
them will be the deciding factor as to whether they oppose implementation or embrace it. 
 
Further, the educators usually denied input when policies are formulated, compensate by 
concentrating their energies on transforming policies while efforts are being made to put 
them into effect. They may engage in a campaign to neutralize a distasteful policy (Craig 
1990:56). This has often been the case with policy on educator post provisioning where 
educators, after mandating their unions, engaged in mass action which often culminated 
in teacher strikes. These actions were used by educators to pressurize the state into 
reviewing policy on educator post provisioning. This resistance by educators has been 
partially successful in derailing policy implementation.  
 
3.2.6 POLICY TOOLS 
There is an array of motivational devices found in policy content that gets people to act in 
concert with policy objectives. Schneider and Ingram (1990:512) have distinguished 
between five broad categories of policy instruments according to the behavioral 
assumptions on which they are based, namely, authority tools; incentive tools; symbolic 
and hortatory tools; capacity tools and learning tools. However, with regard to policy on 
educator post provisioning the following policy tools are relevant: 
 
 3.2.6.1 AUTHORITY TOOLS 
Authority tools are one of the most common tools used by government to achieve policy 
aims. These are simply statements backed by the legitimate authority of government that 
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grant permission, prohibit, or require action under designated circumstances. Authority 
tools are mainly used within hierarchical systems of government to guide the behaviour 
of agents and officials, but seldom extend to target populations. These tools assume 
agents and targets are responsive to the organizational structure of leader-follower 
relationships and that the lower level agents usually will do as they are told (Schneider & 
Ingram 1990:514, Bleiklie 2000:107-108). With regard to educator provisioning, it is the 
National Minister of Education that authorizes provincial education departments, through 
policy, to create and distribute educator posts. Provincial MEC’s and Heads of Education 
Departments, through implementation manuals, in turn, authorize department officials 
and principals to implement post provisioning policy. Failure to implement policy by 
these officials may result in disciplinary action being taken against these officials.  
 
3.2.6.2 CAPACITY TOOLS 
Capacity tools provide information, training, education and resources to enable 
individuals, groups or agencies to make decisions or carry out activities. These 
approaches assume incentives are not an issue, but their may be barriers stemming from 
lack of information, skills or other resources needed to make decisions or take actions 
that will contribute to policy goals (Schneider & Ingram 1990:517, Bleiklie 2000:109-
110). The use of capacity tools in ensuring policy relevant behaviour is paramount when 
it comes to policy on educator provisioning because of its highly technical nature.  
 
3.2.6.3 SYMBOLIC AND HORTATORY TOOLS  
Symbolic and hortatory tools assume that people are intrinsically motivated and decide 
whether or not to take policy related action on the basis of their beliefs and values. 
Individuals bring into decision situations cultural notions of right, wrong, justice, 
individualism, equality, obligations and so forth. The idea here is that target populations 
are more likely to comply with behaviour desirable from a policy perspective if they 
themselves find the behaviour to be consistent with their beliefs (Schneider & Ingram 
1990:519, Bleiklie 2000:110-111). Policy on educator post provisioning appeals to the 
values and beliefs of educators with its notions of social justice in educator distribution. 
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Consequently, educators moved by values of equity and social redress will support policy 
on educator provisioning.   
 
3.3 THE NEOLIBERAL IDEOLOGY 
It is important to note that policies are ideological texts which have been constructed 
within a particular context. Therefore, a brief account of the concept ideology is 
presented followed by a discussion on the state’s political ideologies. 
 
3.3.1 THE CONCEPT IDEOLOGY 
The concept ideology through time has acquired many different meanings. Leatt (Ashley 
1989:3) views ideology as an action-related system of ideas and institutions, intended to 
change or defend an existing socio-economic order. Stilwell (2002:389) on the other hand 
advocates that ideologies are a system of beliefs. They embody particular value 
judgments about the economy and society and commonly give legitimacy to a particular 
socio-economic order e.g. neoliberal ideology as a justification for ‘free market’ 
capitalism.  
 
In the Marxist tradition of social thought, ideologies are conceptual structures created by 
the ruling class to justify their position. It is seen as a system of distorted or misleading 
ideas which are based on illusions, and which serve the interests of those who rule 
society. Marx saw ideology as an instrument of dominance used by the ruling class over 
the working class (Ashley 1989:2). For Marx ideology is a consequence of, and not the 
cause of, something that happens in society. He believed that something such as ideology 
(without any physical properties) could not have an influence on something material. 
Only material things could be causal agents. Thus, Marx argued that ideology expresses 
fundamental conditions in a society and that it has no influence in a society. In other 
words, ideology is a by-product of social activity (Enteman 1993:15).  
 
In the South African context ideology has played a prominent role in the political, 
economic and social sphere. The dominant political ideology that shaped South African 
society pre-1994 was that of the apartheid ideology which led to the stratification of 
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society on the basis of race. With the coming into political power of the democratic 
movements in 1994 a new political ideology, neoliberalism which is largely economic in 
orientation has gained ground. 
 
3.3.2 THE ESSENCE OF NEOLIBERALISM 
According to Bourdieu (1998:2), the neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among 
many. Rather, it is a ‘strong discourse’ because it has on its side those forces which 
dominate economic relationships such as financiers, the owners and managers of large 
corporations as well as government officials and politicians. These individuals sanctify 
the power of the market in the name of economic efficiency, which requires the 
elimination of administrative or political barriers capable of inconveniencing the owners 
of capital in their quest for the maximization of profit. According to Stilwell (2002:21), 
the core belief of neoliberalism is that by giving freer reign to market forces more 
efficient economic outcomes will result. Therefore, in many industrialized nations there 
has been a push, in the couple of decades, for deregulation, privatization and the 
liberalization of trade and capital movements.  
 
Neoliberalism argues that the private sector is the most important force in any economy – 
guarantee increased profits for the private sector and everyone will benefit – according to 
this approach. If the profits of business increase they will be re-invested, there will be 
economic growth, more jobs, more goods will be produced and bought and we will have 
continuous prosperity (Pape 1998:1). 
 
Central to this ideology is the push towards a lean and mean state. According to neo-
liberal economics, the state’s main objective should be to promote the profitability of 
business. A lean and mean state is neither a producer nor a deliverer of services. 
Government owned companies and many government services must be privatized under 
neo-liberalism.  In addition, with a lean and mean state, the government has to practice 
fiscal discipline – spending less in order not to compare with the private sector. 
Ultimately a lean and mean state is not a force for redistribution and development but an 
ally of business (Pape 1998:2). According to Weber (2002:265), neoliberalism concerns a 
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retreat from democratic practice in public policy. It is characterized by privatization of 
education, decentralization in education governance, fiscal austerity in social spending 
and the advocacy of cost recovery (user fees, student loans). 
 
Key to neoliberalism is competition. The neoliberal approach supports competition at all 
levels – between workers, between countries and to some extent between companies. 
Becoming internationally competitive and export orientated is vital – produce more for 
the world market and sell these goods at competitive prices and use the profits to further 
expand industry. Delivery to the local market is not a priority (Pape 1998:2). 
 
In order to become globally competitive added pressure is exerted on bosses and workers. 
Higher quality of goods must be produced at lower prices. Workers must work harder – 
longer hours, more tasks, and fewer holidays. Employers must spend less money on 
health and safety, benefits and wages. These practices often lead to outsourcing, the 
replacement of workers by new technology, the hiring of employees on fixed term 
contracts and casualisation of labour (Pape 1998:2). 
 
3.3.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S COMMITMENT TO NEOLIBERALISM 
The South African society, under apartheid rule of the National Party (NP) government, 
was considered according to Marais (2001:7) as one of the most unequal societies on 
earth. By the World Bank’s calculations, the poorest 40% of its citizens earned less than 
4% of the income circulating in the economy. The wealthiest 10% pocketed more than 
51% of the income. Given such a vast inequality coupled with the need for economic 
growth and job creation in order to address rampant unemployment, South Africa needed 
an innovative macro-economic strategy to address these problems. 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) which formed the first democratically elected 
government in South Africa in April 1994 articulated its first economic policy in the form 
of a 1990 ‘Discussion Document on Economic Policy’. Central to this document was the 
restructuring of the economy. The overriding theme though was ‘growth through 
redistribution’, a formula in which redistribution acts as a spur to growth and in which the 
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fruits of growth are redistributed to satisfy basic need. The ‘growth through 
redistribution’ approach was severely censured by mainstream economists and in the 
media because of its strong socialist undertones. The ‘growth through redistribution’ 
strategy was deemed unsustainable and such thinking within ANC circles quickly 
withered (Marais 2001:124-126). 
 
Since the ‘growth through redistribution’ strategy, economic thinking within ANC circles 
began to take on precepts of neo-liberal dogma. According to Viv McMenamin (Marais 
2001:130), an ANC economist, thinking within the ANC had come to reflect a shift away 
from policies which were considered morally and politically correct, but will cause strong 
adverse reaction from powerful local and international interests. Its draft policy 
guidelines released in 1992 made no mention of restructuring or regulating the financial 
sector and mooted the possibility of privatization in the public sector. 
 
The ANC’s economic policy platform, released just prior to the April 1994 election, was 
revealed in two documents: The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macro-economic Policy in South Africa. 
The RDP, however, was stated as official ANC policy. Although the RDP reflected the 
issues such as housing, training, services, and jobs that were considered important to the 
ANC’s base constituency, the ANC’s macroeconomic policies after the April 1994 
elections were characterized as both moderate and business friendly. Nelson Mandela, 
South Africa’s president, stated at the World Economic Forum in 1994 that the ANC 
government would adhere to western economic policies rather than the socialist policies 
the ANC advocated as a banned liberation movement (Hanson & Hentz 1999: 498). This 
was seen as a major shift in the ANC’s economic policy since in 1990, with the 
unbanning of the ANC, Nelson Mandela declared that ‘the nationalization of the mines, 
banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of 
our views in this regard is inconceivable’ (Marais 2001:122).  
 
According to Hanson and Hentz (1999:499), the culmination of the government’s move 
to neo-liberal orthodoxy was signaled by the apparent demise of the RDP on 28 March 
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1996 and its replacement with a new economic blueprint, the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in June 1996. The GEAR was the ANC’s first 
comprehensive economic plan since its election in 1994. According to Bond (2000:78), 
the GEAR was based on the Reserve Bank’s model, along with models developed by the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), World Bank and Stellenbosch Bureau of 
Economic Research. All these models were extremely orthodox, with biases that 
favoured neo-liberal policies that treated markets as fairly reliable and well functioning 
institutions. Notwithstanding strong labour opposition to the GEAR, Trevor Manuel the 
Minister of Finance contended that the GEAR strategy was ‘non-negotiable’ in its broad 
outline. The models collectively predicted that if the desired policies were adopted, South 
Africa would reach 6% sustainable growth and create 400 000 new jobs a year by the turn 
of the century (Bond 2000:78).  
 
3.3.4 FROM A NEOLIBERAL TO A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
Recently, there has been some tension in government circles with regard to its thinking 
on its economic policy. The new trend is for some of the government ideologues to refer 
to the South African state as a ‘developmental’ rather than a neoliberal state. A 
developmental state is viewed as one that is able to manage the delicate balance between 
growth and social development. In a developmental state, poverty alleviation is key, 
expanding economic opportunities and fighting social deprivation is critical and 
providing public services and facilities to the poor is paramount (South Africa. Ministry 
of Finance 2004:3). Thus, in a developmental state, improving the access to education 
and the quality of education for the disadvantaged communities is considered a priority. 
This would, therefore, mean diverting more funds to disadvantaged schools so that both 
the quantity and quality of its educator pool could be improved as well as its physical 
infrastructure and material resources    
 
3.4 MANAGERIALISM  
According to Fitzsimons (1999:1), one of the features of contemporary Western society is 
the tendency under neo-liberal philosophy to define social, economic and political issues, 
as problems to be resolved through management. This has consequently paved the way 
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for the introduction of managerialism as a new mode of governance in the public sector. 
Managerialism according to Turner and Hulme (1997:14) is the adoption by the public 
sector of private sector management practices. It is driven by the application of public 
choice theory and neo-classical economics to public sector management. Neo-classical 
economists are of the view that the public sector is inefficient and ineffective. Big 
government had not been effective government and it was time the principles of the 
market were allowed to operate. Reducing the size of the state and restricting the 
operations of the state would bring considerable savings. Programmes to increase 
bureaucratic capacity and efficiency and to encourage private sector growth through 
market mechanisms would then ensure that development would take place (Turner & 
Hulme 1997:18). 
 
In the search for better performance in the public sector, Mok (1999:2) notes that some 
fashionable terms such as ‘excellence’, ‘increasing competitiveness’, ‘efficiency’, 
‘accountability’, ‘devolution’ and ‘self-managing schools’ have been introduced in order 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Given South Africa’s 
commitment to the neoliberal dogma, reforms in the public sector to reduce state 
involvement in the provision of public goods became part of the state’s agenda. In 
education, devolution of powers to the provinces and to the schools themselves has 
become a reality. Schools are considered as ‘self reliant’ and ‘self managing’ entities. In 
terms of finance, as this resource becomes scarce, the buzzword at all levels is that of 
efficiency.  
  
3.4.1 THE PARADIGM SHIFT TO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT   
Mok (1999:2) notes that in the past two decades there has been a fundamental change in 
the philosophy of governance from a ‘big government, small individual’ to a ‘small 
government, big individual’ creed. Intending to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the public sector, governments have begun to engage themselves in transforming the 
way that services are managed. Moving away from the traditional public administration 
paradigm to the ‘new public management’ (NPM), a more transparent and accountable 
public sector, as well as a more effective control of work practices are stressed. 
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3.4.2 THE DOCTRINES OF NPM  
Different commentators and advocates of NPM have stressed different aspects of the 
doctrine. From a survey of the NPM package advocated by Hood (1991:4-5), Boston 
(Fleisch 2002:162), Bardill (Fleisch 2002:163) and Martin (2002:130) the following key 
features can be identified: 
• Devolution of management control (towards what is often referred to as the 
doctrine of self management). 
• A shift from large scale bureaucracies to quasi-independent agencies. 
• A shift towards contracting out services and outright privatization. 
• The use of short-term labour contract. 
• A general stress on cost saving and efficiency. This may involve cutting direct 
costs (reducing state expenditure) by downsizing of personnel. 
• Raising labour discipline and resisting union demands. 
• Greater transparency in resource allocation and the use of resources in new ways 
so as to heighten efficiency and effectiveness. 
• ‘Hands on’ professional management with managers given the freedom to 
manage. 
 
The data gathered in this study, will be analyzed using the above features of NPM. 
 
3.4.3. MANAGERIALISM AND EDUCATION 
An account on an international perspective of managerialist policies in education is 
presented followed by an exposition on some of the drawbacks of pursuing managerialist 
policies in education. 
 
3.4.3.1 AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Within education, as in other public services such as housing, health and welfare, it is 
possible to identify a new institutional culture which has been termed ‘NPM’, ‘new 
managerialism’ and ‘corporate managerialism’. In various parts of the world there are 
increasing numbers of attempts to restructure and regulate state schooling. Central to 
these initiatives are moves to dismantle centralized educational bureaucracies and to 
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create in their place devolved systems of education entailing significant degrees of 
institutional autonomy and a variety of forms of school-based management and 
administration. In many cases, these changes have been linked to enhanced parental 
choice or an increased emphasis on community involvement in schools. Such policy 
initiatives often introduce a ‘market’ element into the provision of educational services 
even though they continue to be paid for largely out of taxation. This may involve 
‘privatizing’ them, both by involving private sector providers and by handing over to 
individuals and families decisions that were previously a matter of public policy. Most 
often, it entails making public services behave more like the private sector. The term 
‘quasi-market’ is increasingly being used to characterize attempts to introduce market 
forces and private decision-making into the provision of education (Whitty, Power & 
Halpin 1998:3, 51). 
 
Simkins (2000:317) points out that the concept of managerialism is becoming an 
increasingly important part of the discourse about public sector reform in the UK. In 
England and Wales, after promulgation of the Education Reform Act of 1988, there is a 
trend to devolve education provision to local communities. Schools could opt out of 
Local Education Authority (LEA) after a parental ballot and choose to run themselves by 
a governing body as a grant maintained school with direct funding from central 
government. By opting for grant maintained status it gains increased powers in relation to 
admissions, finance and staffing. Schools could also opt for institutional autonomy 
through the Local Management of Schools (LMS) policy. LMS grants governing bodies 
of schools that remain within LEA’s increased control over their own budgets and day to 
day management. These schools receive funds according to a formula which ensures that 
85% of the LEA’s budget is handed down to schools and 80% of each schools budget is 
determined directly by the number and ages of its learners. The funding formula includes 
teacher salaries and teachers are now de facto (though not de jure) employees of the 
governing body (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:18-19). 
 
Similarly, education reforms instituted in New Zealand was largely shaped by a 
government which embraced NPM. The Picot Report (1988) and the government’s 
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Tomorrows Schools prompted reforms that led to a shift in the responsibility for budget 
allocation, staff employment and educational outcomes from central government and 
regional education boards to individual schools. Schools were given boards of trustees 
(comprising parents and members of the business community) who could opt for bulk 
funding – granting of 100% of their funding including teacher salaries based on a 
predetermined learner-educator ratio (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:21). 
 
In the Australian context, given its federal constitution, education provision is mainly the 
responsibility of the six states and the Northern Territory. Devolution has been a feature 
of government reforms since the 1970’s. The concept of self-managing schools has 
gained popularity and various state education departments are remodeling schools on 
these lines. Since 1989 New South Wales has been implementing its decentralization 
programme which promoted devolution and choice – not only restructuring school 
management along corporate principles but deregulating school zones to stimulate 
competition between schools. The state of Victoria, however, is a leading proponent of 
devolution. By 1992 all schools were governed by a school council which had control of 
all items except teaching staff salaries. Further, reforms have seen Victoria’s schools 
being granted full control over budgets and even personnel. The school council recruits 
the principal, who then takes responsibility for staff and resources. Odden (Whitty, Power 
& Halpin 1998:23-24) claims that these reforms represent one of the world’s most 
comprehensive, well-designed, promising and professional approaches to decentralized 
management of schools. These reforms need to be seen against a background of sharp 
reductions in the level of resourcing from the state. Further, during the mid 1990’s six 
hundred schools were closed and there was a reduction of 20% in the number of teachers 
employed as a result (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:23-24). 
 
Similarly, the South African education system has not been immune to the education 
reforms taking place internationally. Since the democratization of the education system in 
1994 there has been significant reforms consistent with NPM. In education, the concept 
of decentralization has been used increasingly has a tool to enhance managerial authority, 
improve economic and managerial efficiency and effectiveness and enhance better 
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governance. One of the primary modes of decentralization used by the government in 
education reform was that of deconcentration.3 With regard to educator provisioning 
deconcentration has translated into the DNE giving the provinces greater autonomy with 
regard to setting their own leaner-educator ratios, determining the size of the provincial 
educator pool, determining substitute educator numbers and policy with regard to the 
employment of temporary educators. Devolution4 has also been used as a mode of 
decentralization where communities have been granted powers to participate in the 
process of school governance through democratically elected SGBs. With regard to 
educator provisioning, SGBs have been empowered to augment the state’s allocation to 
schools through the appointment of SGB paid educators in order to improve efficiency in 
service delivery and improve responsiveness to learner needs. A third form of 
decentralization used by the government in education is that of delegation.5 In terms of 
delegation SGBs have been granted powers to set user fees (school fees) and thereby 
reduce the financial burden of public schools on the state. The setting of fees by SGBs 
has, however, allowed some privileged groups to effectively ‘privatize’ schools within 
the public school system through the levying of exorbitant fees.  
 
3.4.3.2 THE COSTS OF MANAGERIALISM 
The adoption of mechanisms and principles from the private sector can enhance 
efficiency of educational services delivery. But what is also true is that the emphasis on 
economic rationalism and the practice of ‘strong management’ in running public sector 
services might have unintended consequences. Displacing costs elsewhere and shifting 
responsibilities from the state to individuals, local communities and other non-state 
sectors, the particular ‘efficiencies’ of certain services may be increased at human and 
social costs. As Rees (Mok 1999:118) points out, ‘costs endured by those subjected to 
managerialist practices include unemployment and associated poverty; part-time work 
and accompanying insecurity; stress anxiety and loss of morale among employees….’ 
                                                 
3 Deconcentration is the passing down of selected administrative functions to lower levels or sub-national 
units within government agencies or departments.  
4 Devolution is the granting of decision making powers to lower authorities or managers and allowing them 
to take full responsibility without reference back to the authorizing government. 
5 Delegation is the transfer of specific authority and decision making powers to organizations that are 
outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that are only indirectly controlled by government. 
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As a result of English reforms, educators face increased workloads, attempts to use them 
more flexibly to counter the effects of budget restrictions, divisive approaches to 
performance related pay and the replacement of full-time, permanent, qualified and 
experienced staff by part-time, temporary, less qualified and less experienced and 
therefore less expensive staff. A report by the National Foundation for Educational 
Research confirms that many of these trends have accelerated since the introduction of 
local management of schools particularly in those schools adversely affected by the use 
of average staffing costs in the funding formula. Ozga and Soucek (Whitty, Power & 
Halpin 1998:71) suggest that the reforms in England, Wales and parts of Australia have 
served to reduce the core of established and costly teachers and enlarge the more flexible 
and less expensive peripheral labour force. Blackmore (Whitty, Power & Halpin 
1998:71) adds that given the position of women in the peripheral labour market, they are 
likely increasingly to be disadvantaged and exploited. Indeed, in many classrooms, 
parents predominantly mothers were being used as unpaid substitute teachers. 
  
Mok (1999:118) makes a valid point in that education, unlike market commodities is a 
human service and a public good. Therefore, conceptualizing it solely as a market 
commodity may marginalize issues to do with morality and ethics as well as doing justice 
to ensure goals such as equity. 
 
Mok (1998:118) in pointing out effects of managerialism on higher education asserts that 
‘doing more with less’ and ‘working smarter with fewer staff and less resources’ has 
become the norm. He notes that in the past few years there has been a general increase in 
academic teachers’ workload, from a staff-student ratio of 1:12 to a ratio of 1:20. In the 
midst of budget cuts, short-term appointments and part-time teaching have become a very 
popular survival strategy.  
 
As result of managerialist reforms in South African education the workloads of educators 
has increased quite considerably over the years. The learner-educator ratios in the various 
provinces remain extremely high and the period load of educators has increased. 
Moreover, SMTs carry larger teaching loads which leave very little time for management 
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duties. The number of temporary educators in the system is also considerably high 
because provincial education departments view the employment of temporary educators 
as a less costly option. Further, parents are being exploited by increasingly being called 
upon to volunteer their services as substitute educators owing to the demand for 
substitute educators far exceeding supply in the provinces.  
 
3.5 RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODELS 
As a consequence of managerialist approaches to education, tools that heighten allocative 
efficiency are employed by public sector organisations. A RAM is an example of one 
such tool. A RAM is a means by which resources are distributed according to preset 
criteria represented by a number of formulae and variables. A RAM is normally 
computerized making it relatively easy to calculate the financial implications of alternate 
assumptions of key variables (Field & Klingert 2001:83). RAMS are widely used in 
education to distribute human resources, material resources and finance. The PPM is a 
RAM that is used by provincial education departments to distribute state paid educator 
posts to schools. It takes into account numerous factors that have an influence on 
educator requirements at schools and uses a number of formulae to determine a school’s 
post entitlement (PPN). 
 
Field and Klingert (2001:83) point out that with shifts in many governments from line 
item budgeting to lump sum budgeting as well as from central control towards 
decentralization, the use of RAMs have gained prominence. They argue that without 
these developments in government policies the use of RAMs would be meaningless. 
Further, with increasing limits being placed on expenditure by governments, the use of a 
RAM stresses flexibility in the distribution of scarce resources. In South Africa, the 
change in the budgetary process from the 1997/8 financial year onwards towards 
decentralized control resulted in provinces drawing up their own budgets. Further, with 
lump sum budgeting by the various ministries in the provinces, as well as the introduction 
of the MTEF in order to project expenditure for the next three years in accordance with 
policy priorities, the introduction of the PPM by the department of education has proved 
to be an invaluable resource allocation tool. 
 105
3.5.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF A RAM 
A RAM is not neutral. It contains a number of basic assumptions regarding what is 
important and what is not. In other words it consists of ‘systematized subjective 
opinions’. Similarly, the PPM is based on a number of factors and variables with regard 
to what is considered important with regard to educator provisioning. However, in 
deciding on particular factors and variables, micro-political activity can be a strong 
influence on decision making and be subject to sub-unit power, a factor which is likely to 
increase in times of financial constraint. Thomas (1999:185-186) has noted in his study 
that during the process of devising a RAM, its details were influenced by micro-political 
activity and the priority and preferences of the main change agents. Although the rhetoric 
was of rationality, the way in which the details of the formula were agreed upon was 
subject to the influence of powerful individuals.  
 
It must be stressed that RAM’s are constrained by budgets. A RAM does not decide on 
budgets, decision makers do. Therefore, a RAM does not eliminate the politics of the 
budgetary process (Field & Klingert 2001:84). It is, therefore, important to note that the 
PPM does not create educator posts. It can only distribute educator posts. The provincial 
education budget allocated for personnel expenditure creates educator posts. The 
determination of the size of the provincial education budget is in fact a political activity 
with provincial legislatures determining education expenditure. 
 
Key to a RAM is the principle of greater transparency, consistency and rationality 
(Thomas 1999:183). A RAM such as the PPM should, therefore, make explicit what 
resources are available and how they will be allocated. The extent to which the 
implementers of the PPM are able to ensure transparency, however, is a moot point. Field 
and Klingert (2001:87), therefore, posit that if there is less than total transparency there 
seems little point in having a model. 
 
A RAM should give organizations a reasonable degree of certainty that the resources 
allocated  will also be the resources available during the financial year and provide them 
with some measure of stability over the relevant period (Field and Klingert 2001:87).  
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3.5.2 WHY USE A RAM?  
The introduction of a major management tool such as a RAM is usually the result of 
some kind of pressure. This pressure, according to Field and Klingert (2001:85), 
normally stems from perceived inconsistencies or unfairness from the user constituency. 
Dissatisfaction with dysfunctionalities of existing methods of resource allocation among 
the interested parties might cause a demand for new methods. Inconsistencies between 
criteria used by the government in distributing resources and those used at the 
institutional level might also be conducive to the introduction of the use of a RAM. The 
PPM was introduced owing to pressure from educators and educator unions. This 
pressure was largely as a result of claims of unfairness in educator distribution to schools 
from the educator constituency. However, from the point of view of the education 
department, the PPM was seen as a major innovation in terms of its strategic and 
operational planning initiatives. 
 
Thomas (1999:184-185) contends that trends towards formulaic approaches have two 
principal aims: to change the culture of organizations towards a more entrepreneurial 
approach by reflecting the pressures of the external environment; and to bring a more 
rational basis to the allocation of resources. Further, he adds that demands for rationality 
in the allocation of resources and for strengthening of the planning process have placed 
considerable emphasis on the need to provide consistent data for decision making at a 
strategic, tactical and operational level. Abhilak (2000:2) commenting on the application 
of the PPM, therefore, makes a valid point that effective implementation of the PPM is 
dependent on accurate data. Educator unions have consistently challenged the department 
on the accuracy of the data used in determining the PPN of schools. They consistently 
maintain that the PPNs of schools are flawed owing to the lack of correct statistics in the 
department’s database.  
 
3.5.3 POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS IN THE USE OF A RAM  
Wildavsky (Thomas 1999:185) notes that the initial introduction of formula-based 
models for resource allocation may imply a radical redistribution of resources compared 
with previous historic patterns of allocation. Therefore, when a RAM is introduced, 
 107
agreement amongst all stakeholders to its implementation is of paramount importance. 
When the revised PPM was introduced in 2003, educator unions were far from happy at 
the manner in which it was implemented. After field-testing of the revised PPM, the 
unions accused the state officials of not consulting them with regard to the results of the 
field testing. Consequently, without approval of the unions the revised PPM was 
implemented.  
 
In most cases, a RAM will in itself change the outcome of the institution’s resource 
allocation processes. There will be winners and losers. Economic theory suggests that if 
losers can be compensated this should reduce the resistance to the adoption of such a 
model. In a survey conducted by Field and Klingert (2001:86) they found that this was an 
important issue. Two thirds of respondents reported some level of disagreement (signing 
up to the model does not necessarily mean that people are happy with it), although 
several were very relaxed about it. However, there are always winners and losers when 
the ‘pot’ is constrained. The losers will be unhappy. The winners, however, are frustrated 
because they cannot get their hands quick enough on the resources that the RAM suggests 
they are entitled to. The data generated in this study aims to identify the institutions and 
groupings that are ‘winners’ and the institutions and groupings that are ‘losers’ when the 
PPM distributes posts to schools. 
 
A RAM is not regarded as a fixed and static entity. Therefore, it is important to accept 
that a RAM may change over time – there may be minor revisions each year. These may 
be the result of inconsistencies or changed priorities due to the ‘changing environment’, 
but in all cases there should be agreement amongst all stakeholders to the revisions. Field 
and Klingert (2001:87) note that when a RAM is first introduced, perfection is highly 
unlikely and will, therefore, need regular review owing to changes in external 
circumstances and internal politics. However, they advocate that when changes are made 
to a RAM, the basic features should be kept for as long as possible to maintain 
predictability. The PPM was revised in 2002 owing to dissatisfaction with the original 
PPM. In revising the model, the core of the model was kept intact and new design 
features were added to the model. 
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In Field and Klingert’s (2001:87) study, a member noted that RAM’s seem to degenerate 
over time as concessions to special interests at institutions are incorporated. When this 
happens it damages the very transparency that the RAM was supposed to achieve. 
Further, over time, the insidious growth of new features or calculations can lead to a 
situation where very few people understand the model anymore. This can lead to users of 
the model becoming totally perplexed and may call into question issues of transparency 
of the RAM. The PPM and its subsequent revision have resulted in the model becoming 
quite complex. The various formulae and calculations make it difficult for principals to 
verify their educator establishments manually. 
  
3.5.4 EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF A RAM 
Equity considerations are important when it comes to resource distribution. It is, 
therefore, necessary to look at the different conceptions of equity. 
 
Broadly speaking, the concept equity is commonly equated with ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’. 
Simkins (1995:222), however, makes the distinction between ‘procedural’ and 
‘distributive’ equity – the former concerning fair treatment in terms of rules and 
procedures, the latter concerning fairness in the distribution of resources and 
opportunities. The PPM, for example, can be argued to be more procedurally equitable in 
that it is based on objective criteria (in the sense that the criteria are set out as common 
rules and not determined by administrative discretion). More challenging and complex 
questions are raised, however, when the issues of distributional equity are addressed with 
regard to the PPM. 
 
When dealing with distributional equity, Simkins (1995:222) raises the following 
pertinent questions: 
• What does ‘equal treatment’ mean? Does it mean ‘identical’ or ‘equivalent’ for 
example? 
• Should it be conceived in terms of access to resource provision, of the nature of 
the educational experiences which the resources provide, or of the outcomes or 
benefits which result for the individual? 
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Given the above dilemma, the researcher chose to look at distributional equity from two 
perspectives in this study, namely, equity in terms of the quality of educators as resource 
inputs and equity based on the outcomes educators as a resource are intended to 
contribute. 
 
Simkins (1995:224) advances that if we assume that there is a fixed quantity of resources 
to be allocated and that learners have different capacities to benefit in terms of learning 
from a given level of resourcing, then there is a clear choice available. We can attempt to 
maximize the total learning gain by directing resources to those whom we expect to gain 
the most or we can direct resources to those whom we judge to be the most 
disadvantaged. In terms of redress, the PPM in principle directs additional human 
resources to disadvantaged schools owing to the assumption that by directing additional 
resources to these schools smaller class sizes will be created which in turn may enhance 
educational quality. However, it should be noted that for any resource distribution to 
schools to have any positive effect on learning a full analysis of the existing resource 
position of individual schools should be done. This should include the quality of the 
resources a school has and can attract in terms, for example, of teacher qualifications or 
teacher experience. Such information is important so as not to exacerbate inequity from a 
distributional equity perspective. 
  
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has focused on the theoretical and conceptual tools used in this study. An 
overview on policy analysis with critical theory being used as an over-arching paradigm 
in policy analysis was presented.  An account on neoliberalism as well as managerialism 
which is informed by the neoliberal ideology was then presented. The use of RAMs in 
education was then elucidated upon.  
 
The next chapter focuses on the research design employed in this study. The 
methodological approach, as well as the data collection tools and techniques employed in 





RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter focused on the theoretical orientation to this study by outlining the 
chosen theoretical frameworks, concepts and models. The focus of this chapter is on a 
discussion of the methodological approach and methods used to generate data, namely, 
the survey questionnaire, interviews and document analysis.  
 
After presenting a brief discussion on the methodological approach, information on the 
survey questionnaire which is the primary data gathering tool employed in this study is 
presented. Issues including the construction and design of the questionnaire, piloting of it, 
the sampling framework as well as the techniques involved in data analysis are presented. 
The interviews, which was a secondary data gathering tool is then presented with a 
specific focus on the rationale for the interviews, the selection of informants, the nature 
of the interviews, trialing of the interviews and techniques involved in the analysis of 
interview data. This chapter then concludes with a brief account on the document study.  
 
4.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
In order to obtain data on the issues related to the critical questions formulated in chapter 
one, the researcher chose to use both the qualitative and quantitative paradigms in order 
to investigate and address the research questions. Quantitative research refers to attempts 
to collect data that can be presented in the form of numbers and which represent some 
measurement or the other. This approach is generally used when breadth is required. 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, refers to the collection of data that reflects the 
quality or nature of a particular phenomenon in the form of description (Uys 2003:118). 
Therefore, in order to ensure sufficient ‘breadth’ in this study the researcher employed 
the quantitative paradigm to gather data. Further, so as not to compromise ‘depth’ and to 
enhance the validity of the findings of this study the qualitative paradigm was also used.   
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 Whilst the researcher was cognizant of the fact that mixing methods was both time 
consuming and requires sufficient expertise by the researcher, Merriam (1988:2) argues 
that by combining qualitative and quantitative methods a form of triangulation results 
which enhances the validity of one’s study. Further, the two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive and can complement each other (Remenyi, Williams, Money & Swartz 
1998:192).  
 
The concept of triangulation is based on the assumption that any bias inherent in 
particular data sources, investigator, and method would be neutralized when used in 
conjunction with other data sources, investigators, and methods (Creswell 1994:174). In 
other words, triangulation is based on the principle that it is better to look at something 
from several angles than to look at it in only one way (Neuman 2000:124). Although 
triangulation is an important reason to combine qualitative and quantitative methods, 
Creswell (1994:175) advances the following additional reasons for combining methods in 
a single study: 
 Complimentary, in that overlapping and different facets of a phenomenon may 
emerge (eg. peeling the layers of an onion) 
 Developmentally, wherein the first method is used sequentially to help inform the 
second method 
 Initiation, wherein contradictions and fresh perspectives emerge 
 Expansion, wherein the mixed methods add scope and breadth to a study. 
 
Merriam (1988:69) contends that the rationale for this strategy is that the flaws of one 
method are often the strengths of another, and by combining methods, observers can 
achieve the best of each, while overcoming their unique deficiencies. Further, Neuman 
(2000:125) adds that a study using both methods is fuller and more comprehensive. 
 
Thus, in keeping with the reasoning that a combined methods study is one in which the 
researcher uses multiple methods of data collection, the researcher in this study combined 
the following methods: 
 Survey questionnaire (largely quantitative) 
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 Interviews (qualitative) 
 Document study (qualitative) 
 
 4.3 THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The survey questionnaire was used as the primary data gathering tool because surveys are 
attractive as a means for probing research questions for two major reasons: 
 Firstly, they are much more efficient in cost benefit terms than would be a study 
of the whole population 
 Secondly, surveys are sometimes more effective in that it would take too long 
and require too many researchers to contact the whole population (Anderson 
1990:195). 
 
Cohen and Manion (1980:75) assert that the survey method enables the researcher to 
collect information from a smaller group or subset of the population in such a way that 
the knowledge gained is representative of the total population. Further, Leedy (Booysens 
2003:127) adds that the best way to obtain data on attitudes, feelings or reactions of 
people is to use a questionnaire. Owing to the fact that one of the critical questions in this 
study centred around gaining information on the views of principals on educator post 
provisioning, the researcher found the questionnaire the most suitable data collection 
instrument.     
 
4.3.1 CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNNAIRE 
Whilst questionnaires are a popular way of obtaining data, O’Sullivan and Rassel 
(1999:230) caution that poor questionnaires may result in low response rates, unreliable 
or invalid data, or inadequate or inappropriate information. They suggest that quality 
questionnaires require well-worded questions, clear responses and attractive layouts. The 
researcher kept this in mind when designing the questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire employed in this study had largely closed-ended questions. Closed-
ended questions typically ask the respondent to make choices from a set of alternatives. 
Only one question was open-ended. The open-ended question allowed the respondents to 
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answer the question in any way they chose. It allowed respondents to openly and freely 
express their thoughts and opinions (Schumacher & MacMillan 1993:345). Remenyi et 
al. (1998:15) point out that the type of question chosen has implications for the type of 
evidence that can be obtained and, therefore, on the method of analysis of the evidence. 
 
Martins, Loubser and Van Wyk (1996:219) advise that proper sequencing of questions 
will enable the researcher to improve the level of understanding achieved by the 
respondents and also induces ‘…a harmonious flow of thought in the questionnaire.’ 
With this in mind, the questionnaire (see Annexure D, page 268-273) was divided into six 
sections: 
 Section A: Biographical and General Information 
 Section B: Economic Status of the School 
 Section C: The Post Provisioning Model 
 Section D: School Organisation and Administration 
 Section E: Implementation of  the Post Provisioning Norm 
 Section F: General Comments 
 
Sections A to E of the questionnaire contained closed-ended questions requiring either a 
categorical response, rank order response or a scaled response. The majority of the 
questions required a scaled response and was of the Likert-type (see example below) 
which allowed respondents the latitude to indicate the extent to which they agree or 
disagree with a variety of statements. Section F of the questionnaire consisted of one 
open-ended question which gave respondents the opportunity to comment on any aspect 
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Anderson (1993:34) states that the Likert scale is widely used in questionnaires where the 
researcher wants to assess views from respondents. It was developed by Rensis Likert to 
measure the direction and strength of an individual’s opinion. According to Hawkins and 
Tull (1994:297) the Likert scale is simple and easy to construct, and is also useful for 
mail surveys since the instructions can be easily understood. However, Zikmund 
(1994:372) cautions that the major disadvantage of the Likert scale is its inability to 
quantify and adequately explain a single score. 
 
4.3.2 MEASUREMENT 
With regard to measurement, questionnaire responses were quantified by assigning 
numbers to the responses. Uys (2003:118) defines measurement as allocating numbers to 
objects or events according to certain rules. Measurement can be done on different levels, 
depending on the nature of the measurement. 
 
Nominal Measurement Level 
According to Uys (2003:119) people can be divided into different mutually exclusive 
categories according to this measurement. The people within a particular category are 
then similar to one another according to the characteristic that is measured, and differ 
from those who are placed in another category. 
 
Ordinal Measurement Level 
Ordinal scales are used when the respondent is asked for responses in the form of a 
ranking order. The evidence is again put into categories and the numbers assigned 
indicate the ordering of the categories. Each successive category thus has more of the 
relevant characteristic than the previous category (Uys 2003:120). 
 
Interval Measurement Level 
Uys (2003:120) points out that in interval measurement there are equal intervals between 
the different categories. Numbers are allocated in such a way that the distance between 
the numbers corresponds to the difference in the degree to which the characteristic is 
present. In addition to the fact that the measurement and the ranking of the measurements 
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are distinguishable, interval measurements thus also have the characteristic of equal 
intervals. 
 
Ratio Measurement Level 
The ratio measurement has the same characteristics as interval measurement except that it 
also has an absolute zero value. In this case the amount indicated by the numbers 
corresponds to the amount of the particular variable that is present. An absolute zero 
value means that the zero represents the total absence of the variable (Uys 2003:120). 
 
4.3.3 PRE-TESTING AND VALIDATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
A measuring instrument is valid to the extent that it is accurately able to measure that 
which it intends to measure. Thus, in order to ensure validity of the questionnaire as a 
measuring instrument, a pilot test of the questionnaire was conducted. Booysens 
(2003:140) contends that pre-testing is a non-negotiable part of questionnaire design. 
 
Anderson (1990:217) suggests that a good method of pilot testing a questionnaire is to 
assemble a group of six to twelve respondents. Being cognizant of Anderson’s 
suggestion, the researcher administered the questionnaire to seven principals based at 
ordinary public secondary schools in the Pinetown District of the eThekwini Region of 
the KZN DEC. The intention was to determine possible flaws in terms of ambiguity, 
layout, language and structuring of the questions. 
 
The pilot study established that the questionnaire was understood by the respondents and 
their responses showed enough variation for the envisaged analysis to be conducted. Two 
principals were questioned verbally a day after completion of the questionnaire. This was 
done in order to determine whether the researcher and respondent were on the same 
wavelength regarding the information the questionnaire proposed to obtain. It was 
established that the questionnaire was able to hold their interest to fully complete it. One 
principal remarked that it took him approximately fifteen minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. This was an important comment since one of the key factors affecting 
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response rate to a questionnaire is the length of the questionnaire. Burgess (2001:7) states 
that questionnaires perceived as long will deter respondents. 
 
4.3.4 SAMPLING FRAMEWORK  
Often it is not practical or even possible to acquire information from all the people about 
whom we want to make inferences. The solution to this problem of not being able to 
study all the people is to select a number of people who have the characteristics in which 
the researcher is interested. This process of selecting part of a group under study is 
known as sampling. 
 
4.3.4.1 DEFINING THE POPULATION    
According to Anderson (1990:156) the first task is to define the group of interest or target 
population since the interest in sampling is to generalize to this target population and one 
cannot pick a suitable sample unless the target population is fully described. Most often, 
there are restrictions on membership in the target population and it is important to 
understand who belongs so that the researcher knows to whom the results can be 
generalized. Uys and Puttergill (2003:109) contend that a population is theoretically 
conceptualized and is a collection of cases that the researcher wants to study. They add 
that the boundaries of this population must be clearly marked off. 
 
The target population for the purposes of this study is ordinary public secondary school 
principals in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. A public school as defined in the South 
African Schools Act, 84 of 1996 is a school established by the Member of the Executive 
Council (MEC) from funds appropriated for this purpose by the provincial legislature. An 
ordinary public school is distinguished from a public school for learners with special 
education needs (LSEN). The justification for focusing on ordinary public schools in this 
study is that the staffing of these schools is the competence of the MEC for Education in 
that particular province. 
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The population is also limited to principals of secondary schools in the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal. A secondary school is defined as a school offering grades eight to 
twelve. Secondary schools were chosen for two reasons: 
 Firstly, because the diversity of courses offered in the Further Education and 
Training (FET) Band makes specific demands on human resource needs and; 
 Secondly, the subjects/learning areas offered make specific demands on class size. 
 
The KwaZulu-Natal Education Management and Information Systems Directorate (KZN-
EMIS) was contacted in order to establish the number of ordinary public secondary 
schools in the province. According to Patrick Buthelezi, a Senior Manager in this 
Directorate, 1 453 schools fall into this category. Thus, the population size for the 
purposes of this study amounts to 1 453 principals. 
 
4.3.4.2 DRAWING THE SAMPLE 
According to Uys and Puttergill (2003:109), when developing a sample, a distinction 
needs to be made between probability and non-probability sampling. In probability 
sampling the aim is to select cases of the population which will provide representative 
information about the population. Anderson (1990:198) states that a probability sample is 
a miniature version of the population to which the survey findings are going to be 
applied. In non-probability sampling one attempts to define the sample in ways which 
over-represent groups with certain characteristics. Accurate representation of the 
population is not always possible, or lists of the population being studied are not 
available. Since the researcher was able to obtain a list of all 1 453 ordinary public 
schools in the province, the probability sampling technique was employed. 
 
More specifically, the researcher adopted the stratified systematic sampling technique. 
According to Babbie (2001:201), stratified sampling is a method of obtaining a greater 
degree of representativeness by decreasing the degree of sampling error. In terms of 
sampling theory, sampling error is reduced by two factors in the sample design: 
 Firstly, a large sample produces a smaller sampling error than does a small sample 
and; 
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 Secondly, a homogenous population produces samples with smaller sampling 
errors than does a heterogeneous population. 
 
Stratified sampling is based on the second factor in sampling theory. Rather than 
selecting a sample from the total population at large, the researcher ensures that 
appropriate numbers of elements are drawn from homogeneous subsets of the population. 
According to Babbie (2001:201) the ultimate function of stratification is to organize the 
population into homogenous subsets (with sufficient heterogeneity between the subsets) 
and to select the appropriate number of elements from each. The choice of stratification 
variables should be primarily related to variables the researcher wants to represent 
accurately. In selecting the elements from the population a systematic sampling strategy 
was used. In a systematic sampling strategy the cases are chosen in an ordered manner 
by, for example, selecting each third or fifth case in the population. This, according to 
Uys & Puttergill (2003:111), is called the nth case. 
 
In terms of this study, the researcher considered the geographical location of secondary 
schools an important stratification variable. In KwaZulu-Natal public schools are grouped 
into regions and districts. In order to ensure representivity, the two stratification variables 
of regions and districts were chosen. In KwaZulu-Natal there are four regions, namely, 
eThekwini, Umgungundlovu, Ukhahlamba, and Zululand. Each region is further sub-
divided into three districts each (see table 4.2, page 121). 
 
4.3.4.3 SAMPLE SIZE  
According to Anderson (1990:199), the most perplexing question to a researcher is the 
question of sample size. From the literature reviewed by the researcher on sample size, 
the researcher noted that there was no fixed measure or guideline in determining sample 
size. The sample size suggested by scholars ranges from 10% to about 22%. The 
researcher, therefore, decided to note the comments made by Anderson (1990:199) with 
regard to sample size. He identifies four major principles governing sample size: 
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 Variability of characteristics being estimated – the greater the variability in the 
characteristics being estimated among the units, the greater the number required 
to obtain a precise estimate of this characteristic. 
 Level of confidence – the laws of statistics deal in probabilities which means that 
although a sample will reflect the target population, different samples will vary 
from one another. The larger the sample the more alike on average it will be to 
other such samples that could be drawn. 
 Tolerance for sampling error – How precise do we want the sample to be? The 
more precision we want the greater will be the sample size requirements. 
 Sample size versus proportion – a statistical fact is that the size of a sample and 
not the proportion of the population is the major determinant of precision. Thus, 
one can have a small sample with an infinitely large population and still get 
acceptable results. In general, the major gains in precision are made steadily as 
sample sizes increase to 150 or 200 after which gains in precision are much more 
modest. 
Sekaran (1992:253) developed a table for determining the sample size from a given 
population (see table 4.1 below). 
 









10 10 1 100 285 
20 19 1 200 291 
50 44 1 300 297 
100 80 1 400 302 
150 108 1 500 306 
200 132 1 600 310 
250 152 2 000 322 
300 169 5 000 357 
500 217 10 000 370 
1 000 278 100 000 384 
    Adapted from: Sekaran (1992:253) 
Taking into account the guiding principles advocated by Anderson, and noting the 
comments by Gilham (2000:14) that a typical response rate to a questionnaire is between 
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30% to 50%, the researcher opted for a larger sample size as possible. Therefore, the 
researcher chose to go with the guidelines developed by Sekaran. The researcher, based 
on a population size of 1 463 (rounded off to 1 500) arrived at a sample size of 306. The 
researcher thus chose to sample the principals of 306 ordinary public secondary schools 
in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
Owing to the fact that the researcher was able to obtain the number of ordinary public 
secondary schools in each region and district from the KZN EMIS database, a 
proportional selection of schools from the various regions and districts as suggested by 
Uys and Puttergill (2003:112) was done. In order to determine the number of ordinary 
public secondary schools to be sampled in each region, the proportion of schools in the 
region relative to the number of ordinary public secondary schools in the province was 





The proportion obtained was then multiplied by the sample size to yield the number of 
schools to be sampled in each region. 
 
Similarly, in order to determine the number of schools to be sampled in each district, the 
proportion of ordinary public secondary schools in each district relative to the number of 
ordinary public secondary schools in the region in which they are located was determined 
using the formula: 
 
 
      
 
Proportion of schools in Region = No. of schools in Region 
                         No. of schools in Province 
Proportion of schools in District= No. of schools in District 
                         No. of schools in Region 
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The proportion obtained was then multiplied by the number of ordinary public secondary 
schools sampled in the respective region to yield the number of schools to be sampled in 
each district. 
 
4.3.4.4 SELECTION OF SCHOOLS 
In order to determine the schools that will be selected as part of the sample, the 
researcher wrote to the KZN EMIS Directorate and requested lists of ordinary public 
secondary schools together with their postal addresses arranged in terms of region and 
districts. These lists constituted the sampling frame. 
 
The schools that were sampled were then selected from the sampling frame using the 
sampling interval formula. According to Babbie (2001:198) the sampling interval is the 
standard distance between elements selected in the sample and is calculated using the 
formula: 
 
Sampling interval =  population size 
                                    sample size 
 
The sampling interval for this study thus worked out to as follows: 
 
Sampling interval = 1 463 
                         306 
 
                                                                                     = 4.78  (rounded off to 5) 
 
Thus, every fifth school was sampled in each district from alphabetically arranged lists of 
ordinary public secondary schools in each district. Babbie (2001:197) suggests that the 
first element in the sample should be randomly selected to prevent any possible human 
bias. Thus, the researcher selected a random number between one and five. This worked 
out to be two. Consequently, every second ordinary public secondary school from the 
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lists per district was included in the sample, plus every fifth school following it. The 
schools were thus selected in the following sequence: 2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27… 
 
4.3.5 ADMINISTERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Prior to the distribution of the questionnaire permission had to be sought from the 
Department of Education for administering the questionnaire at schools falling under 
their jurisdiction. 
 
4.3.5.1 PERMISSIOM FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
The researcher wrote to the Head Office of the KZN DEC (see Annexure A, page 265) 
requesting permission to conduct research at public ordinary secondary schools falling 
under its jurisdiction. Permission was granted by the Research, Strategy, Policy 
Development and ECMIS Directorate (see Annexure B, page 266). 
 
4.3.5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
All 306 questionnaires were mailed to the principals of the schools sampled. A one page 
covering letter (see Annexure C, page 267) was enclosed together with the questionnaire 
which elucidated the following: 
 The purpose of the research questionnaire. 
 An assurance that the responses will be treated in the strictest of confidence. The 
researcher felt that this was the best way of obtaining responses that would be 
honest. 
 Return information. Although self addressed stamped envelopes were enclosed 
for the return of questionnaires, Burgess (2001:7) suggests that return information 
should be included. 
 Contact information should the respondent need to contact the researcher with 
queries or questions. 




4.3.6 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The data was analyzed by using a computer based analysis system (SPSS – Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences) to obtain both descriptive and inferential statistics. 
 
4.3.6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics ‘include both specific numbers and ways of presenting data in 
tabular form in order to make the information succinct but clear to the reader’ (Harris 
1995:6). In essence, descriptive statistics involve transformation of raw data into a form 
that would provide information to describe a set of factors in a situation. This is done 
through ordering and manipulation of the raw data collected (Sekaran 2000:395). The 
most popular tools of descriptive statistics include frequency distributions, measures of 
central tendency and measures of variability. 
 
4.3.6.2 INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
Researchers place great importance on being able to explain the relationship that exists 
between different variables or between two or more groups. Further, researchers would 
also like to draw conclusions about a much larger population from results obtained by 
studying the sample group. To achieve these objectives, researchers will need to utilize 
inferential statistical techniques. Inferential statistics concerns the use of those statistical 
techniques that allow researchers, ‘to draw inference from a sample that can be applied or 
generalized to the population from which the sample came’ (Harris 1995:218). Some of 
the popular inferential statistical tests used in the analysis of data in this study are the T-
test, Chi square test and Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient. 
 
4.4 INTERVIEWS 
4.4.1 RATIONALE FOR THE USE OF INTERVIEWS  
In order to triangulate the data obtained from the questionnaire and to seek greater depth 
to the issues surrounding educator post provisioning, the researcher considered interviews 
to be the ideal data gathering tool. Owing to the fact that questionnaire data tends to be 
‘thin’ by offering more breadth than depth, interviews were helpful in the sense that it 
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helped the researcher to gather more information on specific items in the questionnaire 
which was worthy of closer scrutiny. Gilham (2000:10) contends that the positive feature 
of interviews is the richness and vividness of the data that it turns up. It enables one to 
‘see’ and to understand what is reflected rather than more abstractly in other kinds of data 
such as statistical summaries.  
 
The researcher was of the view that by posing open-ended questions to selected 
informants, the informants could be encouraged to express their opinions to the questions. 
Further, by asking supplementary questions (probes), informants could clarify or extend 
their responses. 
 
4.4.2 INTERVIEW INFORMANTS 
Two sets of interviews were conducted. The first set of interviews was conducted with 
nine principals from ordinary public secondary schools. The second set of interviews was 
conducted with three union officials who are provincial negotiators serving on the 
staffing committee of the KZN ELRC. 
 
4.4.3 SELECTION OF INFORMANTS   
In selecting the informants for the interviews, the purposive sampling technique was 
used. Purposive sampling according to Bertram (2003:12) means that the researcher 
makes specific choices about which people to include in the sample. The informants 
selected, however, do not represent the wider population, namely, all ordinary public 
secondary school principals in KZN or all union provincial negotiators in KZN. Bertram 
(2003:71) contends that the selected respondents simply represent themselves. 
 
The principals that were selected as interview informants were selected on the basis of 
convenience. Convenience sampling simply refers to choosing a sample which is easy for 
the researcher to reach (Bertram 2003:71). All nine principals were from the eThekwini 
Region of KZN and were selected in terms of the following criteria: 
• Three principals were selected from poorly resourced schools. 
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• Three principals were selected from schools that had a mediocre level of 
resources. 
• Three principals were selected from well-resourced schools. 
In terms of the selection of union officials, three provincial negotiators who serve on the 
staffing committee of the KZN ELRC - one each from the South African Democratic 
Teachers Union (SADTU), the Association of Professional Educators of KwaZulu-Natal 
(APEK) and the Suid Afrikaanse Onderwys Unie (SAOU) -  were selected. 
  
4.4.4 NATURE OF THE INTERVIEWS 
In terms of interviews the main dimension of difference is the extent to which the 
interview is structured and the degree to which the interviewer is allowed to ‘lead’ the 
content of the interview. The researcher was of the view that a structured interview would 
be too restrictive in the sense that one has to adhere rigidly to a pre-planned interview 
schedule without having the freedom to prompt and probe further or encourage the 
informant to elaborate or reformulate a given response. Given this limitation, the 
researcher opted for both semi-structured and unstructured interviews as data gathering 
tools because of the latitude it offered the researcher in the use of probes and prompts in 
order to obtain depth into the issues on educator post provisioning. 
 
The semi-structured interviews were used in interviewing principals. The researcher 
considered this type of interview suitable for interviewing principals because although it 
has more structure it is very open in style (Gilham 2000:7). Based on the responses of 
principals from the questionnaire the researcher developed a set of questions (see 
interview schedule – Annexure E, page 274) which were put to the nine principals. 
 
Unstructured interviews were used in interviewing the three union officials. A single 
question (main question) was posed to each of the three union officials (see Annexure F, 
page 275). Thereafter, probes, prompts, and follow-up questions which pursued the 
implications of answers to the main question were asked. 
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4.4.5 TRIALLING OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Possible interview questions for the semi-structured interview were trialled with senior 
members of the management staff at a secondary school. This exercise enabled the 
researcher to: 
• Get some sort of feel for the interview process. 
• Determine which questions were key questions. 
• Ascertain questions that needed rethinking. 
• Make decisions as to questions that need to be omitted. 
It was not possible to trial the question of the unstructured interview owing to the small 
population size in terms of union provincial negotiators serving on the staffing 
committee. 
 
4.4.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Prior to the commencement of both the unstructured and semi-structured interviews the 
informants were briefed on the purpose of the study and were assured that any 
information furnished by them would be used solely for the purposes of research. Further, 
they were assured that neither their names nor the names of their schools or unions would 
be quoted.  
  
4.4.7 ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA 
The nine semi-structured interviews and the three unstructured interviews were audio 
tape recorded. Each interview was then transcribed verbatim. After the transcription 
process the researcher had to engage in minor editing in order to increase the readability 
of the transcript. The transcripts were then subjected to qualitative content analysis by 
identifying key substantive points in the transcript and then grouping them into themes 






4.5 DOCUMENT STUDY  
In order to seek answers to the first two critical questions the researcher engaged in an in- 
depth study of the following documents in order to ascertain its impact on educator post 
provisioning. 
 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review Reports 
 Regulation No 24077 of November 2002 
 ELRC Resolution 3 of 1996 
 Regulation No 593/4 of April 1998 
 Regulation No 1676 of December 1998 
 
In analyzing the contents of these documents, the researcher integrated the salient 
features of these documents into the literature review and then went on to provide a 
critical review of these documents. 
 
4.6 SUMMARY  
This chapter highlighted how the research design was planned and executed. A detailed 
discussion with regard to the data gathering tools was presented. The sampling 
techniques employed, issues concerning validity as well as data analysis procedures were 
discussed. 
 
The next chapter deals with the presentation, analysis and discussion of the data. 
 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) 
 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
 National Norms and Standards for School Funding 




PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF DATA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter outlined the research design and methodology employed in this 
study. This chapter focuses on the presentation, analysis and discussion of the data 
gathered from the 134 survey questionnaires and interviews with principals and union 
officials. An account of the trends emerging from the document study is also presented.  
 
In order to address the following two research questions formulated in chapter one, 
namely: 
• What impact does policy on educator post provisioning have on issues of equity 
and redress? and 
• What are the views of principals on educator post provisioning and its 
implementation? 
the data from the questionnaire which is largely quantitative is presented. This is then 
followed by a presentation of the qualitative data obtained through interviews. An 
analysis and discussion of both the questionnaire and interview data using the theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks presented in chapter 3 on policy analysis, neoliberalism, 
NPM, RAMs and critical theory using a thematic approach then follows in a section 
entitled ‘emerging trends and patterns’. A summary of the main findings from the data is 
integrated into the ‘emerging trends’ section.   
 
With regard to the critical questions related to the document study, namely:  
• What ideology informs and underpins policy on educator post provisioning? and 
• What changes has policy on educator post provisioning undergone in order to 
meet the needs of schools? 
an account of the emerging trends and patterns from the literature review together with  
the main findings is presented.  
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5.2   PRESENTATION OF THE QUANTITATIVE DATA 
In presenting the quantitative data the researcher has made use of both descriptive and 
inferential statistics. In order to make the data more comprehensible the data is organized 
and summarized using frequency distributions and bar graphs followed by a factual 
description of the data. In certain instances, inferential statistical techniques are used in 
order to make predictions about the sample of principals surveyed in comparison to the 
population of principals in KZN. 
 
Section A: Biographical and General Information 
Question 1: What is your experience as principal? 
















Figure 5.1: Bar graph depicting years of experience as principal. 
Years of experience as principal

















In terms of experience as principal there is a fair distribution of respondents. An equal 
number of respondents are noted in the 0-3 year, 4-6 year and 10 years and over category. 
The 45% of principals who have 7 and more years of experience would have been 
implementers of policy on educator post provisioning since its inception in 1996.  
 
Question 2: How would you classify the geographic location of your school? 















Figure 5.2: Bar graph depicting geographic location of schools.  
















This question establishes the locality of the schools surveyed. For the purposes of this 
study urban schools are schools located within a radius of 0–20km from the city centre. 
Suburban schools are schools located within a radius of 21-50km from the city centre and 
 132
would include ‘township’ schools. Rural schools are schools located within a radius of 
more than 51km from the city centre. A fair distribution of schools in terms of urban 56 
(42%), suburban 35 (26%) and rural 43 (32%) responded to the questionnaire. The 
location of schools is an important factor in determining the educator post provisioning 
needs of schools. One of the factors taken into account in determining the post 
provisioning needs of schools is the poverty grading of a school based on criteria 
stipulated in the national Norms and Standards for School Funding. The location of the 
school is one of the criteria used in determining the poverty grading of the school. 
 
Question 3: Does your school have a functional school governing body? 













Figure 5.3: Bar graph depicting functionality of SGB. 
















In keeping with NPM reforms, namely, the corporatisation of schools in order to achieve 
greater efficiency, cost savings and service quality improvements, the South African 
Schools Act, 84 of 1996 makes it mandatory for all public schools to have democratically 
elected SGBs. These SGBs are considered to be the ‘strategic apex’1 of schools and are 
charged with the responsibility of school governance. From the principals that responded 
to the questionnaire an overwhelming majority of schools, namely 130 (97%), claim to 
have functional SGBs. Only 4 (3%) of the respondents indicated that their schools do not 
have functional SGBs.  
 
Section B: Economic Status of the School 
Question 1: In terms of the Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF) how is 
your school classified? 





























                                                 
1 The ‘strategic apex’ of schools, namely the SGBs are delegated certain powers through the South African 
Schools Act and can potentially be seen as a major power source in reshaping schools along strategic lines. 
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In terms of the NNSF, all public schools are classified into quintiles. However, in KZN 
all public schools for the purposes of funding are grouped into deciles with the poorest 
schools being classified in decile one and the least poor schools in decile ten.  
 
Notwithstanding this classification it is common among educators to use the term 
advantaged and disadvantaged when referring to schools. It is generally understood that 
schools falling within deciles one to five are termed disadvantaged and those falling 
within deciles six to ten are termed advantaged. From table 5.4 and figure 5.4 it can be 
seen that 72 schools constituting 54% of the schools that responded classify themselves 
as ‘advantaged’ and 62 schools constituting 46% of the schools that responded classify 
themselves as ‘disadvantaged’. 
 
Question 2: What is the annual school fee payable per learner? 
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Figure 5.5: Bar graph depicting annual school fee payable per learner. 
Annual school fee per learner
above R 5000
R 3001 - R 5000
R 1001 - R 3000
R 501 - R 1000
R 201 - R 500




















The South African Schools Act, 86 of 1996 empowers SGBs of public schools to levy 
school fees so that they may be able to ‘supplement the resources supplied by the state in 
order to improve the quality of education provided by the school to all learners at the 
school’ (South Africa 1996: sec. 36). From table 5.6 and figure 5.6 it can be seen that of 
the 72 advantaged schools, 9 schools (13%) charged school fees above R 5 000; 3 schools 
(4%) charged fees between R 3 001 and R 5 000; 1 school charged fees between R 1 001 
and  R 3 000; the majority of schools, namely 40 schools (56%) charge fees between R 
100 and R 501 and only 3 schools (4%) charge fees of between R 1 and R 200. 
 
The fee structure in the disadvantaged school cohort shows that of the 62 schools 
surveyed the overall range of schools fees levied is between R 1 and R 1 000. The 
majority of the disadvantaged schools, namely 54 schools (87%) levied schools fees in 
the range R 1 to R 200. Only 6 schools (8%) charged fees between R 201 to R 500 and 2 




Table 5.6: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in    























t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
A comparison of the mean school fee payable between advantaged and disadvantaged 
schools reveals that advantaged schools levied higher school fees, namely a mean of 3.17  
(R 501 – R 1 000) compared to disadvantaged schools with a mean of 1.16 (R 1 – R 200). 
Moreover, the variability of the scores about the mean, namely the standard deviation is 
higher in advantaged schools (1.3) compared to disadvantaged schools (0.451). This 
indicates that the spread in terms of school fees levied is larger (1.3 away from the mean 
of 3.17) compared to disadvantaged schools which is smaller on average (0.451 away 
from the mean of 1.16). Further, the t-test reveals that the mean difference in schools fees 
levied of 2.07 between advantaged and disadvantaged schools is significant at the 5% 
level of significance. Therefore, it can be presumed that advantaged schools charged 






Question 3: What percentage of parents of learners at your school actually pay fees? 
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In terms of the actual payment of school fees by parents in the advantaged school cohort, 
the majority of respondents, 55 (76%) indicated that they have a school fee recovery rate 
of 50% and above compared to 41 (66%) of the respondents from disadvantaged schools. 
Moreover, 21 (34%) respondents from the disadvantaged cohort indicated less than 50% 








Question 4: How would you classify the socio-economic status of the community 
from which the school draws the majority of its learners? 
Table 5.8: Frequency distribution of the socio-economic status of the community from 
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Figure 5.6: Bar graph depicting the socio-economic status of the community from which 
the school draws the majority of its learners. 
Socio-economic status of the community
























The advantaged communities for the purposes of this study are the communities where 
there are high levels of employment, formal housing with a ratable income of above 
R300 000 and superior infrastructure. The disadvantaged communities are communities 
were unemployment levels are high; informal settlements and low cost housing; and poor 
infrastructure. From table 5.8 and figure 5.6 it can be seen that 53 (85%) of the 
respondents from disadvantaged schools indicated that they draw the majority of their 
learners from disadvantaged communities. However, a substantial number of respondents 
from the advantaged school cohort, namely 35 (49%) respondents indicated that they 
draw the majority of their learners from disadvantaged communities.  
 
Question 5: How would you classify the material resources available in the school? 
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Figure 5.7: Bar graph depicting the material resources available in the school. 


























From table 5.9 and figure 5.7 it can be seen that 27 (38%) of the respondents from the 
advantaged school grouping considered the material resources at their schools to be 
adequate or more than adequate compared to just 3 (5%) of the respondents from the 
disadvantaged school grouping who considered their material resources to be adequate. 
No respondents from the disadvantaged school grouping indicated that their material 
resources were very adequate. Whilst 21 (29%) of the respondents from the advantaged 
school grouping indicated that their material resources were not very adequate and no 
respondents indicated that their material resources were useless, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents, 49 (79%) from the disadvantaged school cluster indicated that 
the material resources available at their schools was either not very adequate or useless.  
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Table 5.10: Pearson’s product moment correlation between annual school fees paid and 












Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
A computation of the correlation between the annual school fee payable per learner and 
the material resources available at the school reveals a high positive correlation of 0.663. 
This indicates that schools that charge high school fees, which are largely the advantaged 
schools, have an adequate level of material resources at the school, whereas schools that 
charge a low amount in school fees, which are largely the disadvantaged schools, have an 
inadequate level of material resources.  
 
Question 6: How would you classify the general infrastructure (classrooms, 
laboratories etc) of the school? 
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Figure 5.8: Bar graph of general infrastructure of the school.  





























From table 5.11 and figure 5.8 it can be seen that 38 (53%) of the respondents from the 
advantaged school cluster considered the physical infrastructure of their schools to be 
adequate or more than adequate. Only 5 (8%) of the respondents from the disadvantaged 
school cluster considered their general infrastructure to be adequate. Moreover, no 
respondent from this grouping considered their infrastructure to be more than adequate. 
 
Whilst 10 (14%) of the respondents from the advantaged school grouping considered 
their general infrastructure to be not very adequate, no respondents classified their 
general infrastructure as useless. An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 44 
(71%) of the respondents from the disadvantaged school cohort, considered their general 
infrastructure to be not very adequate or useless. 
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Table 5.12: Pearson’s product moment correlation of annual school fee paid per learner 












Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
A computation of the correlation between the annual school fee paid per learner and the 
general infrastructure of the school reveals a high positive correlation of 0.657. This 
indicates that schools that charge high school fees, which are largely the advantaged 
schools, have a general infrastructure which is adequate to more than adequate, whereas 
schools that charge a low amount in school fees, which are largely the disadvantaged 
schools, have a general infrastructure that can be considered not very adequate or useless.  
 
Section C: The Post Provisioning Model (PPM) 
 
Question 1: Were you consulted with regard to the design of the post provisioning  
model (PPM)? 




















Figure 5.9: Bar graph depicting consultation with regard to the design of the PPM. 
















An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 121 which translate to 90%, reported 
that they were not consulted with regard to the design of the PPM. Only 13 (10%) of the 
respondents indicated that they were consulted with regard to the design of the PPM.  
 
Question 2: If yes, by whom? 
Table 5.14: Frequency distribution indicating the consulting agency with regard to the 

















Figure 5.10: Bar graph depicting the consulting agency with regard to the design of the 
PPM. 
Consulted by














Of the 13 principals who were consulted with regard to the design of the PPM, the 
department of education was the agency which elicited their views. No principal 
indicated that she/he was consulted by the unions on the design of the PPM. The unions 
comprise fifty percent of the bargaining council for educators (ELRC). These unions, at 








Question 3: Were you workshopped on the formula used to calculate the post                      
provisioning norm (PPN) of a school? 
Table 5.15: Frequency distribution with regard to whether principals were workshopped 













Figure 5.11: Bar graph depicting whether principals were workshopped on the formula 
used to calculate the post provisioning norm (PPN). 














Only 42 respondents, which translate to 31%, indicated that they were workshopped on 
the formula used to determine the PPN of a school. The overwhelming majority of 
respondents, namely 92 which constitutes 69%, indicated that they weren’t workshopped 






Question 4: If yes, by whom? 
Table 5.16: Frequency distribution of the agency that workshopped principals on the 















Figure 5.12: Bar graph depicting the agency that workshopped principals on the formula 
used to calculate the PPN. 
Workshopped by













Of the 42 (32%) respondents who indicated that they were workshopped on the formula 
used to calculate the PPN of a school, 40 of the respondents constituting 30% of  the total 
number of respondents indicated that the department of education was the agency that 
workshopped them. Only 2 respondents comprising just 2% of the total number of 




Question 5: Has your school qualified for the appointment of educators from the 
redress pool?        
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Figure 5.13: Bar graph showing educator distribution in terms of redress. 



















Overall, only 26 (20%) of the 134 schools surveyed qualified for poverty redress posts. 
Of the 62 disadvantaged schools, only 18 schools comprising 29% of the schools in the 
disadvantaged cluster, qualified for redress posts. In the advantaged school cohort, 8 
schools out of 72 constituting 11% of the schools qualified for redress posts.  
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Question 6: The following are some of the factors used in determining the post 
provisioning needs of schools. Rank them from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most 
important factor. (Use a number once only) 
 
Poverty grading of a school 



















Overall Mean Ranking: 2 
 
Figure 5.14: Bar graph showing rank order of poverty grading of a school. 



















With regard to the factor poverty grading of a school, the majority of the respondents, 
namely 73 constituting 55%, considered the poverty grading of a school an important 
factor by either ranking it one or two from the five factors/variables listed. The overall 
mean ranking of this factor was 2. 
 
Table 5.19: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools 

















grading of a school
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from 
advantaged schools had mean of 2.36, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools 
had a mean of 2.42, and the means do not differ significantly at the 5% level of 
significance. It can therefore not be presumed that respondents from the advantaged 
school cohort considered this factor a significantly more important factor than 








Need to promote particular subjects/learning areas 
Table 5.20: Frequency distribution showing the ranking of the factor the need to promote 



















Overall Mean Ranking: 3 
 
Figure 5.15: Bar graph depicting ranking in terms of the need to promote particular 
subjects/learning areas in schools. 

















A substantial number of respondents ranked this factor either two (29%) or three (28%). 
Overall, the average mean ranking of this factor was three compared to the other four 
factors/variables. On closer scrutiny, a different picture emerges when one considers the 
responses of the respondents from advantaged and disadvantaged schools separately.  
 
Table 5.21: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools 












3.012 132 .003 .59
Equal variances
assumed
factor - need to promote
subjects/learning areas
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
t-test for equality of means
 
 
A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from 
the advantaged schools had mean of 2.86, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools 
had a mean of 2.27, and the means differ significantly at the 5% level of significance. 
This would suggest that on average the respondents from the disadvantaged school 
grouping ranked this factor significantly higher than the respondents from the advantaged 









Maximum ideal class size of specific subjects/learning areas 
Table 5.22: Frequency distribution showing ranking of the factor maximum ideal class 




















Overall Mean Ranking: 1 
 
Figure 5.16: Bar graph depicting ranking of the factor maximum ideal class size of 
specific subjects/learning areas. 



















The class size for the different subjects/learning areas is considered a very important 
factor by the respondents. Overall, 90 respondents constituting 68% of the total number 
of respondents ranked this factor either one or two. In terms of the overall mean ranking, 
this factor was ranked one in comparison to the other four factors/variables.  
 
Table 5.23: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools 












-2.415 132 .017 -.48
Equal variances
assumed
factor - maximum ideal
class size of
subjects/learning areas
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from 
advantaged schools had mean of 1.97, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools 
had a mean of 2.45, and the means differ significantly at the 5% level of significance. 
This would suggest that on average the respondents from the advantaged school grouping 
ranked this factor significantly higher than the respondents from the disadvantaged 







Having more than one language medium of instruction 
Table 5.24: Frequency distribution of the ranking of the factor more than one language 




















Overall Mean Rank: 5 
Figure 5.17: Bar graph showing the ranking of the factor more than one language 
medium of instruction. 


















The majority of the respondents ranked this factor either four (37%) or five (40%) 
making this factor one of the least important factors of the five. Only 8 respondents 
comprising 6% of the respondents ranked this factor either one or two. Overall, the mean 
rank of this factor was 5 compared to the other four factors/variables. 
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Table 5.25: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools 












1.266 132 .208 .22
Equal variances
assumed
factor - more than one
language medium of
instruction
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from 
advantaged schools had mean of 4.17, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools 
had a mean of 3.95, and the means do not differ significantly at the 5% level of 
significance. 
 
Learners with special educational needs (LSEN) 




















Overall Mean Ranking: 4 
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Figure 5.18: Bar graph depicting the ranking of the factor learners with special 
educational needs. 


















Overall, 88 of the respondents constituting 65% ranked this factor either four (25%) or 
five (40%). In terms of the overall mean ranking, this factor was ranked four compared to 
the other four factors/variables.  
 
Question 7: To what extent, do you believe the following factors/variables should be 
taken into account in determining the PPN of schools?  
 
Qualification level of educators at a school 


















Figure 5.19: Bar graph showing the factor qualification level of educators at a school. 

















With regard to the factor, qualification level of educators at a school, 76 respondents 
which translate to 57 % indicated that they agreed to strongly agreed that educator 
qualifications should be taken into account when determining the post provisioning needs 
of schools. In contrast to this, 58 respondents constituting 41% disagreed to strongly 
disagreed that educator qualifications should be taken into account in determining the 
PPN of schools. Whilst the majority of the respondents believed that the qualifications of 
educators at a school should be taken into account, it is interesting to note the responses 







Table 5.28: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools 






factor - qualification level




3.390 132 .001 .60
Equal variances
assumed
factor - qualification leve
of educators at a school
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from 
advantaged schools had mean of 2.69, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools 
had a mean of 2.10, and the means differ significantly at the 5% level of significance. It 
can therefore be presumed that the respondents from the disadvantaged school cohort 
agreed to a greater extent that the qualification level of educators at a school should be a 
variable for consideration.  
 
Learners admitted from disadvantaged communities 






















Figure 5.20: Bar graph showing the factor learners admitted from disadvantaged 
communities.  


















An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 121 which translate to 91% of the 
respondents agreed to strongly agreed that the number of learners at an institution 
admitted from disadvantaged communities needs to be taken as a factor when 
determining the post provisioning needs of schools. Moreover, 63% of the respondents 
strongly agreed that this factor should be taken into account. Only 13 respondents, 









Table 5.30: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools 













-.919 132 .360 -.12
Equal variances
assumed
factor - learners admitted
from disadvantaged
communities
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
A computation of the t-test for the equality of means indicates that the mean difference of 
0.12 is not significant at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, it cannot be presumed 
that the respondents from the advantaged school cohort responded differently to those in 
the disadvantaged school cohort. 
 
Learners who are second language speakers of English 
Table 5.31: Frequency distribution of the factor learners who are second language 





















Figure 5.21: Bar graph showing the factor learners who are second language speakers of 
English.  

















An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 107 constituting 80% of the 
respondents, agreed to strongly agreed that the number of learners who are second 
language speakers at a school should be taken into account when determining the PPN of 
a school. Only 27 respondents, constituting 20% disagreed to strongly disagreed that this 









Table 5.32: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools 


















t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
A computation of the t-test for the equality of means indicates that the mean difference of 
0.10 is not significant at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, it cannot be presumed 
that the respondents from the advantaged school cohort responded significantly 
differently to those in the disadvantaged school cohort. 
 
Question 8: The incremental revisions made to the post provisioning model have 
resulted in an equitable distribution of educators to schools. 
Table 5.33: Frequency distribution showing whether the incremental revisions made to 























Figure 5.22: Bar graph showing whether the revisions made to the PPM has resulted in 
equity in educator distribution. 





















The majority of the respondents, namely 84 which translate to 63%, disagreed to strongly 
disagreed with the statement that the revisions made to the PPM has resulted in an 
equitable distribution of educators to schools. Only 22 respondents, which translate to 











Question 9: The post provisioning model tends to favour schools with diverse 
curriculum offerings. 
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Figure 5.23: Bar graph of classification of school and curriculum diversity. 





























Overall, 71 respondents comprising 53%, agreed to strongly agreed with the statement 
that the PPM favours schools with diverse curriculum offerings. Further, 49 respondents 
comprising 37%, disagreed to strongly disagreed with this statement. However, it is 
interesting to note the responses of the respondents from the advantaged and 
disadvantaged school cohort separately. A substantial majority of the respondents from 
the disadvantaged school cohort, namely 67% agreed to strongly agreed with this 
statement compared to 40% of the respondents in the advantaged school cohort. In 
contrast, 24% of the respondents from the disadvantaged school grouping disagreed to 
strongly disagreed that the PPM favours schools with diverse curriculum offerings 
compared to 46% of the respondents in the advantaged school grouping. 
 
Section D: School Organisation and Administration  
Question 1: The number of state funded educator posts allocated to my school caters 
for the curriculum needs of my learners. 
Table 5.35: Frequency distribution showing whether the number of state paid posts caters 



























Figure 5.24: Bar graph depicting whether the number of state paid posts caters for the 
curriculum needs of learners. 





















Only 27 (20%) of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement that the 
number of state funded educator posts allocated to their schools caters for the curriculum 
needs of their learners. The overwhelming majority of the respondents, namely 84 (63%), 










Question 2: Does your school governing body allocate funds in their annual budget 
for the employment of additional educators? 
Table 5.36: Frequency distribution showing whether the SGB allocates funds for the 
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Figure 5.25: Bar graph depicting whether the SGB allocates funds for the employment of 
educators. 























An overwhelming majority of respondents from the advantaged school cohort, namely 59 
(82%), indicated that their SGBs allocate funds for the appointment of additional 
educators. Only 13 (18%) of the respondents indicated that their SGBs do not allocate 
funds for the appointment of additional educators. For schools in the disadvantaged 
cluster, the reverse holds true. Only 13 (21%) of the respondents indicated that their 
SGBs allocate funds for the employment of additional educators. The majority, 
comprising 49 or 79% of the respondents from the disadvantaged school cluster indicated 
that their SGBs do not allocate funds for the employment of additional educators. 
 
Table 5.37: Chi-square test of classification of school and allocation of funds by SGBs 










Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The




The computation of the Pearson Chi-square test indicates that there is a significant 
relationship (at a 95% level of significance) between the classification of schools 
(advantaged/disadvantaged) and the allocation of funds by the SGBs for the employment 











Question 3: If yes, how many educators have they employed this year? 




Figure 5.26: Bar graph showing the number of SGB paid educators employed.  



























Table 5.38 and figure 5.26 indicates that of the advantaged schools, only 13 schools 
comprising 18% do not have SGB appointed educators compared to 50 (81%) schools 
from the disadvantaged school cluster. Moreover, 59 (82%) of the respondents from the 
advantaged school cohort indicated that their SGBs employed 1 or more educators this 
year compared to just 12 (20%) respondents from the disadvantaged cohort. 
 
Table 5.39: Pearson’s product moment correlation between annual school fee payable and 












Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
A computation of the correlation between the annual school fee per learner and the 
number of educators employed by the SGB yields a very high positive correlation of 
0.887. This indicates that the higher the school fee levied per learner at a school, the 
larger the number of educators employed by the SGB of the school. 
 
Question 4: The education department’s timing of the announcement of the PPN 
leads to effective school organisation? 
Table 5.40: Frequency distribution showing whether the education department’s timing 




















Figure 5.27: Bar graph depicting whether the education department’s timing of the 
announcement of the PPN leads to effective school organisation. 



















An overwhelming majority of respondents, accounting for 116 or 86% of the respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the timing of the 
announcement of the PPN leads to effective school organisation. An alarming 79% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Only 12 (9%) of the respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. 
 
Question 5: Substitute educators2 are appointed timeously by the education 
department. 
Table 5.41: Frequency distribution showing whether substitute educators are appointed 


















                                                 
2 Substitute educators are appointed by the department as replacements for educators who are away from 
school for 30 consecutive schooldays or more owing to ill-health or other forms of leave approved by the 
department. 
 173
Figure 5.28: Bar graph depicting whether substitute educators are appointed timeously by 
the department. 



















The majority of the respondents, numbering 94 which translate to 70% strongly disagreed 
with the statement that substitute educators are appointed timeously by the education 
department. In addition, a further 21 (16%) of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement bringing the tally of those who either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement to an overwhelming 86%. Only 8 respondents which translate to 6% either 
agreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. 
 
Question 6: Vacancies are filled timeously by the education department. 
Table 5.42: Frequency distribution showing whether vacant posts are filled timeously by 



















Figure 5.29: Bar graph depicting whether vacant posts are filled timeously by the 
education department. 




















The majority of the respondents, namely 100 which translates to 75% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed with the statement that vacant posts are filled timeously by the 
education department. In addition to this, 20 (15%) of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement bringing the tally of the respondents who disagreed to strongly disagreed with 
the statement to an overwhelming 90%. Only 5 (4%) of the respondents agreed to 










Section E: Implementation of the Post Provisioning Norm 
Question 1: Principals are consulted on issues of implementation of the post 
provisioning norm. 
Table 5.43: Frequency distribution showing whether principals are consulted on issues of 


















Figure 5.30: Bar graph showing whether principals are consulted on issues of 
implementation of the post provisioning norm. 






















An overwhelming majority of the respondents, namely 104 (77%) of the respondents, 
disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement that principals are consulted on issues 
of implementation of the PPN. Of this grouping of respondents, 81 (60%) strongly 
disagreed with the statement. Only 20 respondents which translate to 15% of the 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. 
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Question 2: The education department sets clear directives as to how the post 
provisioning norm is to be implemented. 
Table 5.44: Frequency distribution showing whether the department of education sets 



















Figure 5.31: Bar graph showing whether the department of education sets clear directives 
as to how the PPN is to be implemented. 
























The majority of the respondents, totaling 76 or 56% of the respondents disagreed to 
strongly disagreed with the statement that the department of education sets clear 
directives as to how the PPN is to be implemented. In contrast to this, only 30 (22%) of 
the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement. 
 
Question 3: Documents on implementation of the post provisioning norm are clear 
and unambiguous. 
Table 5.45: Frequency distribution showing whether the documents on the 


















Figure 5.32: Bar graph showing whether the documents on the implementation of the post 














With regard to documents on the implementation of the PPN, the majority of the 
respondents, namely 77 which accounts for 57% of the respondents, either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement. In contrast to this, 31 respondents comprising 23% 
of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement. 
 
Question 4: Members of staff are fully apprised of the objectives and processes of 
the post provisioning norm implementation. 
Table 5.46: Frequency distribution showing whether members of staff are apprised of the 


















Figure 5.33: Bar graph showing whether members of staff are apprised of the objectives 
and processes of the post provisioning norm implementation. 






















A plurality of respondents, namely 63 which translates to 47% of the respondents agreed 
to strongly agreed with the statement that members of staff are fully apprised of the 
objectives and processes of the PPN implementation. It is also noted that 43 (32%) of the 
respondents disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement. 
 
Question 5: Staff members fully support the process of implementation and 
participate actively in the process. 




















Figure 5.34: Bar graph showing support for and participation in the process of 
implementation by staff members. 






















An overwhelming majority of respondents comprising 100 or 75% disagreed to strongly 
disagreed with the statement that staff members fully support the process of 
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implementation and participate actively in the process. Moreover, just over half of the 
respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. A small minority of the respondents 
totaling 18, which translates to 13% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement.  
 
Question 6: Site stewards3 participate actively in the process of implementation. 




















Figure 5.35: Frequency distribution showing participation of site stewards in the 
implementation process. 





















                                                 
3 Site stewards are union representatives who are democratically elected by members of a particular union 
in a school. They serve as a link between the union and members in a school. 
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With regard to the participation of site stewards, 75 (56%) of the respondents which 
constitutes the majority of the respondents, indicated that they either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement that site stewards participate actively in the process 
of implementation of the PPN. Only 18 respondents, constituting 13 % of the respondents 
agreed to strongly agreed with the statement. 
 
Question 7: Adequate support is provided by the department of education via. 
SEMs to assist principals with implementation. 
Table 5.49: Frequency distribution showing support provided by the department via. 


















Figure 5.36: Frequency distribution showing support provided by the department via. 
SEMs with regard to implementation. 






















The majority of the respondents totaling 74 and comprising 55% of the respondents 
disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement that adequate support is provided by 
the department of education via. SEMs to assist principals with implementation. In 
contrast to this, 36 respondents which translate to 27% either agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement. 
 
Section F: General Comments 
MULTI-TERM PPN 
Eleven respondents commented that rather than declaring a PPN on an annual basis, a 
multi-term PPN would be welcomed as it would lead to greater staff stability at schools. 




Principals indicated that the average learner-educator ratio in the province was 
misleading and was in no way a measure of the actual class size. Seventeen principals 
made the point that there needs to be a decrease in the learner-educator ratio in the 
province. There seems to be support for a ratio of between 30:1 and 32:1, whilst a few 
principals suggested that 28:1 would be an ideal ratio. 
 
WORKSHOPS ON FORMULA 
Seven principals made the point that the application of the PPM and its related formulae 
was a highly technical process. They strongly believed that there should be greater 
advocacy as well as transparency as to how the model together with its related formulae 
is used in determining the PPN of schools. Two principals were of the view that the 
secrecy surrounding the entire process was creating the impression that the PPN was 
being manipulated by department officials. These principals were, therefore, of the view 
that there needs to be workshops for principals on the issue of educator provisioning. 
They believed that they need to be capacitated on how the model is applied. This they 
believed will enable them to verify their PPNs when it is declared by the department. 
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CRITERIA USED FOR REDRESS ALLOCATION 
A plurality of respondents from advantaged, urban and suburban schools commented that 
the criteria used to determine qualification for posts from the redress pool seriously 
disadvantages them. They believed that the current criteria, namely, condition of the 
physical infrastructure of the school and poverty of the community around the school 
without taking into account actual learner demography counts against them from 
qualifying for educators in terms of the poverty redress factor built into the PPM. With 
advantaged schools admitting large numbers of learners from disadvantaged communities 
from the neighbouring townships and informal settlements, they stated that learner 
poverty should be one of, if not the sole criterion in determining qualification for posts 
from the redress pool. 
 
TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PPN 
Twenty principals commented on the inappropriate timing of the announcement of the 
PPN. They made the point that the implementation of the PPN whilst the academic year 
is in progress undermines effective administration and leads to a breakdown in the 
organizational culture of schools, especially when class units have to be compressed, 
workloads redistributed and timetables reworked. Moreover, the movement of staff 
across schools whilst the academic year is in progress impacts negatively on curriculum 
delivery.  
 
SUITABLE RELEASE TIME 
Some principals commented that the PPN needs to be released by the latest in September 
so that schools can engage in meaningful planning for the forthcoming academic year.  
Further, any movement of staff resulting from the implementation of the PPN should take 
place on the first school day. They commented that if such practices are observed it will 
lead to a smooth start to the school year and will ensure minimal disruptions to the 





5.3   PRESENTATION OF THE QUALITATIVE DATA 
The qualitative data presented below was gathered from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with principals and unstructured interviews conducted with union officials. 
The interviews were primarily used as a secondary data gathering tool in order to 
triangulate the data generated by means of the questionnaire as well as to provide ‘thick 
description’4. 
 
The data generated from the interviews is presented thematically using verbatim 
quotations in order to ensure that the voices of the informants and not just that of the 
researcher is heard. Further, where informants made similar points the data is quantified. 
In the case of the semi-structured interviews, at the end of each quotation nom de plumes 
for the informants are used in order to give some indication as to the nature of the 
institution where the informant is based whilst simultaneously protecting the identity of 
the informant.  
  
5.3.1 TRANSPARENCY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATORS 
Seven principals quite emphatically disagreed that issues around educator post 
provisioning is sufficiently transparent. They contended that important information on the 
workings of the post distribution formula as well as the relevant statistics that are factored 
into the formula are not made transparent to them. All the department officials do is to 
hand the PPN report to principals and instruct them to implement it. Consequently, they 
commented: 
 
‘... there is not enough transparency…Normally we get summoned to a meeting and they 
call out all the names [of schools] and you get your piece of paper [PPN report] and 
then everyone has a whole lot of queries.’            [G Smith] 
 
                                                 
4 ‘Thick description’ is a term used in qualitative research to refer to the depth or ‘thickness’ of the 
description that a researcher needs to report. 
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‘No sir not [transparent] … they push this form [PPN report] into your hand at a very 
quick meeting… and then you look at these funny formulas… no one really explains to 
you… your own SEM tells you he has read it and he can’t understand it’. 
                [Ms van der Westhuizen] 
 
‘No, definitely [not transparent]… We are called as principals to a meeting. [A] highly 
secretive meeting for whatever reason and then we are issued these statements of the 
PPN… there isn’t sufficient transparency telling us how they arrived at the PPN… they 
need to start putting all the facts and figures on the table… But the way in which it is 
done is very high handed. It is just presented to you at a meeting. You are required to 
sign for it and take it away’                     [P Moodley] 
 
5.3.2 WORKSHOPS ON POST PROVISIONING 
Given the lack of transparency, principals made the point that there needs to be 
workshops on the issue of educator post provisioning so as to empower and capacitate 
principals on how the entire process of educator provisioning works. This is reflected by 
the following comment: 
 
‘… I think there needs to be more advocacy as to how this thing works… I am in the dark 
as to how it is applied every year.’                      [D Gibson] 
 
Further, the weightings of subjects were changed when the revised PPM was 
implemented and principals indicated that they were not briefed on the revisions to the 
model. The principal’s, therefore, made the following points:  
 
‘... some of the weightings have changed and most of us weren’t aware that some of the 
weightings have been changed…no one was actually advised.’                           [G Smith] 
 
‘…I’d like them to explain things to me …my lack of clarity [on the formula] will indicate 
to you that we weren’t fully… briefed on this thing.’       [P Moodley] 
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5.3.3 CRITERIA USED FOR THE ALLOCATION OF REDRESS POSTS 
One principal, whose school is classified in decile ten (advantaged) in terms of the 
national Norms and Standards for School Funding and whose learner population 
comprises 87% of learners from disadvantaged communities, strongly believed that his 
school should have qualified for educators from the redress pool. He stated that: 
 
‘…we need to become more conscious of the fact that redress is ensuring that 
communities of people who were disadvantaged [in the past] are advantaged and 
somewhere in the model we have to take race into account. I believe that firmly, based on 
the different population groups that obviously the black community was disadvantaged to 
a large extent… we need to take this into account so it becomes a factor’.      [D Gibson] 
 
Another principal from a mediocre-level resourced school was quite scathing in his 
criticism of the criteria used by the department to distribute the posts allocated for 
redress. He believed that by only taking into account the condition of the schools 
infrastructure and neglecting learner poverty, seriously disadvantages his school. He 
commented: 
 
‘In terms of the description that the department affords to [my school] we are an 
advantaged school. Unfortunately that classification has been based on just the 
infrastructure and not really who we are catering for. We’ve got two informal settlements 
just below the school that draws in over 150 children… that is not taken into account. 
They can hardly be termed advantaged children’.                                            [P Moodley] 
 
The union officials also seem dissatisfied with the criteria used in distributing poverty 
redress posts. They seem to concur with the view articulated by some principals that 
learner poverty should be looked into as a factor in distributing redress posts. One union 
official commented: 
 
‘… this is where our problem lies [as a union] because the criterion that indicates the 
level of poverty or how disadvantaged a school is… does not really look into the factor of  
 187
learner poverty… [it] does not take into account your entire learner poverty index’ 
                 [Union A] 
She went on to further illustrate her point by commenting: 
 
‘… you may have a so-called advantaged school in the heart of Durban… but your 
learner poverty index would be great by the mere fact that it is schooling learners who 
cannot pay school fees.’                   [Union A] 
  
In contrast, principals from well-resourced schools and drawing a large number of 
learners from advantaged communities believed they had no right to expect to qualify for 
educators from the redress pool.  
 
The union officials were also very critical of the department’s attempts at redress. They 
take the view that redress should be looked at holistically and consequently, believed that 
the department has a very short-sighted approach to redress by only looking at it from a 
human resources perspective. One union official therefore, commented: 
 
‘…it’s not just human resources… it’s the whole learner support materials… your 
physical infrastructure… all of that needs to be taken into consideration.’         [Union B] 
 
Another union official went on to explain how limitations in the physical infrastructure at 
disadvantaged schools affects the deployment of educators in terms of redress: 
 
‘… if you distribute posts to a school in the heart of a rural area where you don’t have 
many classrooms… you might find that you are sending teachers who cannot be 
accommodated in that school simply because there is no classroom facilities.’  [Union A] 
 
Union officials also commented that whilst the redress allocation is supposed to benefit 
the disadvantaged schools in terms of lowering the class sizes it in fact does not. Owing 
to limitations in their physical infrastructure, class sizes are not reduced. One official, 
therefore, commented: 
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‘You have a PPN which tells you 1:36… When you go to these schools you find 1:50, 
1:60, 1:70… the PPN, because of a lack of classrooms, does very little to lower the class 
size’                                                                                                                        [Union B] 
 
5.3.4 SCHOOL CURRICULA 
The data on school curricula is presented under the categories; PPM and curriculum 
diversity, promotion of subjects, and curriculum diversity and its demand on specialists. 
 
PPM and Curriculum Diversity 
Four of the nine principals agreed that the PPM tends to favour schools which offer a 
diverse curriculum. They point to the higher weightings allocated to subjects which in 
turn increases the total weighted learners of the school in terms of the PPN formula. This 
increased weighting then allows such schools to lay claim to more posts from the 
provincial pool of educators. Some of the comments made by these principals are as 
follows: 
 
‘I have looked at those weightings and … if you are doing Dance your weighting is like 
0.45 or something like that against teaching physical science who may get… 0.185 for 
every learner…’                        [D Gibson] 
 
‘I know of schools that are bigger [larger enrolment] than ours but seem to have a lower 
PPN…I think it can only really be accounted for the fact that we offer such a wide variety  
of subjects… I think that we have something like twenty one different subjects and so a lot 
of those are in the specialist category for which you qualify for additional weightings.’ 
                 [G Smith] 
 
The union officials were also in agreement that schools offering a diverse curriculum 
seem to be advantaged by the PPM. One union official commented: 
 
‘… the number of educators in a school is going to be determined by the type of 
curriculum you are going to offer… and you discover in advantaged institutions… where 
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you have subjects like computer science… technical skills subjects… the weightings of 
subjects are quite high [and] you discover that you qualify for quite a few educators.’ 
                 [Union B] 
 
The union official went on to explain the situation at disadvantaged institutions. He 
pointed out that because of the subjects that they are forced to offer - because of 
inadequate physical and material resources and a lack of adequately trained personnel – 
their overall subject weightings are small which results in a reduction in their entitlement 
to educator posts. He commented: 
 
‘If you go to the rural schools, they don’t teach those [science and technical skills] 
subjects. They teach the social subjects and the weightings [of these subjects] is low and 
will [therefore] always qualify for lesser [smaller number] teachers.’        [Union B] 
 
Four of the principals, whose institutions offer a diverse curriculum, were of the view that 
by promoting curriculum diversity they are in no way being advantaged by the PPM. 
They argue that whilst some of the subjects they offer do carry a higher weighting in 
terms of educator post provisioning this in no way compensates for the additional number 
of periods created through splits and combination classes as a result of timetabling. These 
principals therefore commented:  
 
‘No, that’s not quite true though on paper it does look that way… You are going to have 
more splits and you are going to need more manpower and the PPN does not allow for 
that… you will [therefore] need to supplement what you are getting from the state.’ 
                      [G Hendricks] 
 
‘The PPM seriously disadvantages schools with a diverse curriculum… At the beginning 
of 2004 as a result of all the splits that we had to create… in fact we created an 
additional 130 periods. If you had to really translate that into teacher requirements that 
would mean three teachers. The department should actually be giving me three 
teachers… for the splits that we created but… that is not considered.’            [P Moodley] 
 190
‘I don’t believe that it favours them. I believe that it does not even cater for splits… 
schools with [a] diverse curriculum have splits and this thing [the PPM]… has total 
disregard for the splits’                       [B Mkhize] 
 
Principals whose schools do offer a diverse curriculum point out that they have to 
increasingly rely on their SGBs to fund the additional posts created as a result of the 
splits and combination classes. One principal commented: 
 
‘These [splits and combinations] are now becoming very expensive… The only way we 
are able to do that and we continue to be committed to it is because of the commitment of 
the parents [on] the SGB to provide the additional educators. So the additional three 
educators as a result of the splits… the GB is actually funding that’.    [P Moodley] 
 
Promotion of Subjects 
The PPM makes provision for the Head of Education in a province to promote particular 
subjects in schools in line with its curriculum transformation agenda. Therefore, there is 
expectation among principals at disadvantaged schools that new subjects would be 
introduced at their schools. This, however, does not seem to be the case. The principals 
from poorly resourced schools were adamant that the department of education is not 
doing enough to promote curriculum diversity at their schools. One principal commented: 
 
‘They [the department] must give an indication that we would like to advertise a post like 
this [computer studies] … can you check with your SGB. I mean who is going to say no to 
computer science… My belief is that the PPN… model is a disguise not to develop your 
school into what an ideal school should be like.’                   [B Mkhize] 
 
Another principal from a poorly resourced school commented that as a school they 
simply do not have the necessary financial resources to promote certain subjects. Their 
state allocation and school fees are not substantial enough for them to fund new subjects 
in the curriculum. He commented: 
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‘The money we get from the department… for this year it is R 50 000 for the first time 
[and it] is enough to pay for electricity and water. Not much for anything else. The fees 
that we get here are very small and the money comes in dribs and drabs.’          [S Nkosi]       
 
Curriculum Diversity and its Demand on Specialists 
Principals made the point that by offering a diverse curriculum they often experienced 
problems in recruiting suitably qualified staff. When highly specialized subjects are 
offered, schools have difficulty in filling educator posts in these subjects. Consequently, 
they commented: 
 
‘… diversity [makes] a big demand on specialists… today to find a TD [technical 
drawing] guy [teacher], a drama teacher, to find an art teacher is like finding gold in 
dust. It is very difficult’.            [D Gibson] 
 
‘... it is very difficult to get teachers…[in] maths, physics and the commerce subjects.’ 
           [G Hendricks] 
 
Moreover, they point out that help form the department of education in locating specialist 
educators is not always forthcoming.  
 
‘… once you start to offer that [a diverse curriculum] you will find that you require 
particular personnel that the department has difficulty in providing.’             [P Moodley] 
 
5.3.5 CLASS SIZE  
The principals indicated that the maximum ideal class sizes as stipulated in the PPM did 
not materialize in practice. They added that by reducing the class size to the ratio 
stipulated by the PPM, the resulting balance of the learners has to be carried by some 
other educator. This, they argued, has the resultant effect of increasing class sizes in other 
subjects substantially above both the average learner-educator ratio of the province as 
well as the ideal maximum class size for those subjects as indicated in the PPM.  
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Moreover, the physical infrastructure at schools may not be conducive to large class sizes 
for certain subjects. By reducing class sizes in these subjects, it impacts on the other 
educators in the school. Two principals, therefore, commented: 
 
‘We had woodwork and our woodwork class can take a maximum of 30 learners… our 
current classes are 50-55 learners. To create a class of 30 learners’ impacts on other 
teachers… so we rather do without the woodwork class’.   [G Hendricks] 
 
‘You got to have a manageable number [in your workshops] but very little provision is 
made to cater for that. You got ten workbenches times two - that leaves you with twenty. 
Someone is carrying that burden of the balance of the pupils that supposed to be in that 
class’.             [P Moodley] 
 
Given the specific needs of certain specialist subjects, smaller class sizes are an 
imperative. However, the PPN of schools does not lend itself to smaller class sizes in 
these subjects. Consequently, some schools are forced to violate legal prescripts in the 
offering of certain subjects. The following comment illustrates this point: 
 
‘…certain subjects require specialized work… [it demands that] the educators comply 
with the Occupational [Health] and Safety Act [and therefore] require smaller classes. 
The woodwork class and metalwork classes are currently sitting at 36. At matric level 
metalwork in terms of occupational safety that is not on. It should be sitting at a 
maximum of 24. But you cannot split the classes into 18 and 18 because it does not make 
economic units and our staffing does not allow for that’.        [P Naidoo] 
 
5.3.6 LEARNERS WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS  
Principals were of the view that the PPM discriminates against ordinary public schools by 
not taking into account the learners they have admitted with barriers to learning. Whilst 
they believed that they are promoting inclusivity by admitting learners with barriers to 
learning, they pointed out that the PPM does not compensate their schools by granting 
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them additional educator personnel to cater for the pedagogical needs of these learners. 
They therefore commented:  
 
‘It [the PPM] should account for that but it doesn’t. What I am doing is stop gap 
remediation by getting outside agencies and outside institutions to actually take the 
problem away from me and not solve the problem’.         [D Gibson] 
 
‘I’d say there are about 100 to 150 learners that do require special care for various 
reasons… maybe slow learners, hard of hearing, defective sight. They are just lumped in 
with mainstream learners because there is no provision that can be made for them. There 
is no one to give them that special attention, particularly those with attention deficits and 
so on. The PPN does not make any provision whatsoever for them…’    [P Moodley] 
 
5.3.7 ADMISSION OF LEARNERS FROM DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES 
Five of the nine principals pointed out that whilst their schools are located in advantaged 
areas, their schools in no way catered for learners exclusively from advantaged 
communities. They are increasingly admitting learners from disadvantaged communities. 
They believed that this factor should be taken into account in educator provisioning. 
These principals commented as follows: 
 
‘Although [my school] is situated in an advantaged area… this is considered advantaged 
because of tarred roads and lighting… we have a fairly large group from disadvantaged 
backgrounds’.                          [P Naidoo] 
 
‘In terms of [the department] we are considered advantaged. We have tarred roads; 
lighting [and] flushing toilets [but] almost 80% of our learners are from disadvantaged 
communities. Most of our learners come from the surrounding informal settlements… and 





5.3.8 SECOND LANGUAGE SPEAKERS OF ENGLISH 
Five of the nine informants indicated that their schools cater for a large number of 
learners who are second language speakers of English. Because English is the LOLT at 
their schools, they assert that these learners need added pedagogical support in English 
and would benefit most if the PPM took this factor into account. One principal from a 
well-resourced school indicated that it was unfortunate that the PPM does not take this 
into account and, therefore, had to turn to his governing body for help in this regard. He 
made the following comment: 
 
‘Our governing body employs the second language [specialist] amongst the governing 
body employed staff… [the] second language specialist gives extra English  [lessons] to 
some of the kids that struggle particularly with English’.          [G Smith] 
 
Another principal made the comment that besides English being a second language to the 
majority of learners at his school, the specific language of many of the specialist subjects 
which he calls a ‘third language’ severely disadvantages learners. He commented: 
 
‘You know whilst he is doing it [the specialist subject] in English, it becomes another 
language because Maths has got its own language, Physical Science has got its own 
language and that can be seen as a third language. Whilst he may be doing it in his 
second language English, he has to come to grips with the specific language of that 
subject… it’s a very serious barrier and it’s only profiency in the language that can 
unlock the real knowledge in many of these subjects’.       [P Moodley] 
 
5.3.9 EMPLOYMENT OF SGB PAID EDUCATORS 
Union officials pointed out that the PPM cannot regulate the employment of SGB paid 
educators. The appointment of SGB paid educators is left to the discretion of individual 
SGBs. Consequently, schools that have the financial resources engage in hiring SGB paid 
educators. The union officials commented that the hiring of SGB paid educators has the 
effect of reducing the learner-educator ratios as well as the educator workloads at these 
schools: 
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‘… no doubt the employment of extra educators or SGB appointees does lessen the load 
to a large degree. There are schools that are sitting with 25:1.’          [Union A] 
 
‘If the state is failing to improve on the learner-educator ratio… as parents they take it 
upon themselves to try to improve that.’            [Union B] 
 
Further, the union officials pointed to the fact that parents who have the financial means 
are simply exercising their rights within the legislative framework in improving the 
quality of education received by their children: 
 
‘…it is simply the question of the rich providing a better quality [education]’.   [Union A] 
 
‘…their justification is that they are improving the quality of learning and teaching.’ 
                 [Union B] 
 
5.3.10 RELEASE OF THE PPN 
The data on the release of the PPN is presented under the categories; timing of the 
announcement of the PPN, impact of the release of the PPN on school organization and 
suitable release time of the PPN. 
 
Timing of the Announcement of the PPN 
Principals were unanimous in their disapproval of the release dates of the PPN. All 9 
principals were of the view that the timing of the release of the PPN has been inopportune 
and has had a negative impact on school organization and service delivery. They also 
pointed out that the late release of the PPN is not a once-off occurrence but has been 
something historical. Some of the comments made by the principals were as follows: 
 
‘… [it] presents major problems… Teaching starts here on the first day and we cannot do 
that and we have not done that in the last two years because of the delay in the PPN…’ 
               [D Gibson] 
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‘…it’s not ideal… to get your final 2004 PPN three of four months into the year must 
make life extremely difficult.’              [G Smith] 
 
‘…it’s been horribly late…As far as I know, from my seven years as principal this 
department has never been on time or has never ever disclosed the PPN at an 
appropriate time. It has always been so inconvenient and caused so many disruptions.’ 
             [P Moodley] 
 
Impact of the Release of the PPN on School Organization 
Eight of the nine principals spoke of the negative impact the inopportune timing of the 
release of PPN has on school organization and administration. More specifically, they 
were extremely critical of the impact of the timing of the release of the PPN on school 
planning, teacher allocations and timetabling and the resultant effect this has on the 
culture of learning and teaching at their schools. These are some of the comments made 
by the principals: 
 
‘…it’s not good for organization… I believe in good administration… I am particular 
about administration. It is really frustrating to be in [this] set-up… We normally give 
teachers their allocations before they leave in December. In the last few years I have not 
been able to do that simply because I am not sure how many teachers I have on the 
permanent staff…’             [D Gibson] 
 
 ‘They [the department] have to understand that schools operate in an organized fashion. 
Much of the planning is done in the year prior to it starting… we are actually doing 
allocations without being certain of our PPN…so it upsets the arrangement.’ 
             [P Moodley] 
 
‘Last year we had planned… we made allocations… but it [the PPN] changed. Then we 
had to change the timetable and allocations and that goes against the call for starting 
lessons on the first day.’               [S Nkosi] 
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Further, a principal from a poorly resourced school spoke of the impact the late release of 
the PPN has when there is a reduction in the number of posts. He pointed out the 
difficulty in getting SGB paid educators appointed after the completion of the budgetary 
process. He commented: 
 
‘…the reduction of posts sometimes would imply a certain subject cannot be taught. You 
might require SGB [appointed] educators… The budget has [already] been ratified. 
Where are you going to get more money?’          [B Mkhize] 
 
Suitable Release Time of the PPN 
The majority of principals were in agreement that a suitable time for the release of the 
PPN would be in the month of September. They believed that if the PPN is released 
during the month of September they will be able to engage in proper human resource 
planning for the forthcoming year. One principal commented: 
 
‘…in September it [must] be given to you…so that your planning can take place.’ 
               [B Mkhize] 
 
Two principals were at pains to point out that the current situation cannot be allowed 
continue because of the detrimental effect it has on planning in general and the culture of 
learning and teaching in particular. One principal therefore commented: 
 
‘The buck is got to stop somewhere and the education department needs to be punctual 
about the way in which they hand this PPN to schools…If they give it to me in September, 
I’ve got my budget meeting in October and then we do our planning in terms of staffing 
and so on in the month of October and November. Before teachers depart for the holiday 
they should have a rough idea of their timetable, their allocation… that would be a fair 





5.3.11 FILLING OF VACANT POSTS  
The data on the filling of vacant educator posts is presented under the categories; 
temporary filling of posts by substitute educators, 30 day policy for the qualification of 
substitute educators, filling of posts through compulsory temporary transfers and filling 
of posts in a permanent capacity. 
 
Temporary Filling of Posts by Substitute Educators 
Principals spoke of the difficulty in recruiting substitute educators because they are 
becoming a scarce resource. They believed that the fact that the department does not have 
a database of substitute educators adds to their woes. In instances where principals were 
able to identify suitable substitute educators, they were cautioned not to employ the 
educators until Departmental approval is given. They therefore commented:  
 
‘…it becomes very difficult… for us to find a substitute. The department does not have 
any substitutes.                                          [Ms D van der Westhuizen] 
 
‘In the seven years that I have been here [as principal] the department has not found a 
single substitute educator… they don’t even have a database of people that they can 
locate… Yet the department has the temerity to send out a circular cautioning principal’s 
that they are not employers and should not engage in employing staff. If principals follow 
that circular there [will] be large numbers of learners that will be sitting without 
educators.’            [P Moodley] 
 
Further, the principals were extremely critical of the procedure to be followed in the 
filling of posts by substitute educators. The lengthy process that needs to be followed, 
results in classes being deprived of an educator for a substantial period of time. One 
principal commented: 
 
‘… the problem is you have to advertise… wait for applications… [do] shortlisting and 
[then] interview… this thing [process] takes place over a two [to] three week period…  
 
 199
what happens is that a class is without a teacher for quite a considerable period of time.’ 
               [B Mkhize] 
 
Another principal spoke of the problems experienced in getting departmental officials to 
approve the appointment of the recommended substitute educator. Department Officials 
often procrastinate in approving substitute appointments. He commented: 
 
‘It causes untold problems… we are told not to employ before the district manager signs 
and they take their time… you have to call them many times [for] a response and the 
delay causes problems… [In the meantime] the classes remain unattended.’  
                                        [S Nkosi] 
 
30 Day Policy for the Qualification of Substitute Educators 
Principals indicated that the policy on substitutes, namely, that school’s will qualify for a 
state paid substitute only if an educator was going to be away from school for more than 
30 consecutive schooldays was highly problematic. They believed that when educators 
are away from school for less than 30 consecutive schooldays, the Department’s policy 
on substitute educators compromises the education of children. Hence they commented: 
 
‘[It] does not help us in the school situation because an educator may be absent for 28 or 
29 days. This means that [in terms of department policy] a class must be without an 
educator for 29 days. Now what about the provision of quality education here? Learners 
are compromised severely.’             [P Naidoo] 
 
‘What happens is that teachers are absent for a week or two weeks… learners are left 
without [a] teacher in [the] classroom. Learners are left unattended and this denies them 
their basic right to [an uninterrupted] education.’             [T Shezi] 
 
They added that in many instances educators are away for three to four weeks and the 
fact that there is no state paid substitute, schools are forced to put in place contingency 
 200
plans. These contingency plans are sometimes not pedagogically sound. They 
commented: 
 
We [have] GB members who are generous with their time and they come in to baby-sit 
the class’.          [G Hendricks] 
 
‘… the school will either try to use parents or say to somebody just come and fill in for 
two weeks and we will pay you an X amount out of GB funds…’       [D Gibson] 
 
Filling of Posts through Compulsory Temporary Transfers5 (CTTs) 
Principals were extremely critical of the manner in which substantive vacant posts are 
filled at their institutions by the department by way of CTTs. Principals were of the view 
that in the filling of vacancies by the department through CTTs, sound educational 
principles are compromised because the department’s main concern is meeting its 
operational requirements rather than meeting the pedagogical needs of the child. Not 
much thought goes into the matching of available personnel to the vacant posts. These 
principals commented: 
 
‘[The] CTT in many cases do not even fulfill the curricular needs. They are just asked to 
move there… and just occupy space. The movement of educators from a primary school… 
to a secondary school… is highly problematic… the type of instruction that happens in 
primary school is extremely different to that in the high school.’        [P Naidoo] 
 
‘CTT [is]… used as an instrument to sort out the departments worries rather than meet 
the specific needs of schools… Let me give you an example. This is a high school. We 
made a request for an IsiZulu educator… staffing [department] should understand that 
we are talking about somebody who is schooled in the didactics of IsiZulu. [The 
department] finds someone who talks IsiZulu… They found a lady in a primary school 
and sent her here to teach IsiZulu in Grades 10 and 11.’                                 [P Moodley] 
                                                 
5 Compulsory Temporary Transfer (CTT) refers to the movement, by the department, of an educator who is 
surplus at one school to another school where there is a vacancy. 
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Filling of Posts in a Permanent Capacity 
All nine principals were unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the department regarding 
the delays in the filling of substantive vacant posts in a permanent capacity. There is no 
urgency to fill the posts. Time frames and management plans for the filling of posts are 
constantly revised resulting in staffing uncertainty at schools. The vacancy bulletins are 
often inaccurate resulting in addendums. These principals commented: 
 
 ‘…you do all your paperwork… only to find there is a new HRM [human resource 
management circular]… coming out with an amended date. [The department does not] 
stick to the management plan and it makes it very difficult for us as a school. You can’t 
really plan. You have to re-plan all the time.’     [Ms D van der Westhuizen] 
 
‘… for the last eight years not a single management plan… went on track in terms of the 
original circular that was sent out. There are always amendments to circulars, 
amendments to management plans. Posts that were supposed to get filled in the first term 
get filled in the fourth term. This affects service delivery. It adversely affects the 
organizational culture of the school as well as the morale of educators.’      [P Naidoo] 
 
‘They don’t [stick to the management plan]… It is historical. They just seem to be making 
the same mistakes. They are not learning from their mistakes.’   [G Hendricks] 
 
5.3.12 DOCUMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
Six principals made the point that the procedure manual on PPN implementation is not 
clear and subject to alternative interpretations. There is no uniform understanding of the 
manual. Principals, Department Officials and Union Officials have their own 
interpretations with regard to what the manual enunciates. Consequently, this sometimes 
results in conflict among the stakeholders.  The principals, therefore, commented:  
 
‘I think most people don’t even have the foggiest idea [of the manual]. This is evident in 
the type of questions that come up in the [principals] meeting.’         [G Smith] 
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‘That has to be a categoric no… different sections in the department have been doing 
different things… the SEMs sometimes tell you go ahead and do a particular thing… next 
thing the district office sends all those forms back.’       [P Moodley] 
 
‘If it was clear there would not be so many squabbles [disputes] after people have been 
identified [surplus].’                [S Nkosi] 
 
5.3.13 SUPPORT FOR AND PATICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF PPN 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The data on support for and participation in the process of PPN implementation is 
presented under the stakeholder categories; members of staff, site stewards, SGBs and 
SEMs. 
 
Members of Staff  
Principals pointed out that staff members are generally supportive of the process only 
when the school’s declared PPN is above the current staff establishment. In other words, 
when vacancies are to be declared staff members participate in the process.  
 
 ‘…I would say yes [they are supportive] because we never had a surplus… We’ve never 
had to declare people in excess.’                    [G Hendricks] 
 
‘…if they know… that nobody is going to be declared in surplus you get full support… 
because they all will like to fight about where the new [vacancy must] be introduced.’ 
               [B Mkhize] 
 
However, when the declared PPN is below the current staff establishment and 
consequently, surpluses have to be declared, staff members are not very supportive of the 
process. One principal whose staff is highly unionized spoke off the vehement opposition 
of members of staff to the implementation of the PPN. He stated: 
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‘…we are working in a highly unionized environment. The moment you have policies and 
procedures in place that affect staff and their colleagues who are union members it is 
natural and normal that they will close ranks… So you get no support. In fact the staff is 
openly hostile.’           [P Moodley] 
 
Site Stewards 
Principals pointed out that support and participation of site stewards in the process is 
dependent on how highly unionized the institutions are. The principals from schools were 
there is not much union activity, which generally tended to be the well-resourced ex-
Model C schools, indicated minimal interference from site stewards. 
 
‘…we don’t have a very highly unionized staff… most of them [staff] belong to one 
particular union… She [site steward] tends to be very supportive.’         [G Smith] 
 
However, principals whose institutions are highly unionized indicated that site stewards 
tended to side with their union members and were not co-operative when implementing 
the PPN. Any policy which threatens the job security of its members is bound to be 
opposed by the site stewards. They commented: 
 
‘Well the site stewards have to support their members… it’s fashionable to oppose policy 
of the… employer especially if it prejudices the employee.’      [P Moodley] 
 
SGBs 
Notwithstanding the fact that circulars from the education department on educator post 
provisioning are addressed to chairpersons of SGBs, principals indicated that SGBs do 
not understand the PPN process and most often than not do not get involved in the 
process. However, if they do get involved in the process it is largely to seek approval for 
the funding of posts from school funds for replacement educators not catered for in the 
PPN. These principals therefore commented: 
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‘…they do not have adequate knowledge [of the process]… they get involved [when] 
replacements are needed.’                                     [P Naidoo] 
 
‘The SGB… quite frankly, they don’t understand this thing.’                           [B Mkhize] 
 
‘They don’t understand it. They don’t understand the PPN. So they don’t participate…’ 
                [T Shezi] 
 
SEMs 
The majority of principals pointed out that the role of the SEMs in the process is merely 
that of handing the PPN circular to them. Eight of the nine principals were quite emphatic 
in voicing their dissatisfaction at the lack of support from SEMs when implementing the 
PPN. One principal very emotionally stated: 
 
‘…that particular category [SEMs] one needs to get angry and upset with… there is no 
support at all…’                                                                                                 [P Moodley] 
 
Moreover, they indicated that when queries were raised with them they were unable to 
provide assistance. They thus questioned the extent to which SEMs understand the 
process. They therefore commented: 
 
‘…these guys [SEMs] don’t even understand this thing. That’s the problem they don’t 
understand it.’              [B Mkhize] 
 
‘Some of them I don’t think even understand how this whole process works because if you 
have technical queries they are often unable to answer them… I’d imagine when you are 
in that position you must make it your duty to be familiar with all those kinds of issues.’ 
                                                  [G Smith] 
 
‘…when you query the calculation of the PPN, I was told… we can’t handle [it] at this 
level. You must write to so and so in Ulundi.’                                                   [P Moodley] 
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5.3.14 MULTI-TERM PPN  
Four principals supported the view of a multi-term PPN. They believed that a multi-term 
PPN will lead to greater stability in schools and improve school planning. They, 
therefore, commented: 
‘…PPN should be kept constant for at least three years. [This would ensure] stability and 
[enhance] school planning and the delivery of quality education.’       [P Naidoo] 
 
‘…the PPN should stretch over three years. It should be reviewed after every three years. 
It will ensure continuity in schools.’               [T Shezi] 
 
5.4 EMERGING TRENDS AND PATTERNS FROM THE DATA 
After a thorough study of both the quantitative and qualitative data, the emerging trends 
and patterns from the data is presented. 
 
5.4.1 EQUITY CONCERNS 
Finding: The vast majority of principals do not believe that the PPM distributes educator 
posts equitably to schools.  
From a distributional equity perspective the PPM does not cater for fairness in the 
qualitative distribution of educators. In noting that educator quality can in part be judged 
by the qualifications of educators (Krige & Scott 1995:57), the PPM does not take this 
variable into account when distributing educators to schools. This means that the 
inequalities in terms of educator qualifications that existed prior to the formation of a 
unitary system of education with the disadvantaged schools having a substantial number 
of educators, who are underqualified or poorly qualified, will continue to be a part of the 
education system. Jansens (1995:134), therefore, makes the point that those learners who 
study at well-resourced schools viz. the advantaged schools with qualified teachers 
experience the curriculum in ways different from children attending disadvantaged 
schools such as township schools even when these schools use the same syllabus. This in 
turn is bound to impact on the nature of the educational experiences which educators as a 
resource are able to provide to their learners and may in turn impact on the outcomes for 
 206
individual learners. Servaas van den Berg (The Mercury 2004c:3) incisively points out 
that the inequalities in the output of the current schooling system is in part attributed to 
the differences in qualifications of educators in the various schools. A cause for concern 
is that this inequity is bound to continue because there are insufficient incentives for 
educators to upgrade their qualifications. Mdlalose (2003:41) points out that educators 
have become reluctant to upgrade their qualifications because the state, in order to prune 
government expenditure (as part of its neoliberal GEAR package); have de-linked 
educator salaries from educator qualifications. Thus, apart from the PPM contributing to 
the inequity in the qualitative distribution of educators, the state’s ideology of 
neoliberalism is further contributing to this inequity by de-linking educator salaries to 
qualifications and thereby not providing sufficient incentives for educators to upgrade 
their qualifications.  
 
Given Bot’s (2003:35) comments that schools in the disadvantaged category have less 
highly qualified educators compared to schools in the higher quintiles (deciles in the case 
of KZN) which have highly qualified educators, principals from these schools believed to 
a greater extent than principals from advantaged schools that educator qualifications 
should be a variable for consideration in the PPM (see section C, question 7, page 157). 
 
From a procedural equity perspective, the PPM in theory should ensure fairness i.e. fair 
treatment in the distribution of educators in terms of rules and procedures because it is 
based on objective criteria (the criteria are set out as common rules in terms of legislation 
and not determined by administrative discretion). Whilst this may be the case, principals 
are not convinced that the PPM results in procedural fairness in the distribution of 
educators. This is largely due to the highly secretive and high-handed manner in which 
the entire issue of educator post provisioning is handled by the department. In noting that 
key to any RAM is the principle of transparency, the fact that there is a lack of 
transparency on the workings of the post distribution formula as well as the relevant 
statistics that are factored into the formula has led principals to believe that the PPN of 
schools are being manipulated by department officials. If there is less than total 
transparency there seems little point in having a resource allocation model such as the 
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PPM. After all, the PPM was introduced in order to bring a about greater rationality and 
fairness in the allocation of educators to schools.   
 
Finding: The linking of curriculum offerings to educator posts has further contributed to 
the inequity in educator distribution.  
Schools that offer a diverse curriculum are advantaged in terms of the distribution of 
posts by the PPM. The schools in the disadvantaged cohort increasingly believe that the 
greater the number of subjects offered by a school, the greater the learner weighting of 
the school and hence, the greater their entitlement to posts in terms of the PPM. Given the 
fact that schools that classify themselves as disadvantaged do not have the necessary 
material resources (see section B, question 5, page 139), the physical infrastructure (see 
section B, question 6, page 141) nor the financial resources (see section B, questions 2 
and 3, pages 134 and 137) to offer broader subject offerings, including subjects which 
carry higher weightings in terms of the PPM, they will continue to be disadvantaged in 
terms of their entitlement to educator posts. Therefore, from a critical theory point of 
view one needs to ask the question as to whose interests are furthered by the PPM. The 
PPM most certainly does not further the interests of schools in the disadvantaged cohort. 
Moreover, even if schools in the disadvantaged cohort do find the means to offer new 
subjects they cannot do so because policy on educator post provisioning as stipulated in 
the procedure manual on PPN implementation precludes them from introducing new 
subjects. The PPM as a resource allocation tool thus serves to perpetuate the inequalities 
in educator distribution to schools. 
 
Finding: The PPM does not compensate schools which offer a diverse curriculum for the 
additional periods created as a result of split and combination classes in terms of 
timetabling. 
The principals from the advantaged school cohort indicated that the advantage gained by 
offering a diverse curriculum in terms of the PPM is illusory. The additional staff gained 
as a result of curriculum diversity comes at a price in that more staff is required to cater 
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for split and combination classes6 in terms of timetabling which is not funded by the 
PPM. Consequently, they point out that they have to increasingly turn to their SGBs to 
fund the additional posts created as a result of the splits and combination classes. This 
shifting of costs from public (state) to private sources (SGBs) is part of the NPM reforms 
which not all schools can afford. 
 
Finding: The employment of SGB paid educators favours the wealthier schools and 
results in numerical educator inequity at schools.  
Based on the income a school is likely to generate in a school year, SGBs as the ‘strategic 
apex’ of schools often make decisions as to whether they are able to supplement the 
baseline educator provisioning of the state by way of funding governing body appointed 
educators. The provisioning of educators from school funds favours schools in the 
advantaged cohort. The fact that they levy higher school fees, their SGBs are able to 
employ more educators (see section D, questions 2 and 3, pages 168 and 170). In some 
advantaged schools the SGB is a bigger employer of educator staff than the state. In 
2004, the number of SGB paid educators accounted for 7% of all educators employed in 
the public school sector in KZN compared to just 2% in 1998 (EMIS 2004b). This 
growing trend in the appointment of SGB paid educators is evidence of ‘creeping 
privatization’ in the public school sector which is in keeping with NPM reforms (Murphy 
1996:15). Whilst supporters of the notion of a ‘self-reliant school’ would see this as a 
positive trend, the stark reality is that schools that do not have the financial resources will 
continue to be disadvantaged. In contrast, the advantaged schools, as pointed out by the 
union officials, will be able to lower their learner-educator ratios and educator workloads 
and thereby improve the quality of education provided to their learners. If this trend is 
allowed to continue, this will further exacerbate the inequalities in output between the 
advantaged and the disadvantaged schools thereby justifying the views of critical 
theorists that schools exist to reproduce the social, economic and cultural order of 
capitalist societies. 
 
                                                 
6 Split and combination classes refer to the additional instructional time created as a result of, for example, 
10A combining with 10B for History, Accounting and Mathematics would require three educators and not 
two had there been no splits and combinations. 
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5.4.2 REDRESS CONCERNS 
Finding: The distribution of posts set aside for poverty redress, is not in keeping with 
policy pronouncements.  
In terms of the ‘levelling’7 approach to redress which is pursued by the state in terms of 
educator provisioning, the poorer schools, namely, those schools from deciles one to five, 
should have qualified for poverty redress posts. The data, however, does not indicate this 
to be the case. Further, whilst rural schools qualified for educators from the poverty 
redress pool, this in no way assisted them in reducing their classroom-educator ratio. The 
fact that they do not have sufficient classrooms, as pointed out by the union officials, 
results in class sizes remaining high. The educators granted to them in terms of redress, 
do not in anyway benefit the learners because the educators granted to the school either 
cannot be accommodated at the school because of a lack of classrooms, or if they do 
remain at the school, all that happens is that the period load of the existing educators is 
reduced. From a critical theory perspective, the instrumental rationality that prevails in 
the distribution of redress posts represents a preoccupation with means rather than ends. 
The department of education in its preoccupation with effecting redress has not given 
sufficient thought to the consequences of its redress policy because the intended 
beneficiaries of redress, which should be the learners, receive no advantage at all. The 
granting of poverty redress posts should be done in tandem with other factors that impact 
on learning. It should be accompanied by physical infrastructure development and the 
provision of material resources if the granting of poverty redress posts is to have any 
impact on learner outcomes. 
 
Finding: The principals as well as the union officials were extremely critical of the 
criteria used in distributing the poverty redress posts.  
Whilst the poverty grading of a school was ranked the second most important factor in 
determining the post provisioning needs of schools, the criteria of taking into account the 
condition of the physical infrastructure of the school as well as the location of the school 
to determine the poverty grading of the school for the qualification of posts from the 
                                                 
7 In terms of the ‘levelling’ approach to redress, resources should be distributed so that the least advantaged 
are favoured most so the variances in learner achievement is minimized. 
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poverty redress pool seriously disadvantages many schools. With school admission 
policies no longer restricting schools to admitting learners solely from the immediate 
feeder area, parents from disadvantaged communities (the townships and informal 
settlements) are increasingly seeking admission for their children to schools in the 
advantaged cohort (see section B, question 4, page 138). Consequently, learner 
demography at schools, more especially the advantaged schools, has changed quite 
considerably over the years. This is evidence consistent with NPM reforms and quasi-
market mechanisms in education that parents are increasingly exercising their right as to 
where they choose for their children to be educated. Given the change in learner 
demography, there is strong support for the learner poverty index of a school to be used 
as a criterion in distributing the poverty redress posts rather than the existing criteria of 
the poverty grading of a school which takes into account the condition of the physical 
infrastructure of the school and the location of the school (see section C, question 7, page 
159 and 5.3.3, page 186). From a critical theory perspective, it is important to note that 
the criteria for determining the distribution of posts set aside for poverty redress was 
determined by individuals with power in society, namely, the officials from the 
department of education. NUPSAW (2002b:8) has noted that the placement of a school in 
particular poverty grading category is dictated by economics: the fewer schools in the 
poorer quintiles (deciles in the case of KZN) the fewer redress posts the department 
would have to distribute. The current criteria, therefore, definitely does not serve the 
interests of the poor and is in need of urgent revision. In noting that a RAM is not a fixed 
and static entity, revisions may, therefore, need to be made to the PPM owing to the 
changing learner demography at schools.  
 
5.4.3 CONSULTATION OF PRINCIPALS ON POST PROVISIONING ISSUES 
The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the consultation of principals on post 
provisioning issues are presented under the categories; design of the PPM and 





DESIGN OF THE PPM 
Finding: There has been an almost total disregard in the consultation of the principal 
constituency on the design of the PPM.  
The principals, as human resource managers of their institutions, should be considered 
key role-players on issues of educator provisioning. After all, they are at the ‘chalkface’ 
and consequently, ideally placed to articulate how different factors inside and outside of 
the school environment impact on learning and consequently, on educator provisioning. 
Therefore, they should be allowed to influence and participate in the determination of 
decisions which affect their institutions. Given Hall and Loucks (1982:135) criticism that 
many policy actors have limited experience in actually working in school settings either 
as educators or as administrators, or if they do have experience, it typically occurred long 
ago, the policy actors involved in framing policy on educator post provisioning should 
have, therefore, ensured wider consultation of principals on the design of the PPM.  
 
Whilst noting that the consultation of principals by the department of education is totally 
inadequate, of concern is the role of the educator unions in seeking mandates from 
principals who are also an important sector of its membership. It seems as though that the 
labour unions represented at ELRC are not consulting with and obtaining mandates from 
principals on their views on educator post provisioning. 
 
In noting that the introduction of a RAM is the result of perceived inconsistencies or 
unfairness associated with existing methods of resource allocation, there should have 
been wider consultation of principals on what they considered unfair in the existing 
methods of educator distribution to schools and what criteria they would consider 
important in determining the educator establishment of schools. Further, the credibility of 
a resource allocation model such as the PPM is dependent on the assumptions on which it 
is based. The fact that there was not wider consultation of the opinions of a very 
important stakeholder grouping on educator provisioning, namely the principals, by both 
the department of education and the educator unions, one needs to question from a 
critical theory perspective as to whose views, interests and opinions were validated in 
deciding on the design features of the PPM. It is abundantly clear, that the opinions and 
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interests of those in authority, and hence, with power viz. officials from the department of 
education were taken into account in the design of the PPM. 
  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PPN 
Finding: There has been an overwhelming neglect in the consultation of principals on 
issues of implementation of the PPN.  
Implementation of the PPN is handled in a very high handed and bureaucratic fashion. 
According to Apple (2001:416), principals are seen as individuals with power in self-
reliant schools. However, when it comes to PPN implementation principals are rendered 
powerless. They are not consulted on implementation issues. The department officials by 
virtue of their positions stamp their authority on principals by instructing them to 
implement the PPN at their schools. The views and queries principals may have are not 
entertained. In some instances, principals were threatened with disciplinary action if they 
did not implement the PPN at their schools.  
 
Principals, as implementers of the PPN at school sites are considered to be the most 
important link in the implementation chain of policy on educator post provisioning. In 
noting that policy on educator post provisioning is not a popular policy among educators; 
and being cognizant of Craig’s (1990:24) comments that for any given policy there are 
numerous approaches to implementation, consulting principals on issues of 
implementation may bring to light possible obstacles to the chosen implementation 
strategy of the department. By being aware of these obstacles to implementation, the 
department of education could then put in place the appropriate policy tools in order to 
ensure that the policy recipients act in concert with the objectives of the post provisioning 
policy of the province. 
 
5.4.4 WORKSHOPS ON THE POST PROVISIONING FORMULA 
Finding: There has been an almost total neglect in capacitating principals on the 
workings of the formula used to calculate the PPN.  
Given the highly technical nature of the formula as well as the incremental revisions 
made to PPM, Field and Klingert (2001:87) make the point that it could lead to a 
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situation where very few people understand the model and could lead to users of the 
model becoming totally perplexed and may, therefore, call into question issues of 
transparency of the model. Both the department of education as well as the educator 
unions are guilty of not doing enough to capacitate and empower principals on the 
workings of the formula. The need to capacitate principals on issues around post 
provisioning is further demonstrated by the fact that many of the principals were unaware 
that the PPM had been revised in 2002. Principals were still referring to the old post 
distribution formula and the constants used in that formula.  
 
The fact that principals were not capacitated on the workings and application of the 
formula means that they do not have the knowledge base to verify the PPN of their 
schools when it is declared. Those with the knowledge, namely, the high ranking 
department officials and union officials who determine policy with regard to educator 
post provisioning are denying principals access to important information which could 
lead to their empowerment on educator post provisioning issues. In 2003, at the level of 
the national ELRC, educator unions pointed out that the formula used to calculate the 
PPN of a school is quite technical and not user friendly. The department in its response 
agreed that it was very technical owing to the variety of factors that had to be taken into 
account in determining a school’s staff establishment. They subsequently indicated that 
they were in the process of developing user manuals to assist principals in using a 
computer programme to calculate the PPN (ELRC 2003:4). These user manuals are, 
however, yet to reach schools. 
 
5.4.5 RANKING OF FACTORS IN THE PPM  
The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the ranking of the factors in the PPM 
is presented under the categories; maximum ideal class size of specific subjects, 
promotion of particular subjects/learning areas, learners with special educational needs 
and language of learning and teaching. 




MAXIMUM IDEAL CLASS SIZE OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS 
Finding: The maximum ideal class size of specific subjects was considered the most 
important factor by principals and had an overall mean ranking of one. Further, 
principals from schools in the advantaged cohort ranked this factor higher on average 
than principals from schools in the disadvantaged cohort.  
Certain subjects require smaller classes than others for reasons such as safety, access to 
equipment and for more intensive guidance. Consequently, principals considered the 
class sizes of specific subjects a very important factor in determining the post 
provisioning needs of schools. The fact that the schools in the advantaged cohort 
generally offer a wide range of curriculum offerings such as metalwork, woodwork, art, 
dance, speech and drama and music which demand smaller class sizes compared to 
schools in the disadvantaged cohort which generally offer the ‘straight six curriculum’8, 
could account for the higher mean ranking ascribed to this factor by advantaged schools. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of this factor, principals indicated that in terms of 
timetabling it was not possible to give effect to policy provisions on class sizes. It is only 
when a policy evolves towards practical application, do distortions to its successful 
execution become apparent (Mahomed 2001:105). In practice, to reduce the class size in 
one subject means that the balance of the learners from that particular class has to be 
carried by another educator. This has the resultant effect of increasing the overall period 
load of the school which in turn creates the demand for additional personnel which the 
PPM does not provide. Consequently, schools which cannot afford the appointment of 
SGB paid educators, do not offer specialist subjects but rather opt for offering the 
‘straight six’ curriculum. Thus, this factor favours the schools in the advantaged cohort 
because they have the financial resources to employ SGB paid educators which enables 




                                                 
8 The ‘straight six’ curriculum refers to a curriculum package comprising two languages and four stipulated 
subjects. There is no choice offered to the learner.   
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PROMOTION OF PARTICULAR SUBJECTS/LEARNING AREAS 
Finding: The need to promote particular subjects/learning areas at schools was given an 
overall mean ranking of three. Further, the principals from the disadvantaged school 
cohort ranked this factor significantly higher than the principals from the advantaged 
cohort. 
The disadvantaged schools generally offer a restricted curriculum viz. a ‘straight six’ 
curriculum. Even critical subjects such as mathematics and science may not be offered 
(Madisha 2001:13). Further, they do not have the material resources nor the physical 
infrastructure (see section B, questions 5 and 6, pages 139 and 141) to offer certain 
subjects/learning areas. This could, therefore, account for the higher on average ranking 
of this factor by disadvantaged schools compared to advantaged schools which offer a 
wide range of curriculum offerings owing to the superior material and physical resources 
they possess, the quantity and quality of their human resources and the might of their 
financial resources.   
 
Although policy on educator post provisioning makes provision for the Head of 
Education in a province to promote particular subjects at schools in line with its 
curriculum transformation agenda, in KZN there has been no strategic plan put in place to 
effect curriculum transformation despite the strong demand for curriculum redress at 
schools.  
 
Curriculum transformation has been handled in a rather haphazard fashion in the 
province. From 2000 to 2002 the number of curriculum transformation posts created by 
the MEC was extremely limited. Mdlalose (2003:35) notes that the allocation of these 
posts was not properly controlled, indicating that a markedly new approach should be 
taken if the need for curriculum transformation in the province is to be addressed.  
 
With the introduction of the revised PPM in 2003, the creation of curriculum redress 
posts by the department of education has not improved. Notwithstanding the revised 
model’s leanings towards the promotion of particular subjects/learning areas at schools, 
the department of education has failed to use this component of the model to effect 
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curriculum redress, all because of its preoccupation with financial stringency. 
Consequently, the inequities of the past in terms of access to the curriculum continue to 
be perpetuated. Whilst the Constitution of the country guarantees learners equal access to 
schools, the curriculum choices available to learners remain unequal. 
 
LEARNERS WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 
Finding: The factor learners with special educational needs at schools was given an 
overall mean ranking of four. 
As part of the state’s cost-cutting initiatives, only schools designated LSEN qualify for 
this factor to be taken into account in determining the post provisioning needs of schools. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that principals from ordinary public secondary schools 
ranked this factor lower down the order. This, however, is cause for serious concern in 
the light of Education White Paper 6 of 2001 and the emphasis being placed by the 
department of education on inclusive education.  
 
Education White Paper 6 of 2001 emphasizes the need to minimize barriers to learning 
and maximize participation at ordinary public schools. From a critical theory perspective, 
the integration of learners with barriers to learning into mainstream education is seen by 
Gibson (1986:144) as a positive emancipatory development. Currently, many of the 
ordinary public schools admit learners with mild to moderate disabilities. Statistics 
extracted from the EMIS database indicate that in 2003 there were 2 972 learners with 
special education needs in ordinary public schools (EMIS 2004b). Given the fact that 
these learners need additional pedagogical support, the PPN of an ordinary public school 
should take this into account. By not including this factor in determining the post 
provisioning needs of ordinary public schools, SGBs may covertly refuse admission to 
learners with special education needs.   
 
Bartlett and Le Grande (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:117), suggest that schools may 
engage in what is called ‘cream skimming’ as part of its efficiency drive which involves 
favouring the admission of those learners who will bring the greatest return for the least 
investment. This in turn could lead to discrimination in the admission policy of ordinary 
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public schools against more expensive users of the school system such as learners with 
special educational needs. Consequently, Bartlett and Le Grande advocate that sufficient 
incentives need to be provided to schools to admit learners who are more expensive users 
of the school system such as the allocation of an extra educator or two. 
 
LANGUAGE OF LEARNING AND TEACHING (LOLT) 
Finding: The factor ‘having more than one LOLT’ was considered the least important 
factor.  
The fact that the overall mean ranking of this factor was 5 (least important factor), and 
the means for schools in the advantaged and disadvantaged cohort do not differ 
significantly, is indicative of the fact that insufficient incentives are being provided to 
schools to offer more than one LOLT. The additional weighted learners granted to 
schools offering more than one LOLT is relatively small and is not attractive enough to 
schools as an incentive to offer more than one LOLT. The capital outlay in terms of 
learning resources and the administrative inconvenience in terms of timetabling far 
outweigh the incentive of, at most, gaining an additional educator. In reality the gaining 
of the additional educator may in practice not be an incentive at all because by offering 
more than one LOLT the number of split and combination classes created in terms of 
timetabling may increase and this may create the need for additional educators which the 
PPM does not provide for. Schools, therefore, are forced into offering a single LOLT 
because of the state’s policy on educator provisioning. This clearly runs counter to the 
state’s policy that learners have the right to access education in the language medium of 
their choice at schools. 
 
For critical theorists, language is one of the most important factors influencing the degree 
to which learners are able to access the school curriculum (Jansens 1995:134). The fact 
that schools do not use IsiZulu or SeSotho as the LOLT means that learners who are 
IsiZulu or SeSotho speakers do not experience the curriculum in the same way as learners 
whose mother tongue is similar to the LOLT of the school. Further, language is more 
than communication; it is about the values, traditions and culture of particular groups 
(Jansens 1995:134). The fact that schools, more often than not, adopt only one LOLT 
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which invariably turns out to be English (see below), results in schools elevating the 
values, traditions and culture associated with English whilst subordinating the values, 
traditions and culture of other language groups. 
 
Finding: The PPM should take into account learners at schools who are second language 
speakers of English. 
Whilst the PPM makes provision for dual and multi-medium schools it makes no 
provision for learners who are second language speakers. Given the fact that the vast 
majority of schools do not offer instruction in more than one of the official languages, a 
World Bank study has noted that many African countries generally adopt the language of 
the former colonial government as the LOLT in the formal education system (The World 
Bank 1988:43). This has been the case in South Africa. Notwithstanding the country’s 
progressive language in education policy of additive multilingualism, the majority of 
schools in the province of KZN have adopted English as the LOLT owing to parental 
demands for instruction to be in English as they recognize the gateway status of English 
(APEK 2004c:3). English, to the vast majority of learners in KZN is, however, regarded 
as a second language and becomes a serious barrier to learning for these learners. Peliwe 
Lolwana, the chief executive of Umalusi9 attributes the poor performance of learners in 
the matric examinations to learner’s low proficiency in English. Lolwana makes the point 
that some learners, especially those in remote rural areas are functionally illiterate in 
English. She adds that proficiency in English is a greater challenge to our schools than 
mathematics and science (Joubert 2004:1-2). Further, Jansens (1995:134) incisively 
points out that most black learners tend to experience the curriculum differently from 
most white learners even when they attend the same school because classes conducted in 
English would favour white learners whose first language may be English compared to 





                                                 
9 Umalusi is the name given to the former  South African Certification Council (SAFCERT). 
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5.4.6 THE PPN AND THE CURRICULUM NEEDS OF LEARNERS 
Finding: The PPN does not address the curriculum needs of learners at schools. 
The provision of educator posts to schools must be seen within the context of the NPM 
reforms taking place in the public sector in general and in the education sector in 
particular. In order to make the education sector more efficient, the core theme of the 
NPM agenda is that of  ‘getting more for less’ (Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashburner & Fitzgerald 
1996:11) or as Hood (1991:5) puts it, ‘parsimony in resource use’. In terms of educator 
provisioning this has translated into the progressive trimming (downsizing) of the number 
of permanent educator posts created by the MEC for distribution to schools in the 
province. This has had the resultant effect of reducing the number of state funded posts at 
schools. Consequently, the majority of the principals indicated that the PPN does not 
cater for the curriculum needs of their learners. Pollit (1990:139) therefore, incisively 
points out that often drives for ‘efficiency’ and ‘value for money’ translate into input 
pruning (downsizing of the number of educators) rather than output improvement.  
 
From a critical theory perspective, the type of instrumental rationality with the main 
focus on efficiency rather than purpose (to what end) has a negative impact on poorer 
schools. When schools are faced with the situation where the number of state paid 
educators cannot cover the curriculum offered by the school, SMTs and SGBs are left 
with two possible alternatives. The first is for SGBs to appoint SGB paid educators who 
are remunerated from school funds raised largely through school fees. This option is a 
costly one and not all schools have the financial resources to pay for governing body 
appointees. The second alternative is to streamline the curriculum and simultaneously 
compress class units. Many of the disadvantaged institutions which cannot afford 
alternative one, are forced into alternative two. The resultant effect of this alternative is 
large class sizes for the learners at disadvantaged schools and the streamlining of the 
curriculum which results in the narrowing of the career opportunities of these learners 
due to the restricted curriculum that they offer.  Even within their streamlined curriculum 




Further, it is important to note that the PPM is severely constrained by the human 
resources that are available in the province. Whilst in theory it allocates a block of 
educator posts to a school, in practical terms it cannot guarantee the allocation of 
specialist educators. Specialist educators are fast becoming a rare commodity and 
consequently, schools which offer diverse curricula are finding it increasingly difficult to 
secure the services of specialist educators. This has prompted the national minister of 
education, Naledi Pandor (APEK 2004b:1) to declare as a crisis the need for educators in 
several critical areas such as mathematics, science and the technical and creative 
disciplines. 
 
5.4.7 TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PPN 
Finding: The timing of the announcement of the PPN does not lead to effective school 
organisation. 
The timing of the announcement of the PPN is not in keeping with statutory 
requirements. In terms of policy pronouncements, schools are supposed to receive their 
PPN in the month of September of the year preceding implementation. This, however, 
historically has not been the case (see table 5.50, below).  
 
Table 5.50: Annual release dates of the PPN 
YEAR PPN RELEASE DATE 
1999 30 March 1999 
2000 02 August 2000 
2001 10 August 2001 
2002 11 June 2002 
2003 22 November 2002 
2004 24 November 2003 (Provisional) 
11 March 2004 (Final) 
Source: KZN DEC (1999b, 2001b, 2002c, 2002e, 2003a, 2004c) 
 
Schools are often handed their PPNs towards the end of the year preceding 
implementation or whilst the academic year is in progress. These inopportune release 
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times often leads to the breakdown in the organizational culture of schools especially 
when the movement of staff takes place whilst the academic year is in progress. 
 
If principals as managers of their institutions are to maximize the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their schools as organisations as a whole, the timeous release of the PPN is 
an imperative in order to facilitate strategic planning. The late release of the PPN does 
not allow for proper human resource planning and allocative efficiency10. Consequently, 
it may not be possible to deploy educators optimally in a particular school year. This may 
in turn contribute to productive inefficiency11 at schools. 
 
5.4.8 FILLING OF EDUCATOR POSTS 
The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the filling of educator posts are 
presented under the categories; substitute educators and vacant substantive posts. 
 
SUBSTITUTE EDUCATORS  
Finding: Substitute educators are not appointed timeously by the department. 
The delay in the filling of substitute educator posts by the department is largely due to 
two factors. Firstly, the demand for substitute educator posts at schools far exceeds the 
number of substitute educator posts in terms of the budget. Pardesi (2004:2) makes the 
point that there is insufficient allocation for substitute educators in relation to the number 
of educators on leave. From 2002-2004, KZN only budgeted for 320 substitute educator 
posts per annum. At the level of the provincial ELRC, the educator unions have 
consistently pointed out that this figure was unrealistic and national policy would dictate 
that approximately 3 000 substitute educator posts be budget for (KZN ELRC 2003a:4). 
However, given the strong emphasis in the province on tighter control over civil service 
spending and the desire to reduce public expenditure and to make what expenditure 
remains go as far as possible, the province cannot afford the dictates of national policy, 
although the MEC, Ina Cronje agrees that a large number of substitutes are required as a 
                                                 
10 Allocative efficiency refers to the allocation of resources to their best and highest uses. 
 
11 Productive inefficiency occurs when more inputs (labour, material resources, energy) are used than 
necessary. 
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result of illness and absenteeism of educators related to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (APEK 
2004a:1). The MEC has intimated that for the 2006 school year she plans to increase the 
number of substitute educators in the system by some 1 167 educators (The Mercury 
2005b:9). Whilst this may translate to a dramatic increase in the number of substitute 
educators, this number pales into insignificance when compared to an HIV/AIDS 
infection rate of 19% among educators in KZN (The Mercury 2005a:3). 
 
Secondly, if a school does qualify for a state paid substitute, the procedure to be followed 
in the filling of the post is a highly bureaucratic one. It is often a time consuming process 
and results in delays in the filling of the post because the department does not have a pool 
of substitute educators which affected schools can draw from. Consequently, schools 
have to advertise the post, shortlist candidates, interview candidates and make 
recommendations to the department for the appointment of the preferred candidate. 
 
From an NPM perspective, if power has been devolved to the level of the school, why 
should schools have to follow this highly bureaucratic time-consuming process. SGBs 
should be granted the power to appoint a substitute educator and the department could 
retrospectively approve the appointment. This will ensure that a learner’s constitutional 
right to an uninterrupted education is not compromised. 
 
Finding: The qualification period imposed by the department for the appointment of state 
paid substitute educators often disadvantages poorer schools in that they may have to 
resort to educationally unsound measures and  leave classes unattended. 
As part of the public service’s cost cutting exercise, the imposition of the ‘30 day policy’ 
for the qualification of a state paid substitute educator runs counter to the MEC’s 
pronouncement that no class should be without an educator. Schools which do not have 
funds to make short-term SGB appointments to cover for educators who absent 
themselves for less than a thirty day period, which is largely the schools in the 
disadvantaged cohort, are caught in a fix. They are forced into situations where sound 
educational principles and values are compromised. They simply leave classes 
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unattended or they have to resort to what Murphy (1996:24) calls volunteerism12 where 
parents have to take care of classes. Critical theorists view this as exploitation of parents 
as a replacement for waged substitute educators. Such practices run counter to the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 which guarantees learners 
an uninterrupted access to education. Thus, the thirty day policy for the qualification of a 
state paid substitute educator does not serve the interests of the disadvantaged schools 
who have to resort to educationally unsound practices and violate constitutional 
provisions. 
 
VACANT SUBSTANTIVE POSTS 
Finding: Vacant substantive posts are not filled timeously by the department. 
The filling of vacant posts by the department is often characterized by lengthy delays in 
the advertising and filling of posts in a permanent capacity. These delays in the filling of 
posts in a permanent capacity results in large numbers of temporary educators in the 
system who are employed on a contract basis. Pardesi (2004:2) asserts that this practice 
coincides with global trends in the public sector to casualise labour. This is in keeping 
with the NPM philosophy of downsizing the number of educators employed permanently 
and increasing the number of temporary educators in the system which is a less costly 
option. Whilst this practice may serve the interests of the state, it in no way furthers the 
interests of schools because temporary educators are employed on a three month contract 
basis and the uncertainty of having their contracts renewed impacts on the quality of 
service they render at school.  
 
Finding: The filling of vacant substantive posts by way of CTTs13 often results in sound 
educational principles being compromised. 
When posts are filled by the department through CTTs not much thought and effort goes 
into the matching of the requirements for a post to the personnel that are available. It 
seems as though that the department’s main priority in the filling of posts through CTTs 
                                                 
12 Volunteerism is where individuals are recruited to work for government institutions without 
remuneration and is viewed as a move towards privatization. 
13 Compulsory Temporary Transfer (CTT) refers to the movement by the education department of a 
educator who is surplus at one school to another school where there is a vacancy as a result of the declared 
PPN for that particular year, 
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is that of meeting its operational requirements rather than meeting the human resource 
needs of schools. This mismatch between the requirements of the vacant post and the 
qualifications of the transferred incumbent has a negative impact on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the school as an institution. This compromising of the qualitative inputs in 
the teaching and learning situation is, therefore, bound to impact on learner outcomes and 
achievement. 
 
5.4.9 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PPN 
The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the implementation of the PPN is 
presented under the categories; directives on implementation, documents on 
implementation, capacitating staff on the process of implementation and support for the 
implementation process. 
 
DIRECTIVES ON IMPLEMENTATION 
Finding: There is a lack of clear directives from the department of education as to how 
the PPN is to be implemented at school level. 
The dissemination of clear directives from those in authority is a core ingredient for 
success in policy implementation. The department of education has, however, failed in 
this regard. There has been constant reversal of policy decisions, tardiness on the part of 
the department to stick to its management plan on implementation and gross incapacity 
on the part of officials in giving firm directives to principals on implementation. This, 
consequently, has impacted negatively on the smooth running of schools. In the absence 
of clear directives from the department on PPN implementation, a level of uncertainty 
prevails amongst principals with regard to their staffing establishments. This in turn has 
impacted on a principal’s ‘freedom to manage’ his institution. 
 
DOCUMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION  
Finding: Documents on PPN implementation are often unclear and lends themselves to 
multiple interpretations. 
It is important to note that just as policies are not made in a vacuum, so to they are not 
implemented in a vacuum. Implementers and recipients will always put their own 
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interpretations and meanings to intended policies. Bowe, Ball and Gold (1996:286) make 
the point that in the arena of practice, policy is simply not received and implemented 
rather it is subject to interpretation and then recreated. Given the ambiguity prevalent in 
the procedure manual on implementation, the department of education is an in fact 
encouraging alternate interpretation. Incoherence or vagueness can perplex implementers 
and provide openings for those policy recipients bent on obstruction (Hill 1984:131). 
Consequently, at the level of the school, the different interpretations of the documents on 
implementation of the PPN become a matter of struggle. Different interpretations are 
contested as they relate to the interests of individuals or groups.  
 
CAPACITATING STAFF ON THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Finding: A substantial number of principals are unclear of their role in the process of 
PPN implementation and are therefore not fulfilling their roles as dictated by policy. 
The procedure manual on PPN implementation explicitly states that it is the task of the 
principal as the implementer of policy at school level, to point out to educators as the 
policy recipients, the objectives and the processes involved in the implementation of the 
PPN. Given the fact that the PPN may necessitate changes in the staff establishment, 
communicating the objectives and processes involved in implementing the PPN is vitally 
important. Tylczak (1991:26) makes the point that in managing change, it is incumbent 
on the manager to be open and continuously tell people what has happened, what is 
happening and what is going to happen. He adds that managers should at all times give 
employees all available information. However, it is abundantly clear that many principals 
are not informing staff members of the objectives and the processes of PPN 
implementation.  
 
SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS  
Finding: Members of staff do not support the process of implementation and only 
participate in the process when the declared PPN is above that of the current staff 
establishment and consequently there are vacancies to be declared. 
Policy on educator provisioning is in fact an unpopular policy among educators because 
educators view this policy as having undesirable consequences for them. For those 
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directly affected by the downsizing (by being identified surplus or additional to a schools 
needs) it means a period of uncertainty – the possibility of being transferred from one 
school to another. For those indirectly affected by the downsizing (the educators that fall 
within the PPN) it means increased workloads without additional compensation. With 
such policy consequences there is bound to be resistance from educators. Therefore, the 
majority do not support this policy. However, when there are vacancies to be declared 
educators view the policy pay-offs to be to their benefit because it will lead to a decrease 
in their workloads. Consequently, they support the policy and participate in the process. 
  
Finding: At schools were the members of staff are highly unionized, site stewards are not 
co-operative in the implementation process and oppose the process.  
Key to the implementation of NPM reforms is that of rejecting union demands because 
public sector unions in promoting the interests of its members often campaign for better 
conditions of service for their members which invariably translate to increased public 
sector budgets. Unions at the level of the ELRC often seek to increase the number of 
educator posts in the province. This has often brought the state officials and unions in 
conflict with each other and has often resulted in countrywide protest action by unions 
when the number of educator posts created in the province threatens the job security of its 
members. Given that the implementation of the PPN may result in the downsizing of the 
number of educator posts at school sites and, consequently, may mean an intensification 
of the workloads for those educators who fall within the PPN, site stewards side with 
their rank and file membership and do not participate in the process of PPN 
implementation and may in some instances overtly resist policy implementation. 
Notwithstanding the lack of support for the implementation process, principals are 
expected to implement the PPN sometimes in a climate where there is conflict, resistance 
and opposition to its implementation.  
 
Finding: SEMs do not provide adequate support to principals in the implementation 
process. 
The SEMs are considered an important link in the implementation chain. In terms of 
implementation of the PPN, the SEMs as ward managers are supposed to monitor the 
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process of PPN implementation by principals in their wards and provide support to 
principals when they are faced with unanticipated problems and resistance from 
educators and site stewards when implementing the PPN. However, this is not the case. 
The SEMs are providing very little support to principals when it comes to PPN 
implementation. 
 
5.4.10 MULTI-TERM PPN 
Finding: Principals support the introduction of a multi-term PPN agreement. 
The budgetary reform process adopted by the state, namely, the MTEF lends itself to the 
introduction of a multi-term PPN agreement. Since expenditure in the province in general 
and in education in particular is known for the forthcoming three years, engaging in a 
three year PPN agreement makes sound planning sense. The president of APEK, Brian 
Manuel (2004c:3) concurs with principals that a three year PPN agreement would 
increase stability in schools. He advances that if the formula is constant for a three year 
period it would then free finances for other resources. Moreover, it would remove the 
negativity, hype and time-consuming debates and negotiations associated with the year-
on-year PPN. 
 
From a managerialist perspective, knowing that your staff establishment is going to be 
more or less fixed for a three year period enhances strategic planning initiatives. In self-
managing schools there is a flat management structure where the majority of educators 
are assigned some management responsibilities and knowing that that these educators 
will be part of the staff establishment for the period of the multi-term agreement, makes it 
possible for principals to assign management responsibilities in terms of school 
development planning initiatives which may run over a two to three year period. Further, 
it will grant principals the latitude to use their human resources in innovative ways so as 






5.5 EMERGING TRENDS AND PATTERNS FROM THE DOCUMENT STUDY 
The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the document study which was 
integrated into the literature study are presented. 
 
 5.5.1 DECENTRALISATION IN EDUCATOR PROVISIONING 
Finding: The responsibility for the provisioning of educator posts has been devolved to 
the provinces. 
In terms of legislation, namely, the Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998, the 
responsibility for the creation and distribution of educator posts which was originally the 
function of the DNE was passed on to the provinces. This passing on of the 
administrative functions with regard to educator post provisioning to the provinces was 
intended as a move to make the education sector more efficient. This trend is in keeping 
with NPM reforms where there is a tendency to shift administrative functions to lower 
levels or sub-national units. Whilst provinces may have some autonomy in terms of the 
creation of posts, the DNE plays a monitoring role through the PPM by making it 
compulsory for all provinces to use the model in the distribution of educator posts. 
 
5.5.2 TRIMMING OF EDUCATION BUDGETS 
Finding: There has been a consistent decline in education expenditure in the provinces. 
The average expenditure for the country as a whole shows a similar trend. 
The decline in both the provincial as well as the national average expenditure on 
education must been seen in the light of the states neoliberal, macroeconomic framework 
called GEAR. Based on assumptions that the public sector was ‘wasteful’ and excessive, 
and state expenditure was an impediment to economic growth because it tended to 
‘crowd out’ private investment (Terreblanche 2002:116), the state has chosen to cut 
public sector budgets.  
 
5.5.3 DOWNSIZING OF EDUCATOR POSTS  
Finding: There has been a progressive downsizing in the number of state-paid permanent 
educator posts and a corresponding increase in the number of state-paid temporary 
educator posts. 
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The trimming of the education budget together with MTEF policy priorities to increase 
non-personnel expenditure has meant that the provincial budget on personnel expenditure 
has had to be cut progressively over the years. This has translated into an NPM trend of 
downsizing the number of permanently employed educators in order to keep within the 
budget for personnel expenditure. The table below reflects the progressive decline in the 
number of educators employed permanently in the public school sector in KZN. 
 
Table 5.51: State paid educators employed in public schools in KZN 
YEAR 2001 2002 2003 2004 
State-Paid Permanent Posts 73 360 65 640 67 614 65 518 
State-Paid Temporary Posts n/a 3 816 5 908 8 904 
Source: EMIS KZN (2004b), SADTU KZN (2004f) 
Congruent to the downsizing of the number of permanently appointed educators in the 
system is the trend of increasing the number of temporary educators in the system. This 
casualisation of labour, in keeping with the neoliberal NPM reforms is seen as a cost 
saving measure by the department. 
 
5.5.4 PRIVATELY PAID EDUCATORS 
Finding: The number of privately paid educators at public schools is on the increase. 
In keeping with neoliberal trends of cost recovery (through the levying of school fees) 
and NPM reforms in school governance, SGBs have been thrust into the role of 
employers in order to augment the states resourcing of schools. This has consequently, 
translated into creating a situation where SGBs have become the employers of privately 
paid educators. The table below indicates that this sector of privately paid teachers is on 
the increase in the public schooling sector. 
 
Table 5.52: State and SGB paid educators employed in public schools in KZN 
YEAR 1998 2000 2002 2004 
State-Paid Posts 76 193 (98%) 70 578 (94%) 69 456 (94%) 74 422 (93%) 
SGB Paid Posts 1 639 (2%) 4 768   (6%) 4 312 (6%) 5 498   (7%) 
Source: EMIS KZN (2004b), SADTU KZN (2004f) 
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5.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the data obtained from the questionnaires was presented. This was then 
followed by the presentation of the data obtained from the interviews with principals and 
union officials. The emerging trends and patterns from the data and the document study 
were executed using the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, namely, policy analysis, 
critical theory, neoliberalism, NPM and RAMs.  
 
In the next chapter the main conclusions of this study are presented and certain pertinent 




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the main conclusions and recommendations are presented. After careful 
consideration of the literature study and the data that emerged from the questionnaires, 
the semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews certain clear conclusions 
emerge about educator post provisioning in the public school sector in terms of the 
critical questions generated in chapter one. On the basis of the findings and conclusions 




In South Africa, the change in political power in 1994 was seen as the panacea by the 
majority of its citizens to the rampant inequity that prevailed in the country. There was 
widespread optimism that the new democratic government would transform all 
components of society including the education system. In the education arena, there was 
growing confidence that a fair and just education system, underpinned by the values of 
equity and redress, would be the order of the day. However, over the past decade hard 
lessons were learned that changes in government do not necessarily mean radical changes 
in the provision of public goods and services such as education.  
 
All governments hold certain beliefs and espouse particular values as to the fundamental 
principles on which the social, political and economic order of society is based. With 
regard to this study, it has become abundantly clear that ideology has played a significant 
role in shaping policy discourses on the thorny question of educator distribution in the 
country in general and in KZN province in particular. Neoliberalism as state ideology, as 
expressed through the macroeconomic GEAR framework, has informed and underpinned 
policy on educator provisioning. One of GEAR’s many neoliberal pronouncements of 
trimming government consumption expenditure has meant a progressive decline, in real 
terms, of state allocations to education. Owing to provincial education budgets becoming 
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smaller, the amount available to be disbursed in terms of personnel costs has 
consequently declined. This in turn has had a ‘domino effect’ in terms of what the 
provinces could afford in terms of educator personnel. In KZN this has translated into the 
number of permanently employed state paid educators progressively declining over the 
years.  
 
In keeping with the neoliberal dogma of displacing costs from the state to private 
individuals and the advocacy of cost recovery, public schools are levying school fees in 
order to supplement the baseline resourcing of the state. In terms of educator 
provisioning, schools that service wealthier communities charge higher school fees and, 
consequently, have the financial resources to hire a larger numbers of SGB paid 
educators. Trends in educator employment show that the proportion of privately paid 
educators in the education system is increasing whilst the proportion of state paid 
educators is decreasing.  
 
The changes educator provisioning has undergone over the years is consistent with the 
neoliberal ‘managerialist’ trends termed NPM which is responsible for public sector 
reform in the UK, Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. Informed by the doctrines of 
NPM, the responsibility for educator provisioning has moved from central control (i.e. 
the DNE) to the provinces. In keeping with the NPM agenda, this decentralization in 
educator provisioning has translated into giving the respective provinces greater powers 
in determining their educator pools. However, in the determination of the educator pool 
the principal driving factor is fiscal austerity. The central government, through the DNE, 
merely plays the role of facilitator rather than a controller and employer. As a facilitator, 
the DNE oversees the process of educator distribution through the introduction of a RAM 
known as the PPM. All provinces in terms of legislation have to use the PPM to distribute 
educator posts in order to bring about a transparent, fair and rational basis to the 
allocation of state paid educators to public schools.  
 
From a social justice perspective, policy on educator provisioning raises some serious 
questions. With regard to equity in educator distribution, the PPM does not ensure 
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distributional equity with regard to qualitative factors such as teacher qualifications. 
Given the historical qualitative maldistribution of educators in terms of qualifications 
with schools in the poorer deciles (disadvantaged schools) having less highly qualified 
educators, whilst schools in the upper deciles (advantaged schools) having educators who 
are highly qualified, the output which educators as a resource is able to contribute may 
result in unequal outputs between advantaged and disadvantage schools. 
 
The linking of curriculum offerings to the number of educator posts serves the interests of 
schools in the advantaged cohort. They have the resources to broaden their curriculum 
choices and hence, will qualify for more educators in terms of the PPM. This clearly 
works to the detriment of schools in the disadvantaged cohort because of their limited 
curriculum offerings and consequently, a smaller educator entitlement in terms of the 
PPM. 
 
Policy has also contributed to a numerical maldistribution in educators. The state’s 
preoccupation with economic efficiency has resulted in exacerbating inequity in educator 
distribution. The employment of SGB paid educators favours the advantaged schools. 
Given their financial resources (through school fees), they are able to employ a 
substantial number of privately paid educators which results in schools in the advantaged 
cohort having far lower learner-educator ratios than schools in the disadvantaged cohort, 
who simply cannot afford hiring SGB paid educators. Whilst this trend may serve the 
interests of the neoliberals in government, the impact it has on the delivery of quality 
education is bound to widen the gap in output between advantaged and disadvantaged 
schools. 
 
Attempts at redress by the state with regard to educator provisioning is, in fact, farcical. 
The additional educator/s gained often does not benefit the learners because most schools 
that qualify for the redress posts do not have the physical infrastructure in terms of 
classrooms to accommodate the additional educators. Consequently, class sizes remain 
high. Further, the criteria used to distribute redress posts have not taken into account 
changes in learner demography. Schools no longer admit learners from the immediate 
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feeder areas. With admissions policies being more relaxed, schools in the advantaged 
cohort are increasingly admitting learners from disadvantaged communities. However, 
these learners receive no benefit with regard to redress because of the criteria used in 
allocating redress posts. 
 
The use of the PPM as a resource allocation tool is met with much negativity from 
principals. The fact that they had no hand in the design of the model; calls into question 
who’s views were validated in the design of the PPM. Given the fact that the PPM has 
resulted in a radical redistribution in human resources, consultation of all stakeholders 
with regard to factors that should be considered in determining a school’s PPN, should 
have been an imperative. In noting that perfection in any resource distribution model is 
highly unlikely, regular reviewing is important. The factors currently used in determining 
the PPN do not lead to the promotion of curriculum diversity as well as curriculum 
redress at disadvantaged schools. Consequently, there is the belief that the PPM is biased 
towards schools in the advantaged cohort. Principals believed that the PPM does not 
promote the introduction of more than one LOLT because the additional educator/s 
gained, if the school offers more than one LOLT, is insufficient to cater for the needs of 
learners. The PPM also discriminates against mainstream schools by not taking into 
account the learners admitted who have special educational needs. Given moves in South 
African education towards inclusivity, this is indeed a retrogressive step. With a view to 
improving the model, so that the model remains relevant to the needs of the schools, there 
are calls for the model to take into account the qualitative maldistribution that exists with 
regard to educator qualifications. In addition, there are also calls for the learner poverty 
index to be used as a basis for distributing redress posts. A strong case was also made out 
for language as a barrier to learning to be factored into the model. 
 
There has also been a lack of use of capacity tools in order to ensure that principals are au 
fait with policy on educator provisioning. Principals were not capacitated on the 
workings of the post provisioning formula and even important statistics that were 
factored into the model were not made transparent to principals. The secrecy surrounding 
the entire process of educator provisioning has contributed to principals viewing the 
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entire process with suspicion and believing that department officials were manipulating 
the entire process. 
 
The downsizing of educator posts at schools has resulted in principals experiencing grave 
difficulty in satisfying the curriculum needs of learners. Whilst the downsizing of 
educator posts contributes to economic efficiency and thereby serving the interests of the 
state, it in no way benefits the learners. The wealthier schools may get away by hiring 
SGB paid educators to satisfy the curriculum needs of its learners but schools serving 
poorer communities are caught in a fix. They cannot afford SGB paid educators and 
therefore, resort to streamlining their curriculum. 
 
From an organizational point of view, the timeous release of the PPN is important for 
human resource planning. However, PPNs are communicated to schools very late in the 
year preceding implementation or in the year of implementation. This late release of the 
PPNs has contributed to a breakdown in the organizational culture of many schools. 
Further, the year on year PPN has contributed to staff instability at their schools and 
hampers planning.  
 
Policy on the filling of educator posts has contributed to sound education principles being 
compromised because of drives for economic efficiency. The cost saving measure of 
appointing state paid substitute educators only when an educator is going to be away for 
thirty consecutive schooldays works against disadvantaged schools. They cannot afford 
SGB paid substitute educators and often have to resort to leaving classes unattended or 
use parents to ‘baby sit’ the classes. Further, the number of substitute educators budgeted 
for by the department is totally inadequate to meet the demand for substitute educators. 
The delays in the filling of educator posts on a permanent basis have resulted in large 
numbers of temporary educators in the system. Whilst this is a cost saving measure from 
the department’s perspective it does not serve the interests of the schools. Having 
temporary educators, employed on a term by term contract basis adds to staffing 
instability at schools. 
 236
The implementation of policy on educator provisioning at school sites is fraught with 
problems. This is largely as the result of policy formulation being separated from policy 
implementation. At the formulation stage very little attention was paid to implementation 
issues. Implementation was left to the provinces. In KZN very little attention has been 
paid to implementation issues. Principals as implementers of the PPN at school sites were 
not consulted on implementation issues. Consequently, department officials are unaware 
of implementation problems at the school sites. Moreover, directives on implementation 
are vague and documents on implementation are ambiguous. Staff members are generally 
hostile to implementation especially when posts are to be downsized. Site stewards also 
tend not to support the process of implementation. Even the SEM’s who are supposed to 
be the custodians of department policy cannot support principals in the implementation 




The following recommendations have implications for: 
• The Department of National Education 
• The Provincial Education Departments 
• SGBs 
• Unions 
• Departmental Officials 
• The ELRC and its provincial chambers 
 
RECOMMENDATION ONE 
Given the neoliberal reforms in educator provisioning, mechanisms need to be put in 
place to protect the learners of disadvantaged communities from policies that may 
exacerbate inequity. The fact that the advantaged schools levy higher school fees, employ 
a large number of SGB paid educators and offer a wide range of curriculum choices to its 
learners, the quality of education offered by these schools tends to be of a higher 
standard. Therefore, wealthier parents will be able to exercise choice and purchase 
education of a better quality for their children by sending them to schools in the 
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advantaged cohort. In contrast, poor parents who lack the financial resources to 
participate meaningfully in the ‘education marketplace’ are restricted for choice. Their 
children are, therefore, forced to attend schools in the disadvantaged cohort where school 
fees are low and who consequently have to rely solely on the baseline resourcing of the 
state. To protect the children of the poor from such inequity, the state needs to intervene 
in order to protect the interests of the poor for whom de facto choice is non existent 
because they do not have money. The state, therefore, needs to provide a funding safety 
net for children from disadvantaged communities. A mechanism needs to be put in place 
where, based on a particular income threshold, the state funds learners whose family 
income is below the stipulated threshold. The parents of these learners by virtue of 
funding by the state (through bursaries or vouchers), will consequently be able to exercise 
choice as to the schools they want their children to attend. 
 
RECOMMENDATION TWO 
Though the PPM has been revised in 2002, it does not distribute educators equitably in 
terms of qualifications. In other words, it is a tool for the quantitative distribution of 
educators. Therefore, any human resource distribution to schools should be preceded by a 
full audit of the existing educator resource position of schools, more especially that of 
educator qualifications, so as not to exacerbate inequity. Where schools lack a reasonable 
number of qualified educators, sufficient incentives need to be provided by the state to 
attract educators with qualifications over and above the minimum REQV 13 qualification 
required by SACE to teach at South African public schools. When a school’s declared 
PPN is above its staff establishment, state intervention in providing the incentive will 




In noting that the assumptions on which RAMS are based are not static and constant 
entities, the drivers (factors) of the PPM may, therefore, need to be reviewed in order to 
be relevant to changing needs of public schools. However, in reviewing the PPM, this 
must be a participative, all inclusive and democratic process. Consultation with principals 
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should be a definite requirement because they are at the cutting edge of PPN 
implementation. 
 
The following factors need to be reviewed: 
• The criteria used in determining the qualification for poverty redress posts needs 
to take into account the changes in learner demography. Consequently, using the 
learner poverty index of a school rather than the equally weighted factors of the 
condition of the physical infrastructure of the school and location of the school 
will be a more relevant criterion. Further, if SGBs are aware that they will be 
compensated by way of being granted additional educator posts for admitting 
learners who hail from disadvantaged backgrounds; this may serve as an 
incentive to advantaged schools to admit more learners from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. 
 
• The PPM also needs to be reviewed in the light of the number of learners at 
schools who are second language speakers of English. Given the fact that the 
PPM offers very little incentives to schools to offer more than one LOLT, this 
invariably results in schools adopting English as the LOLT. This, results in 
learners who are second language speakers being at a distinct disadvantage 
compared to learners whose home language is English. Consequently, this may 
lead to differences in the way the curriculum is experienced by first language 
speakers of English and second language speakers of English. The PPM, 
therefore, needs to compensate schools that have large numbers of learners who 
are second language speakers of English by granting these schools an additional 
educator or two to deal with this barrier to learning. 
 
• The PPM needs to pay sufficient attention to curriculum redress at disadvantaged 
schools. The disadvantaged schools offer a restricted curriculum and from a 
social justice point of view, is source of inequity when compared to the schools 
in the advantaged cohort. Whilst the PPM is geared towards curriculum redress, 
the province has not made use of this facility in effecting redress. The provincial 
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education department in its MTEF planning needs to build curriculum redress 
into its list of priorities. The province’s strategic plans should reflect this. 
Further, by ensuring redress and equity in curriculum offerings between 
advantaged and disadvantaged schools, this will ensure that schools will compete 
on an equal footing for educator posts owing to the fact that the number of 
educator posts granted to a particular school is partly linked to the curriculum 
offerings of the school. 
 
• The mainstreaming of learners with special educational needs is truly an 
emancipatory move.  However, in order to ensure that ordinary public schools are 
not discriminated against in terms of admitting learners with special educational 
needs, the PPM must take this factor into account. 
 
RECOMMENDATION FOUR 
For the allocation of redress posts to have any meaningful pedagogical impact on learners 
by way of creating smaller class sizes at disadvantaged schools, an audit must be done of 
the school’s physical infrastructure capacity to create these smaller class sizes. If schools 
do not have the classrooms to accommodate the additional educators granted to them 
because of poverty redress, it is pointless granting these schools the additional posts. The 
allocation of poverty redress posts must, therefore, be done in tandem with classroom 
availability. If classrooms are not available, it is incumbent on the provincial education 
department, in terms of its capital costs planning, to build the additional classrooms. 
 
RECOMMENDATION FIVE 
Given the highly technical nature of the process involved in determining the PPN of 
schools, the DNE, the provincial education departments as well as educator unions should 
as a matter of priority engage in a massive campaign to capacitate principals on the 
application of the PPM and its related formula. It is abundantly clear that most principals 
are not aware of the processes and procedures involved in determining the PPN of a 
school. Workshops to capacitate principals on the PPN and related issues will ensure that 
a fair measure of transparency exists in the distribution of educator posts. 
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RECOMMENDATION SIX 
The annual PPN consultative process in the province has in the past been bathed in 
controversy. There is too much hype around the process. Criticisms have often been 
levelled at both the employer and employee parties with regard to bad faith negotiations. 
Given the fact that historically, agreement between both the employer and employee 
parties on the creation and distribution of educator posts in the province has often not 
occurred, this has consequently, resulted in the delay in the release of PPNs to schools, 
which in turn has impacted negatively on school organisation and administration. If the 
department is serious about organizational and allocative efficiency practices at schools, 
the timeous release of the PPNs is imperative. The consultative process needs to take 
place much earlier. Further, in the true spirit of transparency and inclusivity, the 
employee parties should be part of the budgetary process where real decisions are made 
as to what is affordable with regard to educator costs. By involving unions at the level 
where budgets are determined is actually negotiating in good faith and may result in the 
entire process of educator provisioning proceeding much more smoothly. The 
consultative process must be over by July and schools must be handed their PPNs by 
September for implementation in January the following year.  
 
RECOMMENDATION SEVEN 
Linked to recommendation six, a much more progressive step would be for employee 
parties to enter into a multi-term PPN agreement with the provincial education 
department rather than the declaration of a year-on-year PPN. The MTEF is ideally suited 
to a multi-term agreement. Owing to the fact that expenditure in the province for the 
forthcoming three years is already known, engaging in a three year PPN agreement 
makes sound planning sense in that it will lead to staffing stability at schools and it could 
be used as a strategic planning tool in progressively lowering the overall learner-educator 







Whilst being a cost-saving measure to the department, the inadequate allocation for 
substitute educators together with policy stipulations that an educator needs to be away 
from school for thirty consecutive schooldays in order for the school to qualify for a state 
paid substitute educator, results in schools having to resort to educationally unsound 
practices. In order to ensure that service delivery at schools is not compromised when 
educators are away from school, the department needs to increase the pool of substitute 
educators in the province. This pool of educators needs to be distributed on a pro rata 
basis (based on learner enrolment) to the circuit offices throughout the province. The 
circuit offices need to compile a database of available substitute educators. If it is known 
that an educator is going to be away for any length of time, schools must be able to 
access a substitute educator from the circuit office with minimal loss of instruction time 
to the learner. 
 
RECOMMENDATION NINE 
The policy where schools have to wait several months or sometimes in excess of a year to 
fill a vacant substantive post permanently, creates staffing instability at schools. Whilst 
having a large number of temporary educators in the system serves the department’s 
interests in that it is a cost saving measure, it in no way benefits the schools. The schools 
as self-managing professional organizations should be granted the authority to fill a 
vacant substantive post when it arises. The SGBs should be allowed to advertise and fill 
the post without having to wait for the highly bureaucratic and time-consuming process 
followed by the department to fill the post. Once the SGBs have advertised, shortlisted 
and interviewed candidates for the post, the SGBs should be empowered to make the 




Success in policy implementation is partially dependent on strong leadership and the 
selection of an appropriate implementation strategy. Therefore, if the implementation of 
the PPN at schools is to meet with success, principals as implementers of policy must be 
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consulted on issues having a bearing on implementation. They will be able to inform 
policy with regard to possible obstacles to implementation which can then inform a 
suitable implementation strategy. Departmental officials need to provide strong 
leadership throughout the implementation process. The SEMs must intervene timeously 
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